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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Conaway v. Stategreen2 sentences2019While the defense did not dispute that Cochran could have been in Americus at some point, the trial transcript reflects that trial counsel withdrew the requested instruction out of concern that it would have suggested to the jury that Cochran was not just in the area but, inexplicably, at the scene of the murder . *344 "As counsel articulated a valid strategic decision regarding a [mere presence] instruction, failure to request that charge is not ineffective assistance." Conaway v. State , 277 Ga. 422 , 424, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). 2019While the defense did not dispute that Cochran could have been in Americus at some point, the trial transcript reflects that trial counsel withdrew the requested instruction out of concern that it would have suggested to the jury that Cochran was not just in the area but, inexplicably, at the scene of the murder . *344 "As counsel articulated a valid strategic decision regarding a [mere presence] instruction, failure to request that charge is not ineffective assistance." Conaway v. State , 277 Ga. 422 , 424, 589 S.E.2d 108 (2003). | 1 | 2 |
Hampton v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Hampton v. State , 282 Ga. 490 , 492 (2) (a), 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (defendant waived right to be present during interviews with individual jurors where defendant "personally and affirmatively waived his right to be present ... and expressly directed his counsel to waive his right to be present"); Bailey v. State , 249 Ga. 535 , 539 (6), 291 S.E.2d 704 (1982) (defendant waived right to be present during an in-chambers hearing of certain motions because defense counsel, after conferring with the defendant, obtained his "express permission" to proceed with the motions hearing without the def 2018See Hampton v. State , 282 Ga. 490 , 492 (2) (a), 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (defendant waived right to be present during interviews with individual jurors where defendant "personally and affirmatively waived his right to be present ... and expressly directed his counsel to waive his right to be present"); Bailey v. State , 249 Ga. 535 , 539 (6), 291 S.E.2d 704 (1982) (defendant waived right to be present during an in-chambers hearing of certain motions because defense counsel, after conferring with the defendant, obtained his "express permission" to proceed with the motions hearing without the def | 1 | 1 |
Farrar v. MACIEgreen2 sentences2012The motion shall be heard not more than 30 days after service . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 13 See Farrar v. Macie, 297 Ga. App. 192, 194-195 (3) ( 676 SE2d 840 ) (2009) (dealing with immunity for psychologists licensed under Chapter 39 of Title 43). 7 The record reflects that no hearing was held on the Anti-SLAPP defense, as required by the statute.14 Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing as required by the Anti-SLAPP statute. 2012The motion shall be heard not more than 30 days after service . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 13 See Farrar v. Macie, 297 Ga. App. 192, 194-195 (3) ( 676 SE2d 840 ) (2009) (dealing with immunity for psychologists licensed under Chapter 39 of Title 43). 7 The record reflects that no hearing was held on the Anti-SLAPP defense, as required by the statute.14 Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing as required by the Anti-SLAPP statute. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Williams v. State, 304 Ga.App. 592, 595 , 696 S.E.2d 512 (2010) (quoting the "strongly supports the conclusion" language after explaining that, "despite the overwhelming evidence —including DNA identification and Williams's flight—trial counsel succeeded in obtaining a directed verdict of acquittal on one count and a jury verdict of acquittal on another"). 2011See, e.g., Williams v. State, 304 Ga.App. 592, 595 , 696 S.E.2d 512 (2010) (quoting the "strongly supports the conclusion" language after explaining that, "despite the overwhelming evidence —including DNA identification and Williams's flight—trial counsel succeeded in obtaining a directed verdict of acquittal on one count and a jury verdict of acquittal on another"). | 1 | 1 |
Radford v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Based on this testimony, defense counsel could not reasonably have thought Wilson's testimony was "`"confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution."'" Radford v. State, supra, 263 Ga. at 48 (1), 426 S.E.2d 868 . 2009Based on this testimony, defense counsel could not reasonably have thought Wilson's testimony was "`"confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution."'" Radford v. State, supra, 263 Ga. at 48 (1), 426 S.E.2d 868 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1994The following constitutes the third oath given: “Do you swear the evidence you shall give in the case of The State of Georgia versus Jose Chico Elam, charged in Count 1 with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and in Count 2 with possession of cocaine, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?” Since the oath indicated appellant’s name, the crimes charged and the fact that the testimony was being given in a trial and not a grand jury proceeding (see State v. Williams, 181 Ga. App. 204, 205 ( 351 SE2d 727 ) (1986)) and the oath was not “materia 1994The following constitutes the third oath given: “Do you swear the evidence you shall give in the case of The State of Georgia versus Jose Chico Elam, charged in Count 1 with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and in Count 2 with possession of cocaine, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?” Since the oath indicated appellant’s name, the crimes charged and the fact that the testimony was being given in a trial and not a grand jury proceeding (see State v. Williams, 181 Ga. App. 204, 205 ( 351 SE2d 727 ) (1986)) and the oath was not “materia | 1 | 1 |
