23 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones-El v. Berge, Wardengreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. 2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. | 2 | 2 |
De La Garza v. Stringfellowgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. 2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. | 2 | 2 |
Worley v. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuitgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. 2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. | 2 | 2 |
Horton v. Allengreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. 2005See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 , 125 S. Ct. 971 , 160 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hollowaygreen2 sentences2000See State v. Cato, 21 Conn. App. 403, 408 , 574 A.2d 240 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 819 , 576 A.2d 547 (1990) (“[a]n out-of-court statement made after the completion of a criminal act is not admissible under the state of mind exception as to the intent or motive underlying that completed act”). 6 Further, the statements involve “double” hearsay, or hearsay within hearsay, that is, Colon’s statements to the witnesses constituted the first layer of hearsay, and what he had told the witnesses that his parents had said to him was the second layer of hearsay. 2000See State v. Cato, 21 Conn. App. 403, 408 , 574 A.2d 240 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 819 , 576 A.2d 547 (1990) (“[a]n out-of-court statement made after the completion of a criminal act is not admissible under the state of mind exception as to the intent or motive underlying that completed act”). 6 Further, the statements involve “double” hearsay, or hearsay within hearsay, that is, Colon’s statements to the witnesses constituted the first layer of hearsay, and what he had told the witnesses that his parents had said to him was the second layer of hearsay. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Catogreen2 sentences2000See State v. Cato, 21 Conn. App. 403, 408 , 574 A.2d 240 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 819 , 576 A.2d 547 (1990) (“[a]n out-of-court statement made after the completion of a criminal act is not admissible under the state of mind exception as to the intent or motive underlying that completed act”). 6 Further, the statements involve “double” hearsay, or hearsay within hearsay, that is, Colon’s statements to the witnesses constituted the first layer of hearsay, and what he had told the witnesses that his parents had said to him was the second layer of hearsay. 2000See State v. Cato, 21 Conn. App. 403, 408 , 574 A.2d 240 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 819 , 576 A.2d 547 (1990) (“[a]n out-of-court statement made after the completion of a criminal act is not admissible under the state of mind exception as to the intent or motive underlying that completed act”). 6 Further, the statements involve “double” hearsay, or hearsay within hearsay, that is, Colon’s statements to the witnesses constituted the first layer of hearsay, and what he had told the witnesses that his parents had said to him was the second layer of hearsay. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205 , 219–20, 881 A.2d 160 (2005). 14 Presumably, Wylie meant that the gang members were ‘‘wolves in sheep’s clothing.’’ 15 Although the defendant refers to the victim’s statements as inadmissible hearsay in his brief, he does not assert that the trial court made an incorrect legal determination that they fit within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule or were nonhearsay. 2019See State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205 , 219–20, 881 A.2d 160 (2005). 14 Presumably, Wylie meant that the gang members were ‘‘wolves in sheep’s clothing.’’ 15 Although the defendant refers to the victim’s statements as inadmissible hearsay in his brief, he does not assert that the trial court made an incorrect legal determination that they fit within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule or were nonhearsay. | 1 | 2 |
General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Capitol Garage, Inc.green2 sentences1994Wigmore, supra, and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Capitol Garage, Inc., 154 Conn. 593 , 227 A.2d 548 (1967). 1994Wigmore, supra, and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Capitol Garage, Inc., 154 Conn. 593 , 227 A.2d 548 (1967). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hullgreen2 sentences2019We previously have held that evidence of a victim’s mental state may be relevant to establish the defen- dant’s motive to kill the victim.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patterson, supra, 276 Conn. 485–86; see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481, 502 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989) (‘‘[t]he victim’s mental state was relevant both to show the victim’s fear of the defen- dant . . . and to establish the defendant’s motive for committing the crime’’). 2019We previously have held that evidence of a victim’s mental state may be relevant to establish the defen- dant’s motive to kill the victim.’’ (Citation omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patterson, supra, 276 Conn. 485–86; see also State v. Hull, 210 Conn. 481, 502 , 556 A.2d 154 (1989) (‘‘[t]he victim’s mental state was relevant both to show the victim’s fear of the defen- dant . . . and to establish the defendant’s motive for committing the crime’’). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wargogreen2 sentences2019This is wholly different from allowing an appellate court to substitute its judgment for the fact finder after the fact finder has made its credibility determinations, which is what the dissent is suggesting we should do here. 13 We note that out-of-court statements demonstrating the defendant’s state of mind can be admissible (1) as nonhearsay when they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; see State v. Wargo, 255 Conn. 113, 138 , 763 A.2d 1 (2000); or (2) under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. 