state of mind requirement in Indiana

1989We also reject Light’s argument that this hearsay was admissible because it falls under the state of mind exception, described in Dunaway v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 682, 686 .

1989We also reject Light's argument that this hearsay was admissible because it falls under the state of mind exception, described in Dunaway v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 682, 686 .

2017In doing so, the Indiana Supreme Court held as follows: First, as we observed in Runyon “because the phrase ‘recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally’ appears in the disjunctive and thus prescribes alternative considerations, the state of mind requirement may be satisfied by adequate evidence that a defendant’s failure to pay a probation imposed financial obligation was either reckless, knowing, or intentional.” 939 N.E.2d at 616 .

2016Our review of the record indicates otherwise. [12] “‘[B]ecause the phrase ‘recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally’ appears in the disjunctive and thus prescribes alternative considerations, the state of mind requirement may be satisfied by adequate evidence that a defendant’s failure to pay a probation imposed financial obligation was either reckless, knowing, or intentional.” Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1113 (quoting Runyon, 939 N.E.2d at 616 ).

2016Our review of the record indicates otherwise. [12] “‘[B]ecause the phrase ‘recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally’ appears in the disjunctive and thus prescribes alternative considerations, the state of mind requirement may be satisfied by adequate evidence that a defendant’s failure to pay a probation imposed financial obligation was either reckless, knowing, or intentional.” Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1113 (quoting Runyon, 939 N.E.2d at 616 ).

2013With respect to whether the State showed that Hayes failed to make his child support payments knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “because the phrase ‘recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally’ appears in the disjunctive and thus prescribes alternative considerations, the state of mind requirement may be satisfied by adequate evidence that a defendant’s failure to pay a probation imposed financial obligation was either reckless, knowing, or intentional.” Id. (citing Runyon, 939 N.E.2d at 616 ).

2016See, e.g., Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1051-52 (Ind. 2003) (holding that where defendant had not placed murder victim’s state of mind in issue, trial court abused its discretion by allowing witnesses to testify that victim had told them that she feared defendant and that defendant had threatened her); Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 443-44 (Ind. 1999) (same). [23] That said, even assuming that Iqbal’s attorney performed deficiently by failing to raise the hearsay issue on appeal, raising the issue would not have resulted in the reversal of Iqbal’s convictions.

2016See, e.g., Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1051-52 (Ind. 2003) (holding that where defendant had not placed murder victim’s state of mind in issue, trial court abused its discretion by allowing witnesses to testify that victim had told them that she feared defendant and that defendant had threatened her); Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 443-44 (Ind. 1999) (same). [23] That said, even assuming that Iqbal’s attorney performed deficiently by failing to raise the hearsay issue on appeal, raising the issue would not have resulted in the reversal of Iqbal’s convictions.

2009See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir.1980) ("[The state-of-mind exception does not permit the witness to relate any of the declarant's statements as to why he held the particular state of mind, or what he might have believed that would have induced the state of mind.").

1993See Komyatti v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 279, 286 (where declarant's state of mind was irrelevant to the issues in the case, the state of mind exception is inapplicable and it is inadmissible hearsay).