paramount rule in Illinois

1969People v. Grilec, 2 Ill2d 538, 119 NE2d 232 .

1968(People v. Grilec, 2 Ill.2d 538, 547 .)” (Accord, People v. Henderson, 37 Ill.2d 489 .) Here, each defendant’s motion failed to show that he would be prejudiced by a joint trial.

1966Sloan v. Beatty, 1 Ill2d 581, 116 NE2d 375 .

1954As established by a long line of decisions of this court and as restated in the recent case of Sloan v. Beatty, 1 Ill. 2d 581 , the paramount rule of testamentary construction is that the intention of the testator as expressed in his will governs the distribution of his estate, and the intention of the testator, once it has been ascertained, will be given effect unless to do so would violate some settled rule of law or would be contrary to public policy.

1994Quote, Inc. (1991), 211 Ill.

1994Quote, Inc. (1991), 211 Ill.

1983App. 3d 901, 904-05 , 278 N.E.2d 813, 816 .) The paramount rule for construction of a covenant is to give effect to the actual intent of the parties as of the time the covenant was made as understood from the whole document construed under the circumstances surrounding its execution.

1979App. 3d 901, 904 , 278 N.E.2d 813, 816 , we stated that: “The paramount rule for the interpretation of covenants is to so expound them as to give effect to the actual intent of parties as of time the covenant was made and as collected from the whole document construed in connection with circumstances surrounding its execution.” While there is no evidence in the instant case as to what the intent of the parties was at the time of the adoption of the covenant, it can clearly be inferred that the parties intended the term “basement” to take on a meaning it would normally take in real estate usage

1977(People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d 351, 356 ; People v. Ross, 41 Ill. 2d 445, 461 , cases cited.) For the trial court in weighing a motion for separate trials ‘The paramount inquiry is whether the defenses are of such an antagonistic nature that a severance is imperative to insure a fair trial. [Citations.]’ (People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d at 356-357 .)” The supreme court also held in People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 376, 386 , 256 N.E.2d 321 , cert, denied, 397 U.S. 975 , 25 L.

1977(People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d 351, 356 ; People v. Ross, 41 Ill. 2d 445, 461 , cases cited.) For the trial court in weighing a motion for separate trials ‘The paramount inquiry is whether the defenses are of such an antagonistic nature that a severance is imperative to insure a fair trial. [Citations.]’ (People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d at 356-357 .)” The supreme court also held in People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 376, 386 , 256 N.E.2d 321 , cert, denied, 397 U.S. 975 , 25 L.

1975This court held that equitable conversion "should not apply in cases of this kind, as it would result in defeating the intention of the testator, which is the paramount rule of construction as to wills." 230 Ill. 469, 475 .) The situation in Adams , involving only an option contract for mineral rights which might never have been exercised and, even when exercised, did not affect the devise of the real estate itself, is plainly not analogous to the present case.

1975This court held that equitable conversion “should not apply in cases of this kind, as it would result in defeating the intention of the testator, which is the paramount rule of construction as to wills.” ( 230 Ill. 469, 475 .) The situation in Adams, involving only an option contract for mineral rights which might never have been exercised and, even when exercised, did not affect the devise of the real estate itself, is plainly not analogous to the present case.

1927In Perry v. Bowman, 151 Ill. 25, 31 , the court laid down the rule in the following language : “In construing the will, the intention of the testatrix, as derived from all its provisions, will control, and effect will be given to such intention when ascertained.” In Pereboom v. Cloyd, 317 Ill. 85 , the court held: “It has been often decided that the paramount rule in the construction of wills is to ascertain the intention of the testator from an examination of the language of the will and then give effect to such intention unless contrary to-public policy or some rule of law,” citing McComb v.

1925(McComb v. Morford, 283 Ill. 584 .) In ascertaining the intention of the testator the whole scope of the will is to be considered and every provision given due weight to ascertain the plan of the testator in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounding him, his family and property at the time of making the will.

1922(Smith v. Dellitt, 249 Ill. 113 ; Armstrong v. Barber, 239 Ill. 389 .) Another fundamental rule in the construction of wills is to consider the whole scope and plan of the testator and to compare the various provisions with one another, construing them, if possible, so that all can stand.

1915(Smith v. Dellitt, 249 Ill. 113 ; Armstrong v. Barber, 239 id. 389.) Another fundamental rule in the construction of wills is to consider the whole scope and plan of the testator and to compare the various provisions with one another, construing them, if possible, so that all can stand.

2014When construing a statute, the paramount rule of statutory interpretation directs courts “to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, the language of the statute being the best indicator of such intent.” Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 37 .

2014When construing a statute, the paramount rule of statutory interpretation directs courts “to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, the language of the statute being the best indicator of such intent.” Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 37 .

2014Statutory language must not be viewed in isolation, but rather it must be considered holistically in light of the entire statute (Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 41 ) and in conjunction with other statutes addressing the same or similar subjects.

2014Statutory language must not be viewed in isolation, but rather it must be considered holistically in light of the entire statute (Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 41 ) and in conjunction with other statutes addressing the same or similar subjects.

1997Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 194 , 595 N.E.2d 561 (1992).

1997Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 194 , 595 N.E.2d 561 (1992).

1993Johnson v. La Grange State Bank (1978), 73 Ill.2d 342, 357 , 22 Ill.Dec. 709, 716 , 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 ; Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co. (1980), 81 Ill.App.3d 1128, 1130 , 37 Ill.Dec. 136, 138 , 401 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 ; Toman, 39 Ill.App.3d at 398 , 349 N.E.2d at 673 .

