state of mind exception in Florida

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2004See Van Zant v. State, 372 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Webb v. State, 336 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).

1993(Emphasis added) The state correctly points out that the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule applies only to the declarant/seller's state of mind, Van Zant v. State, 372 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), which is not an issue in this case.

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

1999See Peterka, 640 So.2d at 69 ; Kingery v. State, 523 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Kennedy v. State, 385 So.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

1993Fleming v. State, 457 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), pet. for rev. den. 467 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1985); Kennedy v. State, 385 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2018See Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 748 (2004) (recognizing exceptions to the state-of-mind rule); Brooks, 787 So. 2d at 771 (explaining that a victim’s state of mind may be relevant to: (1) an element of the crime; (2) an issue in the case where defendant claims self-defense, that the victim committed suicide, or the victim’s death was accidental; or (3) when used to rebut a defense raised by defendant); Woods, 733 So. 2d at 988 ; Peede v. State, 474 So. 2d 808, 816 (Fla. 1985); State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

2017See Suarez v. State, 879 So.2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that declarant's comment made prior to the relevant timeframe in which state of mind was at issue was not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule). .

2017See Suarez v. State, 879 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that declarant’s comment made prior to the relevant timeframe in which state of mind was at issue was not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule). 2 See Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 18 (Fla. 2010) ("[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998))).

2010“It is well settled that the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of extra-judicial statements only if the declarant’s state of mind is at issue in a particular case or to prove or explain the declarant’s subsequent conduct.” Rigdon v. State, 621 So.2d 475, 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (citation omitted); see also Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1992), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992).

1999See Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 931-32 (Fla.), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992); Downs v. State, 574 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla.1991); Charles W.

2010“It is well settled that the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of extra-judicial statements only if the declarant’s state of mind is at issue in a particular case or to prove or explain the declarant’s subsequent conduct.” Rigdon v. State, 621 So.2d 475, 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (citation omitted); see also Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1992), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992).

1999See Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 931-32 (Fla.), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992); Downs v. State, 574 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla.1991); Charles W.

2010“It is well settled that the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of extra-judicial statements only if the declarant’s state of mind is at issue in a particular case or to prove or explain the declarant’s subsequent conduct.” Rigdon v. State, 621 So.2d 475, 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (citation omitted); see also Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1992), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992).

1999See Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 931-32 (Fla.), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992); Downs v. State, 574 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla.1991); Charles W.

2000See Peterka v. State, 640 So.2d 59, 69 (Fla. 1994).

1999See Peterka, 640 So.2d at 69 ; Kingery v. State, 523 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Kennedy v. State, 385 So.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

1999See Peterka, 640 So.2d at 69 ; Kingery v. State, 523 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Kennedy v. State, 385 So.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

1994Kingery v. State, 523 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Ehrhardt, § 803.3a.

2024Section 90.803(3)(a)(2) allows for the admission of "[a] statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when 10 such evidence is offered to . . . . [p]rove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant." Relying on Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1997); Dorbad v. State, 12 So. 3d 255, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); and D.M.L. v. State, 976 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Sigismondi acknowledged that the state of mind exception does not typicall

2024The supreme court rejected the argument that the statement was too remote and held that this type of statement, made the day before the defendant had escaped, was "exactly the kind of evidence contemplated by section 90.803(3)(a)(2) . . . as satisfying the state of mind exception to explain subsequent conduct." Id.

1989United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C.

1984United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d at 771 ; Hunt, 429 So.2d at 813 ; Bailey, 419 So.2d at 722 ; Van Zant, 372 So.2d at 504 .

1993Fleming v. State, 457 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), pet. for rev. den. 467 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1985); Kennedy v. State, 385 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

1986See Fleming v. State, 457 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Van Zant v. State, 372 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

1989Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

1984Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Kennedy v. State, 385 So.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Van Zant v. State, 372 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

2025Horton v. Allen, 370 F. 3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 127 (1999)) (stating that firmly rooted exceptions are those that permit the admission of declarations “made without motive to reflect on the legal consequences of one's statements and in situations that are exceptionally conducive to veracity”).

2025Horton v. Allen, 370 F. 3d 75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 127 (1999)) (stating that firmly rooted exceptions are those that permit the admission of declarations “made without motive to reflect on the legal consequences of one's statements and in situations that are exceptionally conducive to veracity”).

2024Section 90.803(3)(a)(2) allows for the admission of "[a] statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when 10 such evidence is offered to . . . . [p]rove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant." Relying on Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1997); Dorbad v. State, 12 So. 3d 255, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); and D.M.L. v. State, 976 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Sigismondi acknowledged that the state of mind exception does not typicall

2024Section 90.803(3)(a)(2) allows for the admission of "[a] statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when 10 such evidence is offered to . . . . [p]rove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant." Relying on Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1997); Dorbad v. State, 12 So. 3d 255, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); and D.M.L. v. State, 976 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Sigismondi acknowledged that the state of mind exception does not typicall

2024"In order to be preserved for further 15 review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved." Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (emphasis added); see also § 924.051, Fla. Stat. (2021) (" 'Preserved' means that an issue, legal argument, or objection to evidence was timely raised before, and ruled on by, the trial court, and that the issue, legal argument, or objection to evidence was sufficiently precise that it fairl

2024Section 90.803(3)(a)(2) allows for the admission of "[a] statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when 10 such evidence is offered to . . . . [p]rove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant." Relying on Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1997); Dorbad v. State, 12 So. 3d 255, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); and D.M.L. v. State, 976 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Sigismondi acknowledged that the state of mind exception does not typicall

2024Section 90.803(3)(a)(2) allows for the admission of "[a] statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when 10 such evidence is offered to . . . . [p]rove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant." Relying on Monlyn v. State, 705 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1997); Dorbad v. State, 12 So. 3d 255, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); and D.M.L. v. State, 976 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), Sigismondi acknowledged that the state of mind exception does not typicall

2024It was also within the court's discretion to consider whether there was any other evidence that Blow was acting in accord with his stated plan to beat Sigismondi up the next time he saw him. "[S]tatements admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are 17 properly admitted only if they involve the state of mind of the declarant and there is evidence demonstrating that the declarant acted in accord with the state of mind or intent." Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1128 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Combs v. State, 133 So. 3d 564, 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (following

2024It was also within the court's discretion to consider whether there was any other evidence that Blow was acting in accord with his stated plan to beat Sigismondi up the next time he saw him. "[S]tatements admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are 17 properly admitted only if they involve the state of mind of the declarant and there is evidence demonstrating that the declarant acted in accord with the state of mind or intent." Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1128 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Combs v. State, 133 So. 3d 564, 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (following

2017See Suarez v. State, 879 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that declarant’s comment made prior to the relevant timeframe in which state of mind was at issue was not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule). 2 See Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 18 (Fla. 2010) ("[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998))).

2017See Suarez v. State, 879 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that declarant’s comment made prior to the relevant timeframe in which state of mind was at issue was not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule). 2 See Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 18 (Fla. 2010) ("[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998))).

2010“It is well settled that the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of extra-judicial statements only if the declarant’s state of mind is at issue in a particular case or to prove or explain the declarant’s subsequent conduct.” Rigdon v. State, 621 So.2d 475, 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (citation omitted); see also Hodges v. State, 595 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1992), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 803 , 113 S.Ct. 33 , 121 L.Ed.2d 6 (1992).

2010In Rigdon , the court held that the victim’s out-of-court statement, that she felt threatened by the defendant, was inadmissible since her “state of mind was not at issue and her statements could not be used to prove appellant’s state of mind.” 621 So.2d at 479 .