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21 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilmore v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023First, Torres noted the 1944 adoption of federal Rule 35, which codified existing common law regarding a district court’s authority to set aside or alter its final judgment. 2012-NMCA- 026, ¶ 18 (citing Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 1957); Gilmore v. United States, 131 F.2d 873, 874 (8th Cir. 1942)). 2023First, Torres noted the 1944 adoption of federal Rule 35, which codified 9 1 existing common law regarding a district court’s authority to set aside or alter its 2 final judgment. 2012-NMCA-026, ¶ 18 (citing Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 3 479, 483 (6th Cir. 1957); Gilmore v. United States, 131 F.2d 873, 874 (8th Cir. 4 1942)). | 2 | 2 |
Feese v. U.S. West Service Link, Inc.green2 sentences2013Link, Inc., 113 N.M. 92, 94 , 823 P.2d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 1991), and citing Aranda v. Mississippi Chem. 2013Link, Inc., 113 N.M. 92, 94 , 823 P.2d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 1991), and citing Aranda v. Mississippi Chem. | 2 | 2 |
Jeffrey v. Hays Plumbing & Heatinggreen2 sentences2013The reason we are having to create new rules to substitute for the statutory text has its origins in Jeffrey v. Hays Plumbing & Heating, 118 N.M. 60, 64 , 878 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Ct. App. 1994), which disregarded the plain language of Section 52-1-26(D) and instead applied the historical principle that “[i]n New Mexico, disability benefits are denied if a claimant, through voluntary conduct unconnected with his injury, takes himself out of the labor market.’” (quoting Feese v. U.S. West Serv. 2013The reason we are having to create new rules to substitute for the statutory text has its origins in Jeffrey v. Hays Plumbing & Heating, 118 N.M. 60, 64 , 878 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Ct. App. 1994), which disregarded the plain language of Section 52-1-26(D) and instead applied the historical principle that “[i]n New Mexico, disability benefits are denied if a claimant, through voluntary conduct unconnected with his injury, takes himself out of the labor market.’” (quoting Feese v. U.S. West Serv. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Huitron-Guizargreen1 sentence2025See United States v. Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713 , 717 (5th Cir. 2025) (assuming 6 “arguendo that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers [the defendant and 7 the defendant’s] conduct” in order to “turn our attention to the historical analysis”); 8 United States v. Gore, 118 F.4th 808, 812 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Whether or not the 9 Second Amendment’s plain text covers stolen firearms, § 922(j)’s prohibition is 10 constitutional because it is consistent with our nation’s regulatory traditions.”); see 11 also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting 12 that an “a | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jaylan Miles Ra Shawn Goregreen1 sentence2025See United States v. Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713 , 717 (5th Cir. 2025) (assuming 6 “arguendo that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers [the defendant and 7 the defendant’s] conduct” in order to “turn our attention to the historical analysis”); 8 United States v. Gore, 118 F.4th 808, 812 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Whether or not the 9 Second Amendment’s plain text covers stolen firearms, § 922(j)’s prohibition is 10 constitutional because it is consistent with our nation’s regulatory traditions.”); see 11 also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting 12 that an “a | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Quirozgreen1 sentence2025See United States v. Quiroz, 125 F.4th 713 , 717 (5th Cir. 2025) (assuming 6 “arguendo that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers [the defendant and 7 the defendant’s] conduct” in order to “turn our attention to the historical analysis”); 8 United States v. Gore, 118 F.4th 808, 812 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Whether or not the 9 Second Amendment’s plain text covers stolen firearms, § 922(j)’s prohibition is 10 constitutional because it is consistent with our nation’s regulatory traditions.”); see 11 also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting 12 that an “a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Torresgreen1 sentence2023First, Torres noted the 1944 adoption of federal Rule 35, which codified 9 1 existing common law regarding a district court’s authority to set aside or alter its 2 final judgment. 2012-NMCA-026, ¶ 18 (citing Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 3 479, 483 (6th Cir. 1957); Gilmore v. United States, 131 F.2d 873, 874 (8th Cir. 4 1942)). | 1 | 1 |
