external standard in Connecticut

1943The standard of care which a person is ordinarily required to exercise to guard his own safety is that of a reasonably prudent man; it is “an external standard, and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned.” Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 48 , 179 Atl. 9 , quoting The Germanic, 196 U. S. 589, 596 , 25 Sup. Ct. 317.

1935This is “an external standard, and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned.” The Germanic, 196 U. S. 589, 596 , 25 Sup. Ct. 317, 49 L.

2017This is so even when the covenants contain such broad, general approval standards ...." [citations omitted] ); Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., supra, 168 Colo. at 8 , 449 P.2d 361 (rejecting claim that restrictive covenant "is not enforceable because no specific standards are contained therein to guide the committee in determining the approval or disapproval of plans when submitted"); Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp ., 356 Mass. 703 , 707, 255 N.E.2d 326 (1970) (restriction requiring approval of plans that lack explicit standards of approval "may be enforced if the power to do so is exercised reasona

2017This is so even when the covenants contain such broad, general approval standards ...." [citations omitted] ); Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., supra, 168 Colo. at 8 , 449 P.2d 361 (rejecting claim that restrictive covenant "is not enforceable because no specific standards are contained therein to guide the committee in determining the approval or disapproval of plans when submitted"); Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp ., 356 Mass. 703 , 707, 255 N.E.2d 326 (1970) (restriction requiring approval of plans that lack explicit standards of approval "may be enforced if the power to do so is exercised reasona

2017This is so even when the covenants contain such broad, general approval standards ...." [citations omitted] ); Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., supra, 168 Colo. at 8 , 449 P.2d 361 (rejecting claim that restrictive covenant "is not enforceable because no specific standards are contained therein to guide the committee in determining the approval or disapproval of plans when submitted"); Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp ., 356 Mass. 703 , 707, 255 N.E.2d 326 (1970) (restriction requiring approval of plans that lack explicit standards of approval "may be enforced if the power to do so is exercised reasona

2017This is so even when the covenants contain such broad, general approval standards ...." [citations omitted] ); Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., supra, 168 Colo. at 8 , 449 P.2d 361 (rejecting claim that restrictive covenant "is not enforceable because no specific standards are contained therein to guide the committee in determining the approval or disapproval of plans when submitted"); Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp ., 356 Mass. 703 , 707, 255 N.E.2d 326 (1970) (restriction requiring approval of plans that lack explicit standards of approval "may be enforced if the power to do so is exercised reasona

2017This is so even when the covenants contain such broad, general approval standards ...." [citations omitted] ); Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., supra, 168 Colo. at 8 , 449 P.2d 361 (rejecting claim that restrictive covenant "is not enforceable because no specific standards are contained therein to guide the committee in determining the approval or disapproval of plans when submitted"); Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp ., 356 Mass. 703 , 707, 255 N.E.2d 326 (1970) (restriction requiring approval of plans that lack explicit standards of approval "may be enforced if the power to do so is exercised reasona

2017This is so even when the covenants contain such broad, general approval standards ...." [citations omitted] ); Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., supra, 168 Colo. at 8 , 449 P.2d 361 (rejecting claim that restrictive covenant "is not enforceable because no specific standards are contained therein to guide the committee in determining the approval or disapproval of plans when submitted"); Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp ., 356 Mass. 703 , 707, 255 N.E.2d 326 (1970) (restriction requiring approval of plans that lack explicit standards of approval "may be enforced if the power to do so is exercised reasona

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017Div. 1970) (noting that "[t]he most commonly voiced criticism of such [a restrictive covenant] is that it is vague, fixes no standards and hence affords the grantor an opportunity to be capricious, unfair and arbitrary" and recognizing that "such covenants have been very generally sustained" although subject to requirement that "any disapproval must be reasonable and made in good faith"); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Assn., Inc. , 90 N.C.App. 40 , 48, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988) (covenants requiring prior approval of plans valid "even if vesting the approving authority with broad

2017State v. Payne , supra, at 693-94 , 104 A.3d 142 ; A. Blank, " The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone," 18 Rich.

2014In Dennis, this court, citing to federal precedent, held that the ‘‘[v]iolation of the right to counsel is an external error’’ that satisfies the burden of demonstrating cause; id, 532; and that ‘‘actual prejudice is presumed when the petitioner’s right to counsel is violated.’’ Id., 536 .

2012Because the lack of effective assistance of counsel is sufficient to meet the “cause” prong, we agree with the petitioner that his “lack of counsel is sufficient cause to excuse any default for failing to [directly] appeal.” Violation of the right to counsel is an external error. “[A]s stated in Coleman [v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 , 111 S. Ct. 2546 , 115 L.

2012Because the lack of effective assistance of counsel is sufficient to meet the “cause” prong, we agree with the petitioner that his “lack of counsel is sufficient cause to excuse any default for failing to [directly] appeal.” Violation of the right to counsel is an external error. “[A]s stated in Coleman [v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 , 111 S. Ct. 2546 , 115 L.

1958“While the standard of care to be used [reasonable care] is an external standard, taking no account of the personal equation of the man concerned, yet the amount of care required depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and if a person suffers from a physical disability increasing the risk of harm to him, that is among the circumstances to be considered.” Muse v. Page, 125 Conn. 219, 223 , 4 A.2d 329 .

1958“While the standard of care to be used [reasonable care] is an external standard, taking no account of the personal equation of the man concerned, yet the amount of care required depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and if a person suffers from a physical disability increasing the risk of harm to him, that is among the circumstances to be considered.” Muse v. Page, 125 Conn. 219, 223 , 4 A.2d 329 .

1943The standard of care which a person is ordinarily required to exercise to guard his own safety is that of a reasonably prudent man; it is “an external standard, and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned.” Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 48 , 179 Atl. 9 , quoting The Germanic, 196 U. S. 589, 596 , 25 Sup. Ct. 317.

1943The standard of care which a person is ordinarily required to exercise to guard his own safety is that of a reasonably prudent man; it is “an external standard, and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned.” Marfyak v. New England Transportation Co., 120 Conn. 46, 48 , 179 Atl. 9 , quoting The Germanic, 196 U. S. 589, 596 , 25 Sup. Ct. 317.