historical analysis in New York

2023The majority’s citation to Peruta v County of San Diego ( 742 F3d 1144, 1167, 1173-1175, 1179 [9th Cir 2014], revd on reh en banc, 824 F3d 919 [9th Cir 2016]) is especially curious, because that Court (sitting en banc) employed a historical analysis and yet concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect a public carry of concealed weapons and upheld California’s good cause requirement.3 None of these 3 California’s licensing statute provided as follows: “The sheriff of a county may issue a concealed carry license to a person upon proof of all of the following: (1) The applicant is of goo

2004In a sense, the Confrontation Clause echoes Raleigh’s dramatic (but unsuccessful) demand to “Call my accuser before my face.” (Crawford, 541 US at —, 124 S Ct at 1360 .) Based on this historical analysis, the Crawford court finds that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause bars the use of a “testimonial” statement made by a witness who does not appear at a criminal trial, unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and was subject to cross-examination at the time the statement was made.

1996This historical rule was not violated when the parties were required to make peremptory challenges juror by juror ( see , People v Miles , 143 N.Y. 383, 386 , supra ; see also , People v Carpenter , 102 N.Y. 238, 248 , supra ), and there is absolutely no evidence in the legislative history of CPL 270.15 of an intent to overrule those cases.

1996This historical rule was not violated when the parties were required to make peremptory challenges juror by juror (see, People v Miles, 143 NY 383, 386 , supra; see also, People v Carpenter, 102 NY 238, 248 , supra), and there is absolutely no evidence in the legislative history of CPL 270.15 of an intent to overrule those cases.

1996Nor is there evidence of an intent to expand "the only substantial advantage remaining to a defendant" ( People v McQuade , 110 N.Y. 284, 294 , supra ) by requiring in all cases that the prosecutor exercise all its challenges to an entire array before the defendant exercises any.

1996Nor is there evidence of an intent to expand "the only substantial advantage remaining to a defendant” (People v McQuade, 110 NY 284, 294 , supra) by requiring in all cases that the prosecutor exercise all its challenges to an entire array before the defendant exercises any.

1994Historical analysis reveals that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found under the State Constitution was primarily directed at sadistic and purely degrading cruelty, including all forms of torture, barbarity or inhumane treatment (see, People v Broadie, 37 NY2d, at 124 , supra; Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47 Fordham L Rev 639, 640-645 [1979]; see also, Matter of Bayard, 25 Hun 546 , 549; Ordinance of 1638, in O’Callaghan, Laws and Ordinances of New Nether-land, 1638-1674, at 10, 12 [crimes should be punished "according t

1994Historical analysis reveals that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found under the State Constitution was primarily directed at sadistic and purely degrading cruelty, including all forms of torture, barbarity or inhumane treatment ( see , People v Broadie , 37 NY2d, at 124 , supra; Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule , 47 Fordham L Rev 639, 640-645 [1979]; see also , Matter of Bayard , 25 Hun 546 , 549; Ordinance of 1638, in O'Callaghan, Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland, 1638-1674, at 10, 12 [crimes should be punished "accord

1989Case law instructs us that the historical test we must apply is whether petitioners sustained their burden to show that the underlying material upon which the Commission relied for its decision failed to supply a rational basis for its determination (see, Matter of Grossman v Rankin, 43 NY2d 493 ; Matter of Berkowitz v New York State Civ.

1989Co., 260 App. Div. 253 , motion for leave to appeal denied 259 App. Div. 1094 ; People v. Halbreich, 18 Misc 2d 473 ; People v. Montgomery, 7 Misc 2d 294 ; Matter of Coleman v. Lee, 1 Misc 2d 685 .) And 'it is commonplace for the Magistrates to avail themselves of the services of counsel representing the complaining witnesses’ to prosecute cases in the lower courts.

1989Co., 260 App. Div. 253 , motion for leave to appeal denied 259 App. Div. 1094 ; People v. Halbreich, 18 Misc 2d 473 ; People v. Montgomery, 7 Misc 2d 294 ; Matter of Coleman v. Lee, 1 Misc 2d 685 .) And 'it is commonplace for the Magistrates to avail themselves of the services of counsel representing the complaining witnesses’ to prosecute cases in the lower courts.

1989Co., 260 App. Div. 253 , motion for leave to appeal denied 259 App. Div. 1094 ; People v. Halbreich, 18 Misc 2d 473 ; People v. Montgomery, 7 Misc 2d 294 ; Matter of Coleman v. Lee, 1 Misc 2d 685 .) And 'it is commonplace for the Magistrates to avail themselves of the services of counsel representing the complaining witnesses’ to prosecute cases in the lower courts.