George Edward Duggins v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023First, Torres noted the 1944 adoption of federal Rule 35, which codified existing common law regarding a district court’s authority to set aside or alter its final judgment. 2012-NMCA- 026, ¶ 18 (citing Duggins v. United States, 240 F.2d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 1957); Gilmore v. United States, 131 F.2d 873, 874 (8th Cir. 1942)). | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. City of Chicagogreen1 sentence2021Justice Scalia, no novice when it came to the intricacies of textualist theory, readily acknowledged that “[h]istorical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving threshold questions, and making nuanced judgments about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 803-04 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Jeffrey Lovitky v. Donald Trumpgreen1 sentence2021Instead, we assume without endorsing the propriety of the dissent’s exclusive reliance on a historical analysis of the kind which forms the focus of the analytical framework used to approach Second Amendment jurisprudence, rather than an ends-means analysis of the kind generally associated with First Amendment jurisprudence. act,” see Lovitky v. Trump, 949 F.3d 753, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we discern no sound reason to countenance such a departure unsolicited and without input from Petitioners in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Lasley v. Bacagreen2 sentences2017See Lasley v. Baca, 1981-NMSC-041 , ¶ 1, 95 N.M. 791 , 626 P.2d 1288 9 (recognizing that the appellate courts will accept, as undisputed, the statement of the 10 applicable facts “fully and clearly set forth in appellant’s brief in chief and not 11 objected to in [the] appellee’s answer brief”). 12 {25} With this understanding and summarization of the historic development of the 13 USPHS and its vital role in the country’s military defense system, I turn to the critical 14 issue in this case, whether the Legislature intended to exclude some military branches 15 of the armed forces that an acti 2017See Lasley v. Baca, 1981-NMSC-041 , ¶ 1, 95 N.M. 791 , 626 P.2d 1288 9 (recognizing that the appellate courts will accept, as undisputed, the statement of the 10 applicable facts “fully and clearly set forth in appellant’s brief in chief and not 11 objected to in [the] appellee’s answer brief”). 12 {25} With this understanding and summarization of the historic development of the 13 USPHS and its vital role in the country’s military defense system, I turn to the critical 14 issue in this case, whether the Legislature intended to exclude some military branches 15 of the armed forces that an acti | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. Texasgreen1 sentence2015Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 577-78 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. RUDY B.green2 sentences2010See Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 23 , 147 N.M. 45 , 216 P.3d 810 . 2010See Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 23 , 147 N.M. 45 , 216 P.3d 810 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Costalesgreen2 sentences2006What is not clear, and is left to be decided in a more appropriate ease, is whether a defendant may nonetheless make a showing of prejudice when the judge’s ex parte communication with a juror is a “housekeeping matter.” See Costales, 37 N.M. at 121 , 19 P.2d at 192 (suggesting, in a case arguably involving a “housekeeping matter,” that reversible error may be found where it affirmatively appears that the defendant was prejudiced). {7} When Rule 5-610(D) was promulgated, it incorporated these principles from our case law. 2006What is not clear, and is left to be decided in a more appropriate ease, is whether a defendant may nonetheless make a showing of prejudice when the judge’s ex parte communication with a juror is a “housekeeping matter.” See Costales, 37 N.M. at 121 , 19 P.2d at 192 (suggesting, in a case arguably involving a “housekeeping matter,” that reversible error may be found where it affirmatively appears that the defendant was prejudiced). {7} When Rule 5-610(D) was promulgated, it incorporated these principles from our case law. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegasgreen1 sentence2004Martinez, 118 N.M. at 265, 880 P.2d at 876 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), which would undoubtedly lead to another dispute over the historical validity of this doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2003See State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677 , 905 P.2d 715 (1995). 2003See State v. Martinez, 120 N.M. 677 , 905 P.2d 715 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
E 13th St Cmty. v. Udcgreen1 sentence2003Id. at 1372. | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell v. Kellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Ex Rel. Udall v. Public Employees Retirement Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McNeill v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co.
