historical analysis in Washington

2014United States v. Smith, 787 F. 2d 111 ( 3d Cir. 1986), also does not assist Miller.

2014United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1986), also does not assist Miller.

2010To the contrary, the Court noted that the business records exception does not include documents kept in the regular course of business when "the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2538 .

2010To the contrary, the Court noted that the business records exception does not include documents kept in the regular course of business when “the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 .

2025Additionally, Rahimi reaffirmed Heller’s more general pronouncement that prohibitions “on the possession of firearms by ‘felons’ ” were “ ‘presumptively lawful.’ ” 602 U.S. at 682 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 ).

2015Id. at 1154 . ¶62 In addition to a textual analysis of the Second Amendment, the Peruta court undertook a historical analysis to determine the original public understanding of the amendment’s scope and meaning.

2011Puapuaga, 164 Wash.2d at 522 , 192 P.3d 360 .

2011Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d at 522 .

2008Boomer, 309 F.3d at 417-23 .

2008Boomer, 309 F.3d at 417-23 .

2008Id. ¶ 28 The Boomer court, relied upon by AT & T, failed to do a historical analysis.

2008Id. ¶28 The Boomer court, relied upon by AT&T, failed to do a historical analysis.

2006App. 893, 897-98 , 951 P.2d 311 (1998).

2006Anderson, 94 Wn.2d at 729-30 (footnote omitted). “[I]n an equity case the court may empanel a jury only for advisory purposes, unless both parties consent to be bound by the verdict. . . .” Anderson, 94 Wn.2d at 731 (citing CR 39(c)). ¶10 Under the historical test, Washington courts determine the overall nature of an action by “lookfing] to see whether the claims in question were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the equity courts when the state constitution was adopted in 1889.” Auburn Mech., Inc. v. Lydig Constr., Inc., 89 Wn.

2006Applying this historical analysis to the juvenile jury trial right, Chavez reasons that because the law drew no distinction between the jury trial rights of juveniles and adults when the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial. ¶ 12 The argument that Blakely mandates a right of jury trial for juveniles has been foreclosed by our holding in State v. Meade, 129 Wash.App. 918 , 120 P.3d 975 (2005).

2006Applying this historical analysis to the juvenile jury trial right, Chavez reasons that because the law drew no distinction between the jury trial rights of juveniles and adults when the Sixth Amendment was enacted, a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial. ¶12 The argument that Blakely mandates a right of jury trial for juveniles has been foreclosed by our holding in State v. Meade, 129 Wn.

2002See State v. Avila, 102 Wash.App. 882, 896 , 10 P.3d 486 (2000), review denied, 143 Wash.2d 1009 , 21 P.3d 290 (2001). [16] See footnote 5. [17] See footnotes 3 and 6. [18] EFF argues that because Sofie was decided after State Credit Ass'n, Sofie's broad analogous approach to the historical analysis overrules State Credit Ass'n `s more narrow approach of an "exact common law equivalent." Sofie, 112 Wash.2d at 649 , 771 P.2d 711 ; State Credit Ass'n, 33 Wash.App. at 621 , 657 P.2d 327 .

2002See n.5, supra. See nn.3, 6, supra. EFF argues that because Sofie was decided after State Credit Ass’n, Sofie’s broad analogous approach to the historical analysis overrules State Credit Ass’n’s more narrow approach of an “exact common law equivalent.” Sofie, 112 Wn.2d at 649 ; State Credit Ass’n, 33 Wn.