2019This is wholly different from allowing an appellate court to substitute its judgment for the fact finder after the fact finder has made its credibility determinations, which is what the dissent is suggesting we should do here. 13 We note that out-of-court statements demonstrating the defendant’s state of mind can be admissible (1) as nonhearsay when they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; see State v. Wargo, 255 Conn. 113, 138 , 763 A.2d 1 (2000); or (2) under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sauciergreen2 sentences2019Put differently, "a claim that has been abandoned during the initial appeal to the Appellate Court cannot subsequently be resurrected by the taking of a certified appeal to this court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saucier , supra, at 223 , 926 A.2d 633 ; see id., at 222-23 , 926 A.2d 633 (declining to consider in certified appeal defendant's claim that excluded statement was not hearsay because, although he raised that argument before trial court, he "subsequently failed to mention that claim in his brief to the Appellate Court, which focused solely on his argument that the st 2019Put differently, "a claim that has been abandoned during the initial appeal to the Appellate Court cannot subsequently be resurrected by the taking of a certified appeal to this court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saucier , supra, at 223 , 926 A.2d 633 ; see id., at 222-23 , 926 A.2d 633 (declining to consider in certified appeal defendant's claim that excluded statement was not hearsay because, although he raised that argument before trial court, he "subsequently failed to mention that claim in his brief to the Appellate Court, which focused solely on his argument that the st | 1 | 1 |
State v. Samuelsgreen2 sentences2019Put differently, "a claim that has been abandoned during the initial appeal to the Appellate Court cannot subsequently be resurrected by the taking of a certified appeal to this court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saucier , supra, at 223 , 926 A.2d 633 ; see id., at 222-23 , 926 A.2d 633 (declining to consider in certified appeal defendant's claim that excluded statement was not hearsay because, although he raised that argument before trial court, he "subsequently failed to mention that claim in his brief to the Appellate Court, which focused solely on his argument that the st 2019Put differently, "a claim that has been abandoned during the initial appeal to the Appellate Court cannot subsequently be resurrected by the taking of a certified appeal to this court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saucier , supra, at 223 , 926 A.2d 633 ; see id., at 222-23 , 926 A.2d 633 (declining to consider in certified appeal defendant's claim that excluded statement was not hearsay because, although he raised that argument before trial court, he "subsequently failed to mention that claim in his brief to the Appellate Court, which focused solely on his argument that the st | 1 | 1 |
Gajewski v. Pavelogreen2 sentences2012Cf. Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 403 , 3 A.3d 892 (2010) ("[i]n accordance with our jurisprudence and the lack of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's charging instructions"); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 229 Conn. 829, 837 , 643 A.2d 1276 (1994) ("[i]t is presumed that the jury follows the instructions given *656 by the court"). 2012Cf. Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 403 , 3 A.3d 892 (2010) ("[i]n accordance with our jurisprudence and the lack of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's charging instructions"); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 229 Conn. 829, 837 , 643 A.2d 1276 (1994) ("[i]t is presumed that the jury follows the instructions given *656 by the court"). | 1 | 1 |
Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C.green2 sentences2012Cf. Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 403 , 3 A.3d 892 (2010) ("[i]n accordance with our jurisprudence and the lack of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's charging instructions"); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 229 Conn. 829, 837 , 643 A.2d 1276 (1994) ("[i]t is presumed that the jury follows the instructions given *656 by the court"). 2012Cf. Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 403 , 3 A.3d 892 (2010) ("[i]n accordance with our jurisprudence and the lack of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's charging instructions"); Gajewski v. Pavelo, 229 Conn. 829, 837 , 643 A.2d 1276 (1994) ("[i]t is presumed that the jury follows the instructions given *656 by the court"). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wade v. Yale Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
Fridge v. First Step, Inc.green2 sentences2007Such statements do not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 595 ; see also State v. Adams, 52 Conn. App. 643, 656-57 , 727 A.2d 780 (1999) (trial court properly excluded, under both state of mind and residual exceptions, statements by defendant to police that he had stabbed victim in self-defense), aff'd, 252 Conn. 752 , 748 A.2d 872 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 876 , 121 S. Ct. 182 , 148 L. 2007Such statements do not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule." (Citations omitted.) Id., at 595 , 637 A.2d 1088 ; see also State v. Adams, 52 Conn. App. 643, 656-57 , 727 A.2d 780 (1999) (trial court properly excluded, under both state of mind and residual exceptions, statements by defendant to police that he had stabbed victim in self-defense), aff'd, 252 Conn. 752 , 748 A.2d 872 , cert. denied, 531 *647 U.S. 876, 121 S.Ct. 182 , 148 L.Ed.2d 126 (2000). [16] Finally, in Wade v. Yale University, 129 Conn. 615, 616-17 , 30 A.2d 545 (1943), a civil case wherein the plaintif | 1 | 1 |
