state of mind exception in Pennsylvania

2020In some instances, following [Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)], our Courts have held that the state-of-mind exception applies to a murder victim’s statement.

2018Specifically, we noted that the exchange should not have been admitted under the state of mind exception to the rule against hearsay because "the logical connection between [Walsh]'s statement of fear and [Appellant's] malice [wa]s not obvious." Becker , 1801 MDA 2013, 2015 WL 7433059 , at 13 (discussing, inter alia , Pa.R.E. 803.03 and Commonwealth v. Luster , 71 A.3d 1029 (Pa. Super. 2013) ).

2025This Court has recognized three common applications of the state of mind exception: (1) “to prove the declarant’s state of mind when that state of mind is an issue directly related to a claim or defense in the case[;]” (2) “to demonstrate that a declarant did a particular act that was in conformity with his or her statement after having made the statement[;]” and (3) to set forth the declarant’s “memory or belief” only if “it relates to the execution, revocation, identification or terms of the declarant’s will.” Id. at 804-05 (citation omitted).

2015See, e.g., Schmalz, supra at 803-804 nn. 3, 5 (noting distinction between state-of-mind non-hearsay evidence offered to explain listener’s reaction and not the truth of the matter asserted, and the state-of-mind exception to hearsay rule where declarant’s state of mind is offered for truth of the matter asserted).

2020See Commonwealth v. Parker, 2014 PA Super 253 , 104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014) (victim’s questions to grandmother were admissible under state of mind exception); - 37 - J-S10010-20 see also Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 2013 PA Super 287 , 79 A.3d 1173, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statement that he was scared of defendant and if he died it would be defendant’s fault was properly admitted as evidence based on state of mind exception).

2016See Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (holding that the victim’s statements regarding being fearful of defendant were properly admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 414 (Pa. 2013); see also Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2013) (same), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 1039 (Pa. 2015).

2025On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v.] Lowenberg[, ____________________________________________ vehicle accident eyewitness to a police officer, which the eyewitness made over ten minutes after the accident, did not constitute a present sense impression and lacked the requisite immediacy). - 19 - J-A05003-25 39

2009See Pa.R.E. 803(3). 7 ¶ 57 The trial court, in admitting said statements, relied on Commonwealth v. Collins, 550 Pa. 46 , 703 A.2d 418 (1997), for the following proposition: On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244 , 392 A.2d 1274 (1978) ] (victim told third person that she wanted to see the

2020This conclusion is supported by the decision in Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418 (Pa. 1997), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant.

2009See Pa.R.E. 803(3). 7 ¶ 57 The trial court, in admitting said statements, relied on Commonwealth v. Collins, 550 Pa. 46 , 703 A.2d 418 (1997), for the following proposition: On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244 , 392 A.2d 1274 (1978) ] (victim told third person that she wanted to see the

2020See Commonwealth v. Green, 2013 PA Super 249 , 76 A.3d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statements that she was afraid of defendant and did not want “to go with him” were not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Moore, 937 A.2d at 1069 (victim’s statement that defendant bullied him was not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. 1981) (victim’s statement that he was fearful of defendant was not admissible under the state of mind exception).

2020See Commonwealth v. Green, 2013 PA Super 249 , 76 A.3d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statements that she was afraid of defendant and did not want “to go with him” were not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Moore, 937 A.2d at 1069 (victim’s statement that defendant bullied him was not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. 1981) (victim’s statement that he was fearful of defendant was not admissible under the state of mind exception).

2020See Commonwealth v. Green, 2013 PA Super 249 , 76 A.3d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statements that she was afraid of defendant and did not want “to go with him” were not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Moore, 937 A.2d at 1069 (victim’s statement that defendant bullied him was not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. 1981) (victim’s statement that he was fearful of defendant was not admissible under the state of mind exception).

2019See Commonwealth v. Green , 76 A.3d 575 , 582 (Pa.Super. 2013) (victim's statements that she was afraid of defendant and did not want "to go with him" were not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Moore , 937 A.2d at 1069 (victim's statement that defendant bullied him was not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Commonwealth v. Thornton , 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248 , 251 (1981) (victim's statement that he was fearful of defendant was not admissible under the state of mind exception).

2020See Commonwealth v. Green, 2013 PA Super 249 , 76 A.3d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statements that she was afraid of defendant and did not want “to go with him” were not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Moore, 937 A.2d at 1069 (victim’s statement that defendant bullied him was not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. 1981) (victim’s statement that he was fearful of defendant was not admissible under the state of mind exception).

