state of mind exception in Missouri

2021See, e.g., State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Mo. 1997) (to fall within “state of mind” exception, out-of-court statement must not be a “mere ‘narration of past events,’” but “‘must refer to the intention, design or state of mind of the declarant’” (footnote citations omitted)); State v. Martinelli, 972 S.W.2d 424, 436 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (“Statements which merely recount past events do not fall within the state of mind exception unless they are a ‘contemporaneous statement of fear, emotion, or any other mental condition.’”; finding exception inapplicable to “a narration which does not invol

2021See, e.g., State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Mo. 1997) (to fall within “state of mind” exception, out-of-court statement must not be a “mere ‘narration of past events,’” but “‘must refer to the intention, design or state of mind of the declarant’” (footnote citations omitted)); State v. Martinelli, 972 S.W.2d 424, 436 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (“Statements which merely recount past events do not fall within the state of mind exception unless they are a ‘contemporaneous statement of fear, emotion, or any other mental condition.’”; finding exception inapplicable to “a narration which does not invol

2000We also note, however, that in State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. banc 1997), the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed that the state of mind exception only permits admission of the statements “in limited situations when they are relevant and the relevancy outweighs their prejudicial effect.” Id. at 483 (quoting State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 903 , 107 S.Ct. 302 , 93 L.Ed.2d 276 (1986)).

1997We also note, however, that in State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. banc 1997), the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed that the state of mind exception only permits admission of the statements “in limited situations when they are relevant and the relevancy outweighs their prejudicial effect.” Id. at 483 (quoting State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 903 , 107 S.Ct. 302 , 93 L.Ed.2d 276 (1986)).

1997In response, the State claimed Weston's and Proffitt's testimony was admissible under the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, citing State v. Ford, 639 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.1982), State v. Kennedy, 842 S.W.2d 937 (Mo.App.1992), and State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410 (Mo.App.1979).

1997In response, the State claimed Weston’s and Proffitt’s testimony was admissible under the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, citing State v. Ford, 639 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.1982), State v. Kennedy, 842 S.W.2d 937 (Mo.App.1992), and State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410 (Mo.App.1979).

2025See State v. Martinelli, 972 S.W.2d 424, 435 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).

2021See, e.g., State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Mo. 1997) (to fall within “state of mind” exception, out-of-court statement must not be a “mere ‘narration of past events,’” but “‘must refer to the intention, design or state of mind of the declarant’” (footnote citations omitted)); State v. Martinelli, 972 S.W.2d 424, 436 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (“Statements which merely recount past events do not fall within the state of mind exception unless they are a ‘contemporaneous statement of fear, emotion, or any other mental condition.’”; finding exception inapplicable to “a narration which does not invol

2007See also Ford, 639 S.W.2d at 575 (deceased’s statements regarding state of mind admissible because “relevant to the issue of which participant in the shooting was the aggressor”); State v. Pagano, 882 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Mo.App.

1999“Because of the danger that such evidence might be considered for an improper purpose, its use is generally limited to cases where hearsay declarations of mental condition are especially relevant— particularly where the defendant has put the decedent’s mental state at issue by claiming accident, self-defense or suicide.” Id.; see also State v. Randolph, 698 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 419 (Mo.App.1979); Kelley, 953 S.W.2d at 83 ; State v. Pagano, 882 S.W.2d 326, 336 (Mo.App.1994); United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 774 (D.C.Cir.1973). 9 As previously set o

1999“Because of the danger that such evidence might be considered for an improper purpose, its use is generally limited to cases where hearsay declarations of mental condition are especially relevant— particularly where the defendant has put the decedent’s mental state at issue by claiming accident, self-defense or suicide.” Id.; see also State v. Randolph, 698 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 419 (Mo.App.1979); Kelley, 953 S.W.2d at 83 ; State v. Pagano, 882 S.W.2d 326, 336 (Mo.App.1994); United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 774 (D.C.Cir.1973). 9 As previously set o

1997In response, the State claimed Weston’s and Proffitt’s testimony was admissible under the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, citing State v. Ford, 639 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.1982), State v. Kennedy, 842 S.W.2d 937 (Mo.App.1992), and State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410 (Mo.App.1979).

2007The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule also allows the admission of statements “to show a future intent of the declarant to perform an act if the occurrence of that act is at issue.” United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C.Cir.1973).

1999“Because of the danger that such evidence might be considered for an improper purpose, its use is generally limited to cases where hearsay declarations of mental condition are especially relevant— particularly where the defendant has put the decedent’s mental state at issue by claiming accident, self-defense or suicide.” Id.; see also State v. Randolph, 698 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 419 (Mo.App.1979); Kelley, 953 S.W.2d at 83 ; State v. Pagano, 882 S.W.2d 326, 336 (Mo.App.1994); United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 774 (D.C.Cir.1973). 9 As previously set o

2000See also State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 458 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837 , 115 S.Ct. 118 , 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994).

1999The Missouri Supreme Court opined that a “victim’s statements of fear of the defendant — where relevant and not unduly prejudicial — are admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 458 .

2000See also State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 458 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837 , 115 S.Ct. 118 , 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994).

