record reflects defense in Arizona

2014See State v. Anderson, 110 Ariz. 238, 241 , 517 P.2d 508, 511 (1973) (acknowledging the doctrine of harmless error may be applied “when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the record reflects that the error, though fundamental, did not contribute to the guilty verdict”).

2014See State v. Anderson, 110 Ariz. 238, 241 , 517 P.2d 508, 511 (1973) (acknowledging the doctrine of harmless error may be applied “when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the record reflects that the error, though fundamental, did not contribute to the guilty verdict”).

2022See State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 244 (1984) (abrogation on other grounds recognized by State v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 299, ¶ 12 (2015)) (concluding the defendant failed to present evidence that a witness “if immunized, would offer evidence that was clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense’s case” sufficient to “trigger” a due process imperative to immunize the witness); see also State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 388 (1982) (concluding no basis to compel immunity for a defense witness absent evidence that the witness’s testimony was both “clearly exculpatory and essential”); State v. D

2022Decision of the Court distance of five hundred feet ahead”); A.R.S. § 28-909(A)(1) (requiring “[e]ach front seat occupant of a motor vehicle” to “[h]ave the lap and shoulder belt properly adjusted and fastened while the vehicle is in motion”); see also Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 157 (1988) (recognizing “the seat belt defense as a matter which the jury may consider in apportioning damages due to the ‘fault’ of the plaintiff”). ¶23 The record does not support the superior court’s finding that Manning and Kuzel, in large part, simply “guess[ed].” To the contrary, the record reflects th

2022See State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 244 (1984) (abrogation on other grounds recognized by State v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 299, ¶ 12 (2015)) (concluding the defendant failed to present evidence that a witness “if immunized, would offer evidence that was clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense’s case” sufficient to “trigger” a due process imperative to immunize the witness); see also State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 388 (1982) (concluding no basis to compel immunity for a defense witness absent evidence that the witness’s testimony was both “clearly exculpatory and essential”); State v. D

2022See State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 244 (1984) (abrogation on other grounds recognized by State v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 299, ¶ 12 (2015)) (concluding the defendant failed to present evidence that a witness “if immunized, would offer evidence that was clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense’s case” sufficient to “trigger” a due process imperative to immunize the witness); see also State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 388 (1982) (concluding no basis to compel immunity for a defense witness absent evidence that the witness’s testimony was both “clearly exculpatory and essential”); State v. D

2022See State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 244 (1984) (abrogation on other grounds recognized by State v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 299, ¶ 12 (2015)) (concluding the defendant failed to present evidence that a witness “if immunized, would offer evidence that was clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense’s case” sufficient to “trigger” a due process imperative to immunize the witness); see also State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 388 (1982) (concluding no basis to compel immunity for a defense witness absent evidence that the witness’s testimony was both “clearly exculpatory and essential”); State v. D

2016Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 26 .4 ¶15 The error is harmless, even if fundamental, if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the trial record reflects the error, and the error does not contribute to a guilty verdict.

2016See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause prevents peremptory strikes based solely upon race).

2015See Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 379-80 , 656 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (1982) (privilege “does not extend to facts which are not part of the communication” such as dates and number of contacts between attorney and client). ¶21 Ashmeade also argues the trial court violated his right to his “attorney of choice” when it allowed an attorney, other than the one Ashmeade had retained, to appear on his behalf.

2015See Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 379-80 , 656 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (1982) (privilege “does not extend to facts which are not part of the communication” such as dates and number of contacts between attorney and client). ¶21 Ashmeade also argues the trial court violated his right to his “attorney of choice” when it allowed an attorney, other than the one Ashmeade had retained, to appear on his behalf.