2020See Commonwealth v. Green, 2013 PA Super 249 , 76 A.3d 575, 582 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statements that she was afraid of defendant and did not want “to go with him” were not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Moore, 937 A.2d at 1069 (victim’s statement that defendant bullied him was not admissible under state of mind exception); see also Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. 1981) (victim’s statement that he was fearful of defendant was not admissible under the state of mind exception).

2006Stallworth, supra (finding that the appellant's threats to the murder victim, which were contained in a PFA petition, were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to establish the appellant's intent or motive *32 for committing the crime); Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401 , 721 A.2d 1040 (1998) (finding that the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the murder victim had told a third party about her negative feelings for the appellant and her relationship with him under the state of mind exception because the victim's opinion o

2006Stallworth, supra (finding that the appellant's threats to the murder victim, which were contained in a PFA petition, were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to establish the appellant's intent or motive *32 for committing the crime); Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401 , 721 A.2d 1040 (1998) (finding that the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the murder victim had told a third party about her negative feelings for the appellant and her relationship with him under the state of mind exception because the victim's opinion o

2014The Moore Court noted that “Fletcher’s reasoning is explicitly directed to the use of victim state of mind evidence to establish the victim’s state of mind.” Moore, 937 A.2d at 1073 n.7. 10 This case may provide the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which has not recently addressed the admissibility of out-of-court statements by a homicide victim based upon the state of mind exception, with the opportunity to further clarify this exception, as it is a pre-trial appeal and involves numerous statements. - 16 - J-A20044-14 material issue in the case.11 Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060-61 ; accord Levanduski,

2006See Commonwealth v. Laich, 566 Pa. 19 , 777 A.2d 1057 (2001) (finding that the appellant's threats to kill the murder victim if he ever caught her with another man were not admissible under the state of mind exception because the victim's state of mind was irrelevant as to the appellant's degree of guilt); Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248 (1981) (finding that the trial court improperly admitted the murder victim's statement to police—that the appellant was after him—because the murder victim's state of mind was not at issue in the case).

2006Stallworth, supra (finding that the appellant's threats to the murder victim, which were contained in a PFA petition, were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to establish the appellant's intent or motive *32 for committing the crime); Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401 , 721 A.2d 1040 (1998) (finding that the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the murder victim had told a third party about her negative feelings for the appellant and her relationship with him under the state of mind exception because the victim's opinion o

2006Stallworth, supra (finding that the appellant's threats to the murder victim, which were contained in a PFA petition, were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to establish the appellant's intent or motive *32 for committing the crime); Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401 , 721 A.2d 1040 (1998) (finding that the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the murder victim had told a third party about her negative feelings for the appellant and her relationship with him under the state of mind exception because the victim's opinion o

2025See Rahman, 75 A.3d at 504 .

2024See Rahman, 75 A.3d at 504 .

2025The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the state of mind exception as follows: Where the declarant’s out-of-court statements demonstrate his or her state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material and relevant, this Court has held that the statements may be admitted. [Commonwealth v.] Riggins[, 386 A.2d 520, 526 (Pa. 1978)]; Commonwealth v. Thomas, … 189 A.2d 255 [, 260 (Pa. 1963)], cert. denied, 375 U.S. 856 , 11 L.

2025On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v.] Lowenberg[, ____________________________________________ vehicle accident eyewitness to a police officer, which the eyewitness made over ten minutes after the accident, did not constitute a present sense impression and lacked the requisite immediacy). - 19 - J-A05003-25 39

2025On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v.] Lowenberg[, ____________________________________________ vehicle accident eyewitness to a police officer, which the eyewitness made over ten minutes after the accident, did not constitute a present sense impression and lacked the requisite immediacy). - 19 - J-A05003-25 39

2009See Pa.R.E. 803(3). 7 ¶ 57 The trial court, in admitting said statements, relied on Commonwealth v. Collins, 550 Pa. 46 , 703 A.2d 418 (1997), for the following proposition: On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244 , 392 A.2d 1274 (1978) ] (victim told third person that she wanted to see the

2025On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v.] Lowenberg[, ____________________________________________ vehicle accident eyewitness to a police officer, which the eyewitness made over ten minutes after the accident, did not constitute a present sense impression and lacked the requisite immediacy). - 19 - J-A05003-25 39

2009See Pa.R.E. 803(3). 7 ¶ 57 The trial court, in admitting said statements, relied on Commonwealth v. Collins, 550 Pa. 46 , 703 A.2d 418 (1997), for the following proposition: On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244 , 392 A.2d 1274 (1978) ] (victim told third person that she wanted to see the

2007See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 775 (D.C.Cir.1973) (stating that, "to allow hearsay statements which relate past events on memory or belief under the state of mind exception would in effect *1070 swallow the hearsay rule.").