State v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2007Such statements do not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 595 ; see also State v. Adams, 52 Conn. App. 643, 656-57 , 727 A.2d 780 (1999) (trial court properly excluded, under both state of mind and residual exceptions, statements by defendant to police that he had stabbed victim in self-defense), aff'd, 252 Conn. 752 , 748 A.2d 872 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 876 , 121 S. Ct. 182 , 148 L. 2007Such statements do not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 595 ; see also State v. Adams, 52 Conn. App. 643, 656-57 , 727 A.2d 780 (1999) (trial court properly excluded, under both state of mind and residual exceptions, statements by defendant to police that he had stabbed victim in self-defense), aff'd, 252 Conn. 752 , 748 A.2d 872 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 876 , 121 S. Ct. 182 , 148 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sauciergreen2 sentences2007State v. Saucier, supra, 90 Conn. App. at 145-46 , 876 A.2d 572 . 2007State v. Saucier, supra, 90 Conn. App. at 145-46 , 876 A.2d 572 . | 1 | 1 |
| Glover v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc.green1 sentence2007Such statements do not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 595 ; see also State v. Adams, 52 Conn. App. 643, 656-57 , 727 A.2d 780 (1999) (trial court properly excluded, under both state of mind and residual exceptions, statements by defendant to police that he had stabbed victim in self-defense), aff'd, 252 Conn. 752 , 748 A.2d 872 , cert. denied, 531 U.S. 876 , 121 S. Ct. 182 , 148 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Bickford v. Anchorage School District Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moseley v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bellgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Madsongreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 29-30 (Colo. 1981) (statements by victim expressing her fear of defendant inadmissible when self-defense and suicide were not at issue in case); Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460, 461-62 (Ky. 1997) (statements by deceased victim that she previously had been abused by defendant husband, who was accused of killing her, were not subject to state of mind exception because they were offered to prove fact that already had happened); State v. Williams, 395 A.2d 1158, 1163-64 (Me. 1978) (victim’s previous statement to friend that she was afraid because h 2007See, e.g., People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 29-30 (Colo. 1981) (statements by victim expressing her fear of defendant inadmissible when self-defense and suicide were not at issue in case); Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460, 461-62 (Ky.1997) (statements by deceased victim that she previously had been abused by defendant husband, who was accused of killing her, were not subject to state of mind exception because they were offered to prove fact that already had happened); State v. Williams, 395 A.2d 1158, 1163-64 (Me.1978) (victim's previous statement to friend that she was afraid because her | 1 | 1 |
| Babcock v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Freeney
green
2 sentences2007The Appellate Court, relying primarily on our decision in State v. Freeney, 228 Conn. 582, 595 , 637 A.2d 1088 (1994), concluded that this statement did not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule; see Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (4); because it was a statement of past intent or motive after an act, rather than a statement of present or future intent. 2007The Appellate Court, relying primarily on our decision in State v. Freeney, 228 Conn. 582, 595 , 637 A.2d 1088 (1994), concluded that this statement did not fall within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule; see Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (4); because it was a statement of past intent or motive after an act, rather than a statement of present or future intent. | 3 | 1999–2007 |
Shepard v. United States
green
2 sentences2007In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the victim's statement to her nurse, "`Dr. Shepard has poisoned me,'" was inadmissible under the state of mind exception. [14] Shepard v. United States, supra, at 103-104, 54 S.Ct. 22 . 2005The defendant asserts that we should assess the evidence in the present case against the Roberts standard of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”; Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 66 ; because the state of mind exception, as applied to declarations made by the victim in a homicide case, is not “firmly rooted.” That application of the exception, he argues, has not enjoyed consistent admissibility and has been examined on a case-by-case basis since the Supreme Court restricted its use in Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 , 54 S. Ct. 22 , 78 L. | 2 | 2005–2007 |
Mutual Life Insurance v. Hillmon
green
2 sentences2005Co. v. Hillmon, *235 145 U.S. 285, 295-96 , 12 S. Ct. 909 , 36 L. 2005Co. v. Hillmon, *235 145 U.S. 285, 295-96 , 12 S. Ct. 909 , 36 L. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Duntz
green
2 sentences1997We conclude, however, that the jury could not have drawn such an inference solely from the statements of the victim without resorting to impermissible speculation. . . . [I]n view of the tremendous potential for this evidence of subjective fear to prejudice the defendant unfairly, we conclude that it was not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.” Id., 233 . 1993How could one logically conclude that, because she feared the defendant and was apprehensive about him, she was dead. 2 In State v. Duntz, 223 Conn. 207 , 613 A.2d 224 (1992), dealing with the precise issue of whether the deceased’s hearsay statements of fear may be admitted into evidence, we held the admission of such evidence to be reversible error. “[T]he victim’s alleged fear of the defendant was not relevant, and therefore . . . the testimony was not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. | 2 | 1993–1997 |
Hodges v. Comm'r of Corr.
