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5 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Micheelgreen2 sentences1996The question is whether the hearing committee’s finding as to the date of the disability “is supported by substantial evidence in the record, viewed as a whole.” See In re Micheel, 610 A.2d 231, 234 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted). 1996The question is whether the hearing committee's finding as to the date of the disability "is supported by substantial evidence in the record, viewed as a whole." See In re Micheel, 610 A.2d 231, 234 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Maloygreen2 sentences1986Compare People v. Jandrew, 101 A.D.2d 90, 92 , 475 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (1984) (statutory appellate review rights may be waived without specifically enumerating them as long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary) (emphasis added); with Commonwealth v. Maloy, 438 Pa. 261, 263 , 264 A.2d 697, 698 (1970) (an effective waiver of the right to appeal requires the accused to be aware of all of his appellate rights) (emphasis added). 1986Compare People v. Jandrew, 101 A.D.2d 90, 92 , 475 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (1984) (statutory appellate review rights may be waived without specifically enumerating them as long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary) (emphasis added); with Commonwealth v. Maloy, 438 Pa. 261, 263 , 264 A.2d 697, 698 (1970) (an effective waiver of the right to appeal requires the accused to be aware of all of his appellate rights) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jandrewgreen2 sentences1986Compare People v. Jandrew, 101 A.D.2d 90, 92 , 475 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (1984) (statutory appellate review rights may be waived without specifically enumerating them as long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary) (emphasis added); with Commonwealth v. Maloy, 438 Pa. 261, 263 , 264 A.2d 697, 698 (1970) (an effective waiver of the right to appeal requires the accused to be aware of all of his appellate rights) (emphasis added). 1986Compare People v. Jandrew, 101 A.D.2d 90, 92 , 475 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (1984) (statutory appellate review rights may be waived without specifically enumerating them as long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary) (emphasis added); with Commonwealth v. Maloy, 438 Pa. 261, 263 , 264 A.2d 697, 698 (1970) (an effective waiver of the right to appeal requires the accused to be aware of all of his appellate rights) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Charlesgreen2 sentences1986See Commonwealth v. Martin, 346 Pa.Super. 129, 134-35 , 499 A.2d 344, 347 (1985) (an effective waiver of appellate rights must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right); People v. Charles, 171 Cal.App.3d 552, 563 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 402, 409 (1985) (criminal defendant may waive statutory right to appeal as long as the record reflects that the waiver was free, knowing and intelligent). 1986See Commonwealth v. Martin, 346 Pa.Super. 129, 134-35 , 499 A.2d 344, 347 (1985) (an effective waiver of appellate rights must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right); People v. Charles, 171 Cal.App.3d 552, 563 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 402, 409 (1985) (criminal defendant may waive statutory right to appeal as long as the record reflects that the waiver was free, knowing and intelligent). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen2 sentences1986See Commonwealth v. Martin, 346 Pa.Super. 129, 134-35 , 499 A.2d 344, 347 (1985) (an effective waiver of appellate rights must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right); People v. Charles, 171 Cal.App.3d 552, 563 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 402, 409 (1985) (criminal defendant may waive statutory right to appeal as long as the record reflects that the waiver was free, knowing and intelligent). 1986See Commonwealth v. Martin, 346 Pa.Super. 129, 134-35 , 499 A.2d 344, 347 (1985) (an effective waiver of appellate rights must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right); People v. Charles, 171 Cal.App.3d 552, 563 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 402, 409 (1985) (criminal defendant may waive statutory right to appeal as long as the record reflects that the waiver was free, knowing and intelligent). | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976). 1983Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Louis Fireison & Associates
green
2 sentences1996Moreover, as we said in Green, supra, 618 A.2d at 188 -89 “Rule 11 is not violated solely because a particular pleading is not warranted by existing law.” Rather, “[i]f such pleading can be justified by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, sanctions are not in order.” Here, the record reflects no inquiry of Ms. Esteves and her counsel as to their pre-filing theory of the fraud case, and whether they contemplated making any type of good faith effort involving an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 1996Moreover, as we said in Green, supra, 618 A.2d at 188 -89 “Rule 11 is not violated solely because a particular pleading is not warranted by existing law.” Rather, “[i]f such pleading can be justified by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, sanctions are not in order.” Here, the record reflects no inquiry of Ms. Esteves and her counsel as to their pre-filing theory of the fraud case, and whether they contemplated making any type of good faith effort involving an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Jeum Chul Park v. Sandwich Chef, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Based upon the foregoing, we cannot sustain the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions because the trial court failed to make “findings on all the relevant issues stated in Rule 11.” Park, 651 A.2d at 803 . *408 Finally, both with respect to the discovery sanction under Rule 37 and the sanction under Rule 11, the trial judge did not explain why the sanction was imposed solely on Ms. Esteves, and not her counsel, or both Ms. Esteves and her counsel. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Ladd
green
2 sentences1982(Record at 112, 119.) Then the court, before denying the defense request for suppression, adverted to the fact that appellant after arrest "said nothing" and "did not . . . ever say to anybody I wish an attorney or I do not want to talk. " While the court in its oral ruling went on to refer to Michigan v. Mosley , this reference was clearly obiter dicta and the court's refusal to suppress, in context, was a recognition that this particular defendant, as knowledgeable as he was of his rights, had not under the circumstances "exercised his Miranda option to terminate questioning." [7] See State 1982(Record at 112, 119.) Then the court, before denying the defense request for suppression, adverted to the fact that appellant after arrest "said nothing" and "did not . . . ever say to anybody I wish an attorney or I do not want to talk. " While the court in its oral ruling went on to refer to Michigan v. Mosley , this reference was clearly obiter dicta and the court's refusal to suppress, in context, was a recognition that this particular defendant, as knowledgeable as he was of his rights, had not under the circumstances "exercised his Miranda option to terminate questioning." [7] See State | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Ayers
green
1 sentence1982(Record at 112, 119.) Then the court, before denying the defense request for suppression, adverted to the fact that appellant after arrest "said nothing" and "did not . . . ever say to anybody I wish an attorney or I do not want to talk. " While the court in its oral ruling went on to refer to Michigan v. Mosley , this reference was clearly obiter dicta and the court's refusal to suppress, in context, was a recognition that this particular defendant, as knowledgeable as he was of his rights, had not under the circumstances "exercised his Miranda option to terminate questioning." [7] See State | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.