1997See also State v. Shum, 866 S.W.2d 447, 458 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837 , 115 S.Ct. 118 , 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994).

2000See also State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 458 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837 , 115 S.Ct. 118 , 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994).

1997See also State v. Shum, 866 S.W.2d 447, 458 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837 , 115 S.Ct. 118 , 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994).

1999“Because of the danger that such evidence might be considered for an improper purpose, its use is generally limited to cases where hearsay declarations of mental condition are especially relevant— particularly where the defendant has put the decedent’s mental state at issue by claiming accident, self-defense or suicide.” Id.; see also State v. Randolph, 698 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 419 (Mo.App.1979); Kelley, 953 S.W.2d at 83 ; State v. Pagano, 882 S.W.2d 326, 336 (Mo.App.1994); United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 774 (D.C.Cir.1973). 9 As previously set o

1997NOTES [1] State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. banc 1986). [2] Id. [3] See State v. Ford, 639 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo. banc 1982) (admitting testimony that murder victim said accused had harassed her and that she was afraid he might come to her house and become violent); State v. Pagano, 882 S.W.2d 326, 336 (Mo.App.1994) (admitting testimony that murder victim said that accused had threatened to kill him and that he feared accused); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Mo.App. 1979) (admitting testimony that murder victim said she was afraid of the accused, afraid of guns, and had heard that

1998State v. Ivory, 916 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Mo.App.

1997The court found that the testimony of the victim’s colleagues admissible as declarations against interest tended to show defendant’s possible motive. 916 S.W.2d at 339 .

1997See Post, 901 S.W.2d at 236 [9], Based on Brown and Post , we conclude that Christy’s statements to Weston and Proffitt were not admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

1997In contrast, in State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231 (Mo.App.1995), the Eastern District held that the victim’s statements that she wanted to divorce the defendant were not admissible under the state of mind exception because her state of mind was not relevant to the defense.

2025A trial court may properly admit hearsay statements that speak to the victim’s or defendant’s state of mind “in limited situations when they are relevant and the relevancy outweighs their prejudicial effect.” State v. Rios, 234 S.W.3d 412, 422 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007); State v. Wiley, 337 S.W.3d 41, 44 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (quoting State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. banc 1997)); see also Townsend, 649 S.W.3d at 79 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (internal citations omitted).

2025A trial court may properly admit hearsay statements that speak to the victim’s or defendant’s state of mind “in limited situations when they are relevant and the relevancy outweighs their prejudicial effect.” State v. Rios, 234 S.W.3d 412, 422 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007); State v. Wiley, 337 S.W.3d 41, 44 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (quoting State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. banc 1997)); see also Townsend, 649 S.W.3d at 79 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (internal citations omitted).

2025Rios, 234 S.W.3d at 423 ; see also Townsend, 649 S.W.3d at 79 (internal citation omitted).

2025See id. 6 Even if Grandmother’s alleged threat to Victim caused Victim to fear her, and that fear of Grandmother were somehow relevant to the overall context of the incident, the state-of-mind exception would not apply because “state of mind statements are only admissible in cases involving claims of self-defense, suicide or accidental death,” none of which are at issue here.

2022State v, Gonzalez, 153 S.W.3d 311, 344 (Mo, bane 2005), Under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, statements that go to a defendant's state of mind may be admissible in cases involving claims of self-defense, suicide, or accidental death, State v. Martinelli, 972 S.W.2d 494 , 435 (Mo, App. E.D, 1998).

2018See, e.g., Rucker , 521 S.W.3d at 571 (evidence of ultimatum that in three days defendant must either find a job or else leave the victim's apartment was properly admitted); Ernst v. Commonwealth , 160 S.W.3d 744 , 752-53 (Ky. 2005) (evidence of landlord's intention to initiate eviction proceedings against the defendant in two days was properly admitted).

2018See, e.g., Dillon v. Commonwealth , 475 S.W.3d 1 , 23 (Ky. 2015).

2016Compressed Steel, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Mo. App. 2006).

2007Specifically, “ ‘[a] declaration indicating a present intention to do a particular act in the immediate future, made in apparent good faith and not for self-serving purposes, is admissible to prove that the act was in fact performed.’ ” State v. Newson, 898 S.W.2d 710, 716 (Mo.App.

2007State v. Nastasio, 957 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Mo.App.

2007The “state of mind exception only permits admission of [ ] statements ‘in limited situations when they are relevant and the relevancy outweighs their prejudicial effect.’ ” Nastasio, 957 S.W.2d at 458 (quoting State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Mo. banc 1997)).

2006Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City, 826 S.W.2d 391, 396-97 (Mo.App.1992).

2001State v. Sutherland, 939 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Mo. banc 1997).

2000This Court’s most recent recitation of the doctrine is found in State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 510 (Mo. banc 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 856 , 117 S.Ct. 153 , 136 L.Ed.2d 98 (1996), which states, “ ‘[w]here a defendant has injected an issue into the case, the state may be allowed to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to explain or counteract a negative inference raised by the issue defendant injects.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 734-35 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 , 108 S.Ct. 206 , 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987)).