state of mind exception in Tennessee

2015App. 2010) (holding that “the portion of the victim‟s hearsay statement in which she told her mother that „it hurt‟ would have also been admissible as an „existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition‟ . . . however, the portion of the hearsay statement „Jesus touch me here,‟ identifying a „third party‟s conduct,‟ would not have been admissible under the state of mind exception”); see also State v. Farmer, 927 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. Crim.

2010See State v. Farmer, 927 S.W.2d 582, 595 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996) (holding the state of mind exception assumes “the declarant’s own state of mind [is] relevant to a material issue” but excludes hearsay testimony admitted to prove a third party’s conduct).

2017See Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 573 (ruling that the victim‘s hearsay statements expressing fear of the defendant were admissible under the state of mind exception and relevant ―to reveal the falsehood‖ of the defendant‘s statement to the police indicating that he and his wife, the victim, were reconciling); State v. Trusty, 326 S.W.3d 582, 603 (Tenn. Crim.

2017See Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 573 (ruling that the victim’s hearsay statements expressing fear of the defendant were admissible under the state of mind exception and relevant “to reveal the falsehood” of the defendant’s statement to the police indicating that he and his wife, the victim, were reconciling); State v. Trusty, 326 S.W.3d 582, 603 (Tenn. Crim.

2014App. 2010) (victim’s statements about her fear of the defendant, which were made close to the time of her death, -22- were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and were relevant to show her state of mind at the time she made the statement and her behavior at the time of her death); State v. Hutchinson, 898 S.W.2d 161, 172 (Tenn. 1994) (victim’s statement that he was going fishing “with the boys” was admissible to show his state of mind, i.e., that he intended to go fishing, and connected one of the defendants to the fishing trip where the victim was drowned).

1996The Advisory Commission Comment to Rule 803.8 states that the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule “contemplates that only the declarant’s conduct, not some third party’s conduct, is provable by this hearsay exception.” See also State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 171 (Tenn.1994).

2005See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 330 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the trial court correctly admitted “testimony about the defendant’s statement evidencing his dislike for blacks under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule”).

2001For example, in the case of State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 329-30 (Tenn. 1992), the defendant was on trial for murder and aggravated kidnaping, and the trial court permitted a witness to testify, pursuant to the state of mind exception, to the defendant’s racially biased statements which the defendant made to the witness on -6- the morning of the murder.

2017Id.

2017See Smith, 868 S.W.2d at 573 (ruling that the victim’s hearsay statements expressing fear of the defendant were admissible under the state of mind exception and relevant “to reveal the falsehood” of the defendant’s statement to the police indicating that he and his wife, the victim, were reconciling); State v. Trusty, 326 S.W.3d 582, 603 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See State v. Wilson, 164 S.W.3d 355, 365 (Tenn. Crim.

2013Evid. 803(3). “[Q]uestions concerning the admissibility of evidence rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere in the absence of abuse appearing on the face of the record.” Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 870 (Tenn. 2008).

2002Cf., e.g., United States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1371 (9th Cir. 1994)(“‘The state-of-mind exception does not permit the witness to relate any of the declarant’s statements as to why he held the particular state of mind, or what he might have believed that would have induced the state of mind.”).

1996We agree with the court in Clark that “to admit such evidence where the victim’s intentions are irrelevant violates one of the fundamental concepts of the state-of-mind exception: that the declarant’s own state of mind be relevant to a material issue in the case.” Clark at 30 ; see also In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal.App.3d 1098 , 200 Cal.Rptr. 789, 802 (1984).

1996We agree with the court in Clark that “to admit such evidence where the victim’s intentions are irrelevant violates one of the fundamental concepts of the state-of-mind exception: that the declarant’s own state of mind be relevant to a material issue in the case.” Clark at 30 ; see also In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal.App.3d 1098 , 200 Cal.Rptr. 789, 802 (1984).

1994State v. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tenn. Crim.

1994State v. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1993).