1993(Johnson v. La Grange State Bank (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 342, 357 , 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 ; Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co. (1980), 81 Ill.

1993(Johnson v. La Grange State Bank (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 342, 357 , 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 ; Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co. (1980), 81 Ill.

1993(Johnson v. La Grange State Bank (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 342, 357 , 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 ; Payne v. River Forest State Bank & Trust Co. (1980), 81 Ill.

1979(People v. Canaday (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 416 , 275 N.E.2d 356 .) In order for defenses to be antagonistic there must be a showing of true conflict in the several defenses.

1979(People v. Canaday (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 416 , 275 N.E.2d 356 .) In order for defenses to be antagonistic there must be a showing of true conflict in the several defenses.

1977(People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d 351, 356 ; People v. Ross, 41 Ill. 2d 445, 461 , cases cited.) For the trial court in weighing a motion for separate trials ‘The paramount inquiry is whether the defenses are of such an antagonistic nature that a severance is imperative to insure a fair trial. [Citations.]’ (People v. Gendron, 41 Ill. 2d at 356-357 .)” The supreme court also held in People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 376, 386 , 256 N.E.2d 321 , cert, denied, 397 U.S. 975 , 25 L.

1971(People v. Gendron, 41 Ill.2d 351, 356 ; People v. Ross, 41 Ill.2d 445, 461 , cases cited.) For the trial court in weighing a motion for separate trials “The paramount inquiry is whether the defenses are of such an antagonistic nature that a severance is imperative to insure a fair trial. [Citations.] ” (People v. Gendron, 41 Ill.2d at 356-357 .) The defenses of the defendants here were entirely consistent with one another.

1959Stites v. Gray, 4 Ill.2d 510 ; Golstein v. Handley, 390 Ill. 118 ; Peck v. Drennan, 411 Ill. 31 .

1959Stites v. Gray, 4 Ill.2d 510 ; Golstein v. Handley, 390 Ill. 118 ; Peck v. Drennan, 411 Ill. 31 .

1959Stites v. Gray, 4 Ill.2d 510 ; Golstein v. Handley, 390 Ill. 118 ; Peck v. Drennan, 411 Ill. 31 .

1959Stites v. Gray, 4 Ill.2d 510 ; Golstein v. Handley, 390 Ill. 118 ; Peck v. Drennan, 411 Ill. 31 .

1959Stites v. Gray, 4 Ill.2d 510 ; Golstein v. Handley, 390 Ill. 118 ; Peck v. Drennan, 411 Ill. 31 .

1959Stites v. Gray, 4 Ill.2d 510 ; Golstein v. Handley, 390 Ill. 118 ; Peck v. Drennan, 411 Ill. 31 .

1956Sloan v. Beatty, 1 Ill.2d 581 ; Barnhart v. Barnhart, 415 Ill. 303 .

1953(Barnhart v. Barnhart, 415 Ill. 303 .) All rules of construction yield to the intention of the testator as expressed in the will and no rule of construction will be applied to defeat that intention.

1941(Rettig v. Zander, 364 Ill. 112 ; Wells v. Dalies, 318 Ill. 301 ; Himmel v. Himmel, 294 Ill. 557 ; Knight v. Knight, 367 Ill. 646 .) It would be impossible, within the reasonable limitations of this opinion, to discuss and analyze all the cases cited and relied upon by the respective parties; nor do we consider it necessary, because, as was said in Love v. Engelke, 368 Ill. 342 , “it is generally recognized that by reason of the variety of language used in wills, decisions construing them, while frequently helpful, are not controlling, and are less helpful as guides than are the cases upon oth

1925(Pereboom v. Cloyd, 317 Ill. 85 .) In ascertaining the intention of the testator the whole scope of the will is to be considered and every provision given due weight to ascertain the plan of the testator in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounds ing him, his family and property at the time of making the; 'will., Himmel v. Himmel, 294 Ill. 557 .

1927In Perry v. Bowman, 151 Ill. 25, 31 , the court laid down the rule in the following language : “In construing the will, the intention of the testatrix, as derived from all its provisions, will control, and effect will be given to such intention when ascertained.” In Pereboom v. Cloyd, 317 Ill. 85 , the court held: “It has been often decided that the paramount rule in the construction of wills is to ascertain the intention of the testator from an examination of the language of the will and then give effect to such intention unless contrary to-public policy or some rule of law,” citing McComb v.

1925(Pereboom v. Cloyd, 317 Ill. 85 .) In ascertaining the intention of the testator the whole scope of the will is to be considered and every provision given due weight to ascertain the plan of the testator in the light of the facts and circumstances surrounds ing him, his family and property at the time of making the; 'will., Himmel v. Himmel, 294 Ill. 557 .

1925(Bradsby v. Wallace, 202 Ill. 239 .) “The paramount rule in the exposition of wills, to which all others must bend, is, that the intention of the testator as expressed in the will must be ascertained and given effect if not prohibited by law.” (Armstrong v. Barber, 239 Ill. 389, 398 .) It is also a familiar rule that in the construction of wills, effect should be given to every word and clause of the will, if that can be reasonably done.

1908(Bradsby v. Wallace, 202 Ill. 239 .) This is the first and great rule in the interpretation of wills and to it all other rules must bend.