external standard in California

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1958(See Francesconi v. Beluomini, supra [ 28 Cal.App.2d 701 ( 83 P.2d 298 )]; Chandler v. Quinlan, 25 Cal.App.2d 646, 648 [ 78 P.2d 235 ].) The probability of injury to a guest from such conduct is an apparent consequence to any person of ordinary prudence and, applying the external standard above mentioned, any driver engaging in such conduct is charged with implied knowledge of the probability of such injury.

1958(See Francesconi v. Beluomini, supra [ 28 Cal.App.2d 701 ( 83 P.2d 298 )]; Chandler v. Quinlan, 25 Cal.App.2d 646, 648 [ 78 P.2d 235 ].) The probability of injury to a guest from such conduct is an apparent consequence to any person of ordinary prudence and, applying the external standard above mentioned, any driver engaging in such conduct is charged with implied knowledge of the probability of such injury.

1947Such a probability, it was concluded, using the language of Stacey v. Hayes, 31 Cal.App.2d 422, 426 [ 88 P.2d 165 ], " 'must have been an apparent consequence to a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence'." Considering the present record, the last quoted instructions advised the jury, in substance, that they might draw their own inferences, and could charge the driver with knowledge "if the judgment of the jury so directs." This instruction presented for determination as an issue of fact the question as to whether Davison had implied knowledge of the probable consequences of his conduct.

1947Such a probability, it was concluded, using the language of Stacey v. Hayes, 31 Cal.App.2d 422, 426 [ 88 P.2d 165 ], " 'must have been an apparent consequence to a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence'." Considering the present record, the last quoted instructions advised the jury, in substance, that they might draw their own inferences, and could charge the driver with knowledge "if the judgment of the jury so directs." This instruction presented for determination as an issue of fact the question as to whether Davison had implied knowledge of the probable consequences of his conduct.

2024(Adair, at p. 904; see id. at p. 906 [“‘reasonable cause’” is an “objective question measured by an external standard”].) In other words, the record before the juvenile court must “exonerate” the petitioner, “not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt.” (Id. at p. 909.) As noted above, relief is available only to “‘petitioners who can show that the state should never have subjected them to the compulsion of the criminal law—because no objective factors justified official action.’” (Id. at p. 905; accord, People v. Bleich (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 292, 299 (Bleich); People v. Chagoyan, su

2024(Adair, at p. 904; see id. at p. 906 [“‘reasonable cause’” is an “objective question measured by an external standard”].) In other words, the record before the juvenile court must “exonerate” the petitioner, “not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt.” (Id. at p. 909.) As noted above, relief is available only to “‘petitioners who can show that the state should never have subjected them to the compulsion of the criminal law—because no objective factors justified official action.’” (Id. at p. 905; accord, People v. Bleich (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 292, 299 (Bleich); People v. Chagoyan, su

2024(Adair, at p. 904; see id. at p. 906 [“‘reasonable cause’” is an “objective question measured by an external standard”].) In other words, the record before the juvenile court must “exonerate” the petitioner, “not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt.” (Id. at p. 909.) As noted above, relief is available only to “‘petitioners who can show that the state should never have subjected them to the compulsion of the criminal law—because no objective factors justified official action.’” (Id. at p. 905; accord, People v. Bleich (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 292, 299 (Bleich); People v. Chagoyan, su

2013(See, e.g., In re Tapia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1113 [contrary to the evidence, inmate denied planning a murder]; In re Shippman (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 446, 460-462 [inmate repeatedly denied or minimized past incidents in which his irrational need to control his romantic partners resulted in emotional or physical violence].) While Lockett‟s choice of words was ill-advised, his use of the single phrase “childish antic” does not amount to some evidence he has minimized the seriousness of, or his role in, the crime. 10 The Board‟s conclusion that Lockett has failed to develop sufficient insi

2013(See, e.g., In re Tapia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1113 [contrary to the evidence, inmate denied planning a murder]; In re Shippman (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 446, 460-462 [inmate repeatedly denied or minimized past incidents in which his irrational need to control his romantic partners resulted in emotional or physical violence].) While Lockett‟s choice of words was ill-advised, his use of the single phrase “childish antic” does not amount to some evidence he has minimized the seriousness of, or his role in, the crime. 10 The Board‟s conclusion that Lockett has failed to develop sufficient insi

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1985Thus, the cases have held “that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.” (Cope v. Davison (1947) 30 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 180 P.2d 873 , 171 A.L.R. 667 ].) “The . . . test that has evolved ... in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.” (Chappell v. Palmer (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 34, 37 [ 45 Cal

1973(See Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 633-634 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 361 P.2d 247 ].) All this phrase means, however, is that the salary-setting agencies shall take into “consideration” the prevailing wage in other public and private employment. 3 At this juncture we note that plaintiffs are not contending that consideration was not given to an external standard.

1973(See Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 633-634 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 361 P.2d 247 ].) All this phrase means, however, is that the salary-setting agencies shall take into “consideration” the prevailing wage in other public and private employment. 3 At this juncture we note that plaintiffs are not contending that consideration was not given to an external standard.

1973(Cf. Monahan v. Dept. of Water & Power (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 746, 752 [ 120 P.2d 730 ].) The succeeding phrase does establish an external standard commonly known as the “prevailing wage” doctrine.

1973(Cf. Monahan v. Dept. of Water & Power (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 746, 752 [ 120 P.2d 730 ].) The succeeding phrase does establish an external standard commonly known as the “prevailing wage” doctrine.

1947(Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 390, 396 [ 264 P. 237 ]; Stroud v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 556, 562 [ 120 P.2d 102 ].) In the Van Fleet case, supra, it was said that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.

1947(Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 390, 396 [ 264 P. 237 ]; Stroud v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 556, 562 [ 120 P.2d 102 ].) In the Van Fleet case, supra, it was said that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.

1947(Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 390, 396 [ 264 P. 237 ]; Stroud v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 556, 562 [ 120 P.2d 102 ].) In the Van Fleet case, supra, it was said that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.

1947(Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 390, 396 [ 264 P. 237 ]; Stroud v. Hansen, 48 Cal.App.2d 556, 562 [ 120 P.2d 102 ].) In the Van Fleet case, supra, it was said that, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to disclose implied knowledge of the probability of injury from an act or omission, an external standard is applied.