green
2 sentences2013Oil & Gas Co., 2008-NMSC-022, ¶ 12 , 143 N.M. 740 , 182 P.3d 121 . {12} This issue calls for a historical analysis starting with the Las Vegas Land Grant. 2013Oil & Gas Co., 2008-NMSC-022, ¶ 12 , 143 N.M. 740 , 182 P.3d 121 . {12} This issue calls for a historical analysis starting with the Las Vegas Land Grant. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Steven Duarte
green
2 sentences2025Defendant focuses on the absence of any 18 historical “categorical ban on felons possessing firearms.” With a single citation to 19 a law review article, the State argues that “typically, if not invariably” felons are 20 “dangerous, and can be prohibited from possessing firearms on that basis alone, 12 1 without a minutiae-like examination of one particular defendant’s criminal dossier 2 versus that of another defendant.” In reply, Defendant points out that “the State has 3 presented no historical analogues akin to the firearm restriction in this case” and 4 relies on the historical analysis i 2025Defendant focuses on the absence of any 18 historical “categorical ban on felons possessing firearms.” With a single citation to 19 a law review article, the State argues that “typically, if not invariably” felons are 20 “dangerous, and can be prohibited from possessing firearms on that basis alone, 12 1 without a minutiae-like examination of one particular defendant’s criminal dossier 2 versus that of another defendant.” In reply, Defendant points out that “the State has 3 presented no historical analogues akin to the firearm restriction in this case” and 4 relies on the historical analysis i | 1 | 2025–2025 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen
green
2 sentences2025As a result, for the historical analysis, “whether modern and 17 historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense 18 and whether that burden is comparably justified are central considerations when 19 engaging in an analogical inquiry.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 20 omitted). 2025The historical inquiry 12 “involve[s] reasoning by analogy” to “determin[e] whether a historical regulation is 13 a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation.” Id. at 28-29 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Steven Duarte
green
2 sentences2025Defendant focuses on the absence of any 18 historical “categorical ban on felons possessing firearms.” With a single citation to 19 a law review article, the State argues that “typically, if not invariably” felons are 20 “dangerous, and can be prohibited from possessing firearms on that basis alone, 12 1 without a minutiae-like examination of one particular defendant’s criminal dossier 2 versus that of another defendant.” In reply, Defendant points out that “the State has 3 presented no historical analogues akin to the firearm restriction in this case” and 4 relies on the historical analysis i 2025Defendant focuses on the absence of any 18 historical “categorical ban on felons possessing firearms.” With a single citation to 19 a law review article, the State argues that “typically, if not invariably” felons are 20 “dangerous, and can be prohibited from possessing firearms on that basis alone, 12 1 without a minutiae-like examination of one particular defendant’s criminal dossier 2 versus that of another defendant.” In reply, Defendant points out that “the State has 3 presented no historical analogues akin to the firearm restriction in this case” and 4 relies on the historical analysis i | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole
green
2 sentences2021The difficulties in interpreting longstanding constitutional provisions are widely understood, as are the dangers of taking up on a court’s own initiative a historical analysis that necessarily entails a systematic and searching inquiry. 19 See Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 2017 UT 89, ¶¶ 95-98 , 416 P.3d 663 (observing, in the context of a state due process challenge to a parole board’s action, that a relevant historical analysis demands “deep immersion in the shared linguistic, political, and legal presuppositions and understandings of the ratification era”). 2021The difficulties in interpreting longstanding constitutional provisions are widely understood, as are the dangers of taking up on a court’s own initiative a historical analysis that necessarily entails a systematic and searching inquiry. 19 See Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 2017 UT 89, ¶¶ 95-98 , 416 P.3d 663 (observing, in the context of a state due process challenge to a parole board’s action, that a relevant historical analysis demands “deep immersion in the shared linguistic, political, and legal presuppositions and understandings of the ratification era”). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Oregon v. Ice
green
2 sentences2010To determine whether Apprendi applies, Ice teaches that we must look to "whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within `the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights.'" 555 U.S. at ___ , 129 S.Ct. at 717 (quoting Harris, 536 U.S. at 557 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ). {42} We agree with the Court of Appeals that the historical analysis undertaken in Ice would be a poor fit here if the inquiry were limited to whether the post-trial amenability determination required by Section 32A-2-20(B) was within the purview of the jury at the time of the framing of the Bill of Ri 2010The Court's historical inquiry focused on "whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within `the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 , 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (plurality opinion)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Harris v. United States
red
2 sentences2010The Court's historical inquiry focused on "whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within `the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 , 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (plurality opinion)). 2010The Court's historical inquiry focused on "whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within `the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 , 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (plurality opinion)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