1989Although the case involved a duly licensed attorney and thus did not present the issue of a prosecutor without a law license, the historical analysis contained there has been used to justify non-law-trained prosecutors. 1 As stated in Matter of Johnson v Boldman ( 24 Misc 2d 592, 594 ), "It has been a 'long-established and accepted procedure and practice of over a century’, which 'to-day has the force of law’, to have the prosecution of misdemeanors and offenses in the lower courts 'conducted by local authorities, that is, by the police, State troopers * * * town and village attorneys and corp

1989Co., 260 App. Div. 253 , motion for leave to appeal denied 259 App. Div. 1094 ; People v. Halbreich, 18 Misc 2d 473 ; People v. Montgomery, 7 Misc 2d 294 ; Matter of Coleman v. Lee, 1 Misc 2d 685 .) And 'it is commonplace for the Magistrates to avail themselves of the services of counsel representing the complaining witnesses’ to prosecute cases in the lower courts.

1989Co., 260 App. Div. 253 , motion for leave to appeal denied 259 App. Div. 1094 ; People v. Halbreich, 18 Misc 2d 473 ; People v. Montgomery, 7 Misc 2d 294 ; Matter of Coleman v. Lee, 1 Misc 2d 685 .) And 'it is commonplace for the Magistrates to avail themselves of the services of counsel representing the complaining witnesses’ to prosecute cases in the lower courts.

1987The absent defendant is accorded the historical presumption that a jury trial is his forum of choice (Cancemi v People, supra; People v Diaz, 10 AD2d 80 ; see, Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich L Rev 695).

1985It is well established that the Federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies to the States (see,' Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1 ).

1985(Supra, at pp 575-577.) The Chief Justice concluded that "Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.” (Supra, at p 581.) In his concurring opinion in Richmond (supra), Justice Brennan set forth not only the historical analysis employed by Chief Justice Burger in the plurality opinion, but also a structural analysis in which he analyzed the function of the 1st Amendment in preserving free and open public discussion of governmental affairs: "[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicat

1985The question is whether in light of "any relevant precedents” and after "assessing the several interests that are at stake” (Lassiter v Department of Social Servs., 452 US, at p 25 ), due process requires the protections the plaintiffs claim. hi The historical privilege against self-incrimination is enshrined in both the US Constitution 5th Amendment and the NY Constitution, article I, § 6.

1975Historical analysis indicates that the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishments was primarily intended to prohibit sadistic and purely degrading cruelty, that is, all forms of torture, whether outright barbarity or inhumane treatment for its own sake (see Weems v United States, 217 US 349, 370 , supra; Matter of Kemmler, 136 US 436, 437 , affg 119 NY 569 , supra; Wilkerson v Utah, 99 US 130, 136, supra; Wilkinson v Skinner, 34 NY2d 53, 59-60 ; People v Davis, 33 NY2d 221, 226 , supra; cf. Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 102 [plurality opn of Warren, C.

1975Historical analysis indicates that the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishments was primarily intended to prohibit sadistic and purely degrading cruelty, that is, all forms of torture, whether outright barbarity or inhumane treatment for its own sake (see Weems v United States, 217 US 349, 370 , supra; Matter of Kemmler, 136 US 436, 437 , affg 119 NY 569 , supra; Wilkerson v Utah, 99 US 130, 136, supra; Wilkinson v Skinner, 34 NY2d 53, 59-60 ; People v Davis, 33 NY2d 221, 226 , supra; cf. Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 102 [plurality opn of Warren, C.

1975Historical analysis indicates that the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishments was primarily intended to prohibit sadistic and purely degrading cruelty, that is, all forms of torture, whether outright barbarity or inhumane treatment for its own sake (see Weems v United States, 217 US 349, 370 , supra; Matter of Kemmler, 136 US 436, 437 , affg 119 NY 569 , supra; Wilkerson v Utah, 99 US 130, 136, supra; Wilkinson v Skinner, 34 NY2d 53, 59-60 ; People v Davis, 33 NY2d 221, 226 , supra; cf. Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 102 [plurality opn of Warren, C.

1975Historical analysis indicates that the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishments was primarily intended to prohibit sadistic and purely degrading cruelty, that is, all forms of torture, whether outright barbarity or inhumane treatment for its own sake (see Weems v United States, 217 US 349, 370 , supra; Matter of Kemmler, 136 US 436, 437 , affg 119 NY 569 , supra; Wilkerson v Utah, 99 US 130, 136, supra; Wilkinson v Skinner, 34 NY2d 53, 59-60 ; People v Davis, 33 NY2d 221, 226 , supra; cf. Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 102 [plurality opn of Warren, C.

1975Historical analysis indicates that the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual punishments was primarily intended to prohibit sadistic and purely degrading cruelty, that is, all forms of torture, whether outright barbarity or inhumane treatment for its own sake (see Weems v United States, 217 US 349, 370 , supra; Matter of Kemmler, 136 US 436, 437 , affg 119 NY 569 , supra; Wilkerson v Utah, 99 US 130, 136, supra; Wilkinson v Skinner, 34 NY2d 53, 59-60 ; People v Davis, 33 NY2d 221, 226 , supra; cf. Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 102 [plurality opn of Warren, C.