green
1 sentence2020Manganello’s hearsay testimony was harmless?’’ State v. Carey, 331 Conn. 913 , 203 A.3d 1246 (2019). 21 In its brief to this court, the state argues that Manganello’s testimony was admissible under (1) the residual exception set forth in § 8-9 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, and (2) the state of mind exception set forth in § 8-3 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Carey
green
1 sentence2020Manganello’s hearsay testimony was harmless?’’ State v. Carey, 331 Conn. 913 , 203 A.3d 1246 (2019). 21 In its brief to this court, the state argues that Manganello’s testimony was admissible under (1) the residual exception set forth in § 8-9 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, and (2) the state of mind exception set forth in § 8-3 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Commonwealth v. Zagranski green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Whitlow v. Durst
green
2 sentences2007We note that the defendant relies on a line of older California cases espousing a broader view of the admissibility of statements pursuant to the state of mind exception, specifically, that, “[w]hen intent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of a decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that indicate the intent with which he performed the act are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it is immaterial that such declarations are self-serving.” (Emphasis added.) Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal. 2d 523, 524 , 127 P.2d 530 (1942). 2007We note that the defendant relies on a line of older California cases espousing a broader view of the admissibility of statements pursuant to the state of mind exception, specifically, that, “[w]hen intent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of a decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that indicate the intent with which he performed the act are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it is immaterial that such declarations are self-serving.” (Emphasis added.) Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal. 2d 523, 524 , 127 P.2d 530 (1942). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Valdes v. United States green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Flett
green
2 sentences2007The testimony of [the victim's mother], relating statements made by her daughter and seeking to establish the truth of facts remembered regarding past events, is inadmissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule."). [19] In support of his claim that the victim's statement in the present case was offered to indicate her "present state of mind at the time she made the statement," the defendant relies on State v. Flett, 40 Wash.App. 277, 287 , 699 P.2d 774 (1985), for the proposition that "[t]he fact that the statement is in the past tense does not necessarily mean that it indica 2007The testimony of [the victim's mother], relating statements made by her daughter and seeking to establish the truth of facts remembered regarding past events, is inadmissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule."). [19] In support of his claim that the victim's statement in the present case was offered to indicate her "present state of mind at the time she made the statement," the defendant relies on State v. Flett, 40 Wash.App. 277, 287 , 699 P.2d 774 (1985), for the proposition that "[t]he fact that the statement is in the past tense does not necessarily mean that it indica | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Haynam v. Laclede Electric Cooperative, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007This approach is inconsistent with the temporal limitations on the admissibility of such statements contained in § 8-3(4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. [21] We also disagree with the defendant's reliance on Haynam v. Laclede Electric Cooperative, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 200 (Mo.1992). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Conyers v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Alvarez
green
2 sentences2007We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs argument that Grasso’s statement is relevant to prove his state of mind, namely, that Sweet’s statement had affected Grasso’s ability to evaluate fairly the plaintiffs performance. 16 Although she cites the state of mind exception; Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (4); the plaintiffs argument really is *52 that Sweet’s statement was offered, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for its effect on Grasso. 17 See State v. Alvarez, 216 Conn. 301, 310-11 , 579 A.2d 515 (1990). 2007We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs argument that Grasso’s statement is relevant to prove his state of mind, namely, that Sweet’s statement had affected Grasso’s ability to evaluate fairly the plaintiffs performance. 16 Although she cites the state of mind exception; Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (4); the plaintiffs argument really is *52 that Sweet’s statement was offered, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for its effect on Grasso. 17 See State v. Alvarez, 216 Conn. 301, 310-11 , 579 A.2d 515 (1990). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Lynn
green
2 sentences2007We also have reviewed numerous sister state cases, and we find most persuasive Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 158-60 , 729 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910 , 120 S. Ct. 258 , 145 L. 2007We also have reviewed numerous sister state cases, and we find most persuasive Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 158-60 , 729 A.2d 910 , cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910 , 120 S.Ct. 258 , 145 L.Ed.2d 216 (1999). [18] In Conyers , the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of testimony that the defendant's cellmate, *648 who had testified against him, had stated to another inmate that he "needed to take care of number one first," in connection with allegations that he had searched other inmates' cells for information about their cases. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Spencer's Appeal From Probate green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Perkins green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Soto green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Soto green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Villafane green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Coppola v. Coppola green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Eisenbach v. Downey green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Santangelo green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Cruz green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Rinaldi green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Buckman v. People Express, Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Shiang-Yueng Feng v. Dart Hill Realty, Inc. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Fleet Bank v. Lawler green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Hoeplinger green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Thomas green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Kelly green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Hawley green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.