PNM Gas Services v. New Mexico Public Utility Commission
green
2 sentences2010Because the Emergency FPPCAC, in the present case, limits automatic cost recovery to “taxes or cost of fuel, gas or purchased power,” we reject ABCWUA’s and NMIEC’s claim. {59} However, ABCWUA claims in its reply brief that the Emergency FPPCAC violates Section 62-8-7(E) because it relies on forecasted increases in PNM’s fuel and purchased power costs, rather than the historical test year method, whereby the PRC “evaluates a utility’s operating costs for a specified preceding twelve-month period and uses the utility’s past experience as a guide to the utility’s future revenue requirement.” In 2010Because the Emergency FPPCAC, in the present case, limits automatic cost recovery to “taxes or cost of fuel, gas or purchased power,” we reject ABCWUA’s and NMIEC’s claim. {59} However, ABCWUA claims in its reply brief that the Emergency FPPCAC violates Section 62-8-7(E) because it relies on forecasted increases in PNM’s fuel and purchased power costs, rather than the historical test year method, whereby the PRC “evaluates a utility’s operating costs for a specified preceding twelve-month period and uses the utility’s past experience as a guide to the utility’s future revenue requirement.” In | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. McClaugherty
green
2 sentences2008Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . {22} After completing a historical analysis, the Court of Appeals initially clarified that “Section 39-1-1 does not grant jurisdiction to the district court, but, rather, limits the period of time that a district court may act on a case over which it has jurisdiction.” McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041 , ¶ 33, 141 N.M. 468 , 157 P.3d 33 . 2008Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . {22} After completing a historical analysis, the Court of Appeals initially clarified that “Section 39-1-1 does not grant jurisdiction to the district court, but, rather, limits the period of time that a district court may act on a case over which it has jurisdiction.” McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041 , ¶ 33, 141 N.M. 468 , 157 P.3d 33 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, P. C.
green
2 sentences2008Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . {22} After completing a historical analysis, the Court of Appeals initially clarified that “Section 39-1-1 does not grant jurisdiction to the district court, but, rather, limits the period of time that a district court may act on a case over which it has jurisdiction.” McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041 , ¶ 33, 141 N.M. 468 , 157 P.3d 33 . 2008Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . {22} After completing a historical analysis, the Court of Appeals initially clarified that “Section 39-1-1 does not grant jurisdiction to the district court, but, rather, limits the period of time that a district court may act on a case over which it has jurisdiction.” McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041 , ¶ 33, 141 N.M. 468 , 157 P.3d 33 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison
green
2 sentences2008Relying upon our case, Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231 , 824 P.2d 1033 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that when an appeal is pending, jurisdiction over the case resides in the appellate court, except for a few specific, enumerated exceptions, and that the motion in this case is not one of those exceptions. 2008Relying upon our case, Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231 , 824 P.2d 1033 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that when an appeal is pending, jurisdiction over the case resides in the appellate court, except for a few specific, enumerated exceptions, and that the motion in this case is not one of those exceptions. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Neely
green
2 sentences2006Neely, 112 N.M. at 711 , 819 P.2d at 258 . {6} From this historical analysis, it is clear that: (1) a presumption of prejudice which the State must dispel only arises from an “improper communication” between judge and juror; (2) an “improper communication” occurs when the substance of the ex parte communication “relates to the issues of the case”; and (3) a communication that does not “relate to the issues of the case” (that is, a “housekeeping matter”) generally does not give rise to a presumption of prejudice. 2006Neely, 112 N.M. at 711 , 819 P.2d at 258 . {6} From this historical analysis, it is clear that: (1) a presumption of prejudice which the State must dispel only arises from an “improper communication” between judge and juror; (2) an “improper communication” occurs when the substance of the ex parte communication “relates to the issues of the case”; and (3) a communication that does not “relate to the issues of the case” (that is, a “housekeeping matter”) generally does not give rise to a presumption of prejudice. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cartwright v. Public Service Company of New Mexico
green
2 sentences2004While we are unwilling to second-guess the historical analysis in Cartwright based on the present record, we reject the notion in Cartwright that “nothing in the theory of Pueblo Rights [is] inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use,” 66 N.M. at 80 , 343 P.2d at 665 , and that the reasons supporting the “Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in New Mexico as they do in California,” id. at 85 , 343 P.2d at 668 . 2004While we are unwilling to second-guess the historical analysis in Cartwright based on the present record, we reject the notion in Cartwright that “nothing in the theory of Pueblo Rights [is] inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use,” 66 N.M. at 80 , 343 P.2d at 665 , and that the reasons supporting the “Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in New Mexico as they do in California,” id. at 85 , 343 P.2d at 668 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Henry green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Ford green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In Re GAULT red | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Vitek v. Jones green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.