historical analysis in Colorado

2013We do not know. 1207 And even if a historical inquiry is necessary to determine whether section 7 was produced by "animosity toward the class of persons affected," see Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 , 116 S.Ct. 1620 , I think that the historical record indicates that many forces were at work during our constitutional convention. €208 Although the congressional debate about the Blaine Amendment occurred essentially contemporaneously with our constitutional convention, that debate concerned much more than religious bigotry.

2013We do not know. 1207 And even if a historical inquiry is necessary to determine whether section 7 was produced by "animosity toward the class of persons affected," see Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 , 116 S.Ct. 1620 , I think that the historical record indicates that many forces were at work during our constitutional convention. €208 Although the congressional debate about the Blaine Amendment occurred essentially contemporaneously with our constitutional convention, that debate concerned much more than religious bigotry.

2012Because of its limited accountability and broad investigative powers, the grand jury "should not be used as a super-legislative body or to express views on political issues." In re 1976 Arapahoe County Statutory Grand Jury, 194 Colo. at 310 , 572 P.2d at 148 .

2012Because of its limited accountability and broad investigative powers, the grand jury "should not be used as a super-legislative body or to express views on political issues." In re 1976 Arapahoe County Statutory Grand Jury, 194 Colo. at 310 , 572 P.2d at 148 .

2012See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596 -98 , 112 S.Ct. 2649 ; Doe v. Indian River School Dist., 653 F.3d 256 , 275-82 (3d Cir.2011) ( Lemon , not Marsh , is the proper test to employ when analyzing prayers during school board meetings); Cammack, 932 F.2d at 772 ("We are reluctant to extend a ruling explicitly based upon the "unique history" surrounding legislative prayer to such a different factual setting." (citation omitted) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 , 103 S.Ct. 3330 )).

2012Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ). ¶ 141 Thus, the historical analysis of Marsh does not apply to the circumstances in this case.

2012Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ). ¶ 141 Thus, the historical analysis of Marsh does not apply to the circumstances in this case.

2012Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ). ¶ 141 Thus, the historical analysis of Marsh does not apply to the circumstances in this case.

2012Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ). ¶ 141 Thus, the historical analysis of Marsh does not apply to the circumstances in this case.

2012Although those definitions properly focus on wrongful or improper conduct, they do not resolve the key distinction between objective impropriety and subjective opinion in the context of discretionary policy judgments by government officials. 129 Our view of misfeasance fits with the historical principle that the grand jury exists primarily to investigate criminal activity and "may[ ] not{,] in the absence of enabling legislation, act in civil matters or exercise its authority to harass another governmental body for political or civil purposes." Gher, 183 Colo. at 318 , 516 P.2d at 644 .

2012Although those definitions properly focus on wrongful or improper conduct, they do not resolve the key distinction between objective impropriety and subjective opinion in the context of discretionary policy judgments by government officials. 129 Our view of misfeasance fits with the historical principle that the grand jury exists primarily to investigate criminal activity and "may[ ] not{,] in the absence of enabling legislation, act in civil matters or exercise its authority to harass another governmental body for political or civil purposes." Gher, 183 Colo. at 318 , 516 P.2d at 644 .

1989Further, they argue that we should adopt the historical analysis made by the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510 , 732 *1065 P.2d 9 (1987), [4] so as to find that the framers had no intention to exempt obscenity from the constitutional protection provided in article II, section 10 of our constitution.

1989We also decline to adopt the historical analysis in State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510 , 732 P.2d 9 (1987), because the Oregon court concentrated on the state of the law in the early 19th century rather than at the time our constitution was adopted in 1876.