2001In his dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 , 70 S.Ct. 430 , 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , where the Court upheld the search of defendant's place of business as incident to the arrest, Justice Felix Frankfurter characterized the expanding scope of allowable searches as a "progressive distortion" of the historical rule that had limited such searches to the person of the arrestee and to articles "in such immediate physical relation to the one arrested as to be in a fair sense a projection of his p

2001In his dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 , 70 S.Ct. 430 , 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), overruled in part on other grounds by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , where the Court upheld the search of defendant's place of business as incident to the arrest, Justice Felix Frankfurter characterized the expanding scope of allowable searches as a "progressive distortion" of the historical rule that had limited such searches to the person of the arrestee and to articles "in such immediate physical relation to the one arrested as to be in a fair sense a projection of his p

1998However, the third requirement for collateral estoppel as set out by the majority, and by this court in other recent cases, is far different from the historical requirement of identity “ ‘of persons and parties.’ ” Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 396 , 429 P.2d 207 (1967) (quoting Northern Pac.

1998However, the third requirement for collateral estoppel as set out by the majority, and by this court in other recent cases, is far different from the historical requirement of identity “ ‘of persons and parties.’ ” Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 396 , 429 P.2d 207 (1967) (quoting Northern Pac.

1998Goodner v. Speed, 96 Wn.2d 838, 840-41 , 640 P.2d 13 (1982), and by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting a civil litigant’s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

1998Goodner v. Speed, 96 Wn.2d 838, 840-41 , 640 P.2d 13 (1982), and by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting a civil litigant’s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

1997Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 251 (citing Indianapolis Union Ry.

1997Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 251 (citing Indianapolis Union Ry.

2025State v. Ross, 28 Wn. App. 2d 644 , 649, 537 P.3d 1114 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1026 (2024), provides that “[New York State Rifle] did not overrule, or cast doubt on, the Court’s recognition in Heller and McDonald that the Second Amendment did not preclude prohibitions on felons possessing firearms.” State v. Bonaparte, 32 Wn. App. 2d 266 , 278, 554 P.3d 1245 (2024) review denied, 4 Wn.3d 1019 (2025), then notes the inability to explain away “the United States Supreme Court’s repeated articulation that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful.” Bonapa

2025State v. Ross, 28 Wn. App. 2d 644 , 649, 537 P.3d 1114 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1026 (2024), provides that “[New York State Rifle] did not overrule, or cast doubt on, the Court’s recognition in Heller and McDonald that the Second Amendment did not preclude prohibitions on felons possessing firearms.” State v. Bonaparte, 32 Wn. App. 2d 266 , 278, 554 P.3d 1245 (2024) review denied, 4 Wn.3d 1019 (2025), then notes the inability to explain away “the United States Supreme Court’s repeated articulation that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons are presumptively lawful.” Bonapa

2024The dissenter concluded that the legislature intended mental anguish to be recoverable, in part, because of the modifier “any” attended to the phrase “actual damages.” The Supreme Court, in Segura v. Cabrera, 184 Wn.2d 587 (2015), noted the historical rule that a statute does not provide a remedy for emotional distress unless the statute can be violated only by conduct amounting to an intentional tort.

2018In Blomstrom, our Supreme Court held that, Generally speaking, “[i]t is . . . axiomatic that article 1, section 7 provides greater protection to an individual’s right of privacy than that guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 493 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (plurality opinion); City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 267 , 868 P.2d 134 (1994) (“It is by now commonplace to observe Const. art. 1, § 7 provides protections for the citizens of Washington which are qualitatively different from, and in some cases broader than, those provided by the Fourth Amendment.”).

2018In Blomstrom, our Supreme Court held that, Generally speaking, “[i]t is . . . axiomatic that article 1, section 7 provides greater protection to an individual’s right of privacy than that guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 493 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (plurality opinion); City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 267 , 868 P.2d 134 (1994) (“It is by now commonplace to observe Const. art. 1, § 7 provides protections for the citizens of Washington which are qualitatively different from, and in some cases broader than, those provided by the Fourth Amendment.”).

2018This historical rule has been repeatedly iterated and reaffirmed recently in Blomstrom v. Tripp, 189 Wn.2d 379 , 402 P.3d 831 (2017) and in Sprague.

2018This historical rule has been repeatedly iterated and reaffirmed recently in Blomstrom v. Tripp, 189 Wn.2d 379 , 402 P.3d 831 (2017) and in Sprague.