2007See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 775 (D.C.Cir.1973) (stating that, “to allow hearsay statements which relate past events on memory or belief under the state of mind exception would in effect swallow the hearsay rule.”).

2014Five judges in Luster rejected three judges’ view that, under Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3 (Pa.Super.2006) (en banc), appeal de nied, 591 Pa. 711 , 919 A.2d 955 (2007), the victim’s statements were not admissible under the state of mind exception.

2014Hence, we perceive no error or abuse of discretion in the trial trial court erred in admitting the challenged evidence under Rule 803(3), we conclude that any such error was harmless in view of the independent and compelling See Green, 76 A.3d at 583 (finding that trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay statements from two witnesses under the state of mind exception but that error was harmless given other evidence of guilt); Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 22 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc - 11 - J-A19016-14 wife/defendant and her paramour inadmissible in murder trial under

2024Commonwealth v. Hess, … 548 A.2d 582 , 585 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citations omitted).

2024Commonwealth v. Hess, … 548 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citations omitted).

2020See Commonwealth v. Parker, 2014 PA Super 253 , 104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014) (victim’s questions to grandmother were admissible under state of mind exception); - 37 - J-S10010-20 see also Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 2013 PA Super 287 , 79 A.3d 1173, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statement that he was scared of defendant and if he died it would be defendant’s fault was properly admitted as evidence based on state of mind exception).

2020See Commonwealth v. Parker, 2014 PA Super 253 , 104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014) (victim’s questions to grandmother were admissible under state of mind exception); - 37 - J-S10010-20 see also Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 2013 PA Super 287 , 79 A.3d 1173, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2013) (victim’s statement that he was scared of defendant and if he died it would be defendant’s fault was properly admitted as evidence based on state of mind exception).

2025On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v.] Lowenberg[, ____________________________________________ vehicle accident eyewitness to a police officer, which the eyewitness made over ten minutes after the accident, did not constitute a present sense impression and lacked the requisite immediacy). - 19 - J-A05003-25 39

2009See Pa.R.E. 803(3). 7 ¶ 57 The trial court, in admitting said statements, relied on Commonwealth v. Collins, 550 Pa. 46 , 703 A.2d 418 (1997), for the following proposition: On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim’s out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant. [Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244 , 392 A.2d 1274 (1978) ] (victim told third person that she wanted to see the

2021See Commonwealth v. Ragan, 645 A.2d 811, 818-19 (Pa. 1994) (affirming admission of testimony, under state-of-mind exception to the rule against hearsay, that eyewitness told a detective he did not wish to talk to detective in front of his wife because she was pressuring him not to testify); see also id. at 824 (holding prosecution’s questioning of witness about threats to family was permissible to explain prior inconsistent statement).

1997Commonwealth v. Ragan, 538 Pa. 2 , 645 A.2d 811 (1994). *60 On several occasions, we have held that a deceased victim's out-of-court statements evincing an intent to meet the defendant shortly before the killing were admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception because such an intent provided circumstantial evidence that the victim did meet with the defendant.

2021The Superior Court proceeded to hold that the day planner note was “admissible under the state-of-mind exception,” because it “tended to establish [Annemarie’s] then-existing belief, i.e., her state of mind, which was relevant to show the ill will that [Annemarie] perceived from Fitzpatrick, and, by implication, that their marriage was not going well.” Id. at 532 .

2021Contradictorily, the panel then opined that the note “was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and therefore was not hearsay.” Id.

2001See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 293-94 , 750 A.2d 261, 275-76 (2000) (holding that the victim’s assertion that he had used a package of drugs belonging to the appellant was admissible under the state of mind exception as evidence of the appellant’s motive); Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401, 411 , 721 A.2d 1040, 1045 (1998) (holding similarly); Commonwealth v. Collins, 550 Pa. 46, 58-60 , 703 A.2d 418, 424-25 (1997) (holding similarly), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1015 , 119 S.Ct. 538 , 142 L.Ed.2d 447 (1998); see also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 559 Pa. 358, 368 , 740 A.2d 219, 225 (199

2001See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 293-94 , 750 A.2d 261, 275-76 (2000) (holding that the victim’s assertion that he had used a package of drugs belonging to the appellant was admissible under the state of mind exception as evidence of the appellant’s motive); Commonwealth v. Chandler, 554 Pa. 401, 411 , 721 A.2d 1040, 1045 (1998) (holding similarly); Commonwealth v. Collins, 550 Pa. 46, 58-60 , 703 A.2d 418, 424-25 (1997) (holding similarly), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1015 , 119 S.Ct. 538 , 142 L.Ed.2d 447 (1998); see also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 559 Pa. 358, 368 , 740 A.2d 219, 225 (199