Kirkland v. Stategreen2 sentences1994The following constitutes the third oath given: “Do you swear the evidence you shall give in the case of The State of Georgia versus Jose Chico Elam, charged in Count 1 with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and in Count 2 with possession of cocaine, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?” Since the oath indicated appellant’s name, the crimes charged and the fact that the testimony was being given in a trial and not a grand jury proceeding (see State v. Williams, 181 Ga. App. 204, 205 ( 351 SE2d 727 ) (1986)) and the oath was not “materia 1994The following constitutes the third oath given: “Do you swear the evidence you shall give in the case of The State of Georgia versus Jose Chico Elam, charged in Count 1 with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and in Count 2 with possession of cocaine, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?” Since the oath indicated appellant’s name, the crimes charged and the fact that the testimony was being given in a trial and not a grand jury proceeding (see State v. Williams, 181 Ga. App. 204, 205 ( 351 SE2d 727 ) (1986)) and the oath was not “materia | 1 | 1 |
Chandler v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Scarlett, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 In colloquy with the court, opening statement, and in requests to charge filed prior to trial, the record reflects that defense counsel intended to present the defense that the victim was the aggressor, and that Miller justifiably acted in self-defense. 2 To the extent the wife beating allegation also amounted to evidence of the victim’s prior specific act of violence against a third party, there is no evidence in the record that Miller complied with the procedures set out in Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407-408 ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991) 1992Scarlett, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 In colloquy with the court, opening statement, and in requests to charge filed prior to trial, the record reflects that defense counsel intended to present the defense that the victim was the aggressor, and that Miller justifiably acted in self-defense. 2 To the extent the wife beating allegation also amounted to evidence of the victim’s prior specific act of violence against a third party, there is no evidence in the record that Miller complied with the procedures set out in Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407-408 ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991) | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2026The record shows that, following voir dire, the trial court, the Appellants, and the Appellants’ counsel retired to the jury room for the trial court to hear a Batson5 challenge, which required the Appellants to walk a short distance between the defense tables and the jury room.6 Before returning to the courtroom, Dawson’s counsel 5 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986). 6 Dawson’s counsel later noted that Dawson had to walk the farthest of the defendants, which counsel estimated was “at least six steps.” 15 informed the trial court that the Appellants were wearing leg braces under their pants 2026The record shows that, following voir dire, the trial court, the Appellants, and the Appellants’ counsel retired to the jury room for the trial court to hear a Batson5 challenge, which required the Appellants to walk a short distance between the defense tables and the jury room.6 Before returning to the courtroom, Dawson’s counsel 5 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986). 6 Dawson’s counsel later noted that Dawson had to walk the farthest of the defendants, which counsel estimated was “at least six steps.” 15 informed the trial court that the Appellants were wearing leg braces under their pants | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Bailey v. State
green
2 sentences2018See Hampton v. State , 282 Ga. 490 , 492 (2) (a), 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (defendant waived right to be present during interviews with individual jurors where defendant "personally and affirmatively waived his right to be present ... and expressly directed his counsel to waive his right to be present"); Bailey v. State , 249 Ga. 535 , 539 (6), 291 S.E.2d 704 (1982) (defendant waived right to be present during an in-chambers hearing of certain motions because defense counsel, after conferring with the defendant, obtained his "express permission" to proceed with the motions hearing without the def 2018See Hampton v. State , 282 Ga. 490 , 492 (2) (a), 651 S.E.2d 698 (2007) (defendant waived right to be present during interviews with individual jurors where defendant "personally and affirmatively waived his right to be present ... and expressly directed his counsel to waive his right to be present"); Bailey v. State , 249 Ga. 535 , 539 (6), 291 S.E.2d 704 (1982) (defendant waived right to be present during an in-chambers hearing of certain motions because defense counsel, after conferring with the defendant, obtained his "express permission" to proceed with the motions hearing without the def | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.