state of mind exception in Arizona

2011Evid., or under the “catch-all” hearsay exception. 26 The statement merely posed a hypothetical question and, therefore, was not admissible under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3) because it neither described a “present feeling or future intent[],” nor did it “tend to prove relevant conduct of the declarant.” See State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶¶ 32-33 , 975 P.2d 75, 85 (1999). ¶ 46 The statement similarly is inadmissible under the “catch-all” exception in Rule *210 803(24).

2011Evid., or under the “catch-all” hearsay exception. 26 The statement merely posed a hypothetical question and, therefore, was not admissible under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3) because it neither described a “present feeling or future intent[],” nor did it “tend to prove relevant conduct of the declarant.” See State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, ¶¶ 32-33 , 975 P.2d 75, 85 (1999). ¶ 46 The statement similarly is inadmissible under the “catch-all” exception in Rule *210 803(24).

1999See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 , 54 S.Ct. 22, 26 , 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933) (using the state-of-mind exception to admit proof of memory or belief would destroy the hearsay rule).

1999See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105-06 , 54 S.Ct. 22, 26 , 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933) (using the state-of-mind exception to admit proof of memory or belief would destroy the hearsay rule).

1999Id.

1994Charo, 156 Ariz. at 563-64 , 754 P.2d at 190-91 ; Christensen, 129 Ariz. at 36 , 628 P.2d at 584 .

1999The manner in which the prosecutor used this evidence in his closing argument both illustrates the wisdom of the prohibition against using the state-of-mind exception to prove facts remembered or believed and refutes any contention “that this [hearsay] was a relatively unimportant piece of evidence.” Charo, 156 Ariz. at 563 , 754 P.2d at 290 (noting prosecutor’s emphasis of improperly admitted evidence during closing argument in finding reversible error). ¶ 51 The state argues, however, that two properly admitted statements render the error harmless.

1999The manner in which the prosecutor used this evidence in his closing argument both illustrates the wisdom of the prohibition against using the state-of-mind exception to prove facts remembered or believed and refutes any contention “that this [hearsay] was a relatively unimportant piece of evidence.” Charo, 156 Ariz. at 563 , 754 P.2d at 290 (noting prosecutor’s emphasis of improperly admitted evidence during closing argument in finding reversible error). ¶ 51 The state argues, however, that two properly admitted statements render the error harmless.

2021In Parsons I, this court affirmed ADHS’s decision based solely on his excluded felony conviction. 242 Ariz. at 325, ¶ 17 .

1999If the reservation in the text of the rule is to have any effect, it must be understood to narrowly limit those admissible statements to declarations of condition— “I’m scared” — and not belief — “I’m scared because Galkin threatened me.” Liu, 960 F.2d at 452 (quoting U.S. v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir.1980) (footnote omitted)); see also M.

1988See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 , 735 P.2d 801 (1987). [1] I agree with and do not discuss the majority's holding relating to the victim's statement that she feared the defendant.

1988See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 , 735 P.2d 801 (1987). [1] I agree with and do not discuss the majority's holding relating to the victim's statement that she feared the defendant.

1985Id. at 257 , 665 P.2d at 979 (citations omitted).

1985Id. at 257 , 665 P.2d at 979 (citations omitted).

1981See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103-104 , 54 S.Ct. 22, 25-26 , 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933); United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 775 (D.C.

1981See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 103-104 , 54 S.Ct. 22, 25-26 , 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933); United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 775 (D.C.Cir.1973).