paramount rule in Missouri

2016Testator’s Intent When determining the meaning of a will’s provision, “the paramount rule of construction is that the settlor’s intent is controlling and such intention must be ascertained1 primarily from the trust instrument as a whole.” First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo.1962).

2015“In determining the meaning of a trust provision, the paramount rule of construction is that the settlor’s intent is controlling and such intention must be ascertained primarily from the trust instrument as a whole.” Hudson v. UMB Bank, N.A., 447 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Mo. App. 2014) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. 1962)).

1996“The paramount rule of construction in determining the meaning of a trust provision is that the grantor’s intent is controlling.” Marvin F. Hall Trust v. Hall, 810 S.W.2d 710, 713-14 (Mo.App.1991).

1996"The paramount rule of construction in determining the meaning of a trust provision is that the grantor's intent is controlling." Marvin F. Hall Trust v. Hall, 810 S.W.2d 710, 713-14 (Mo.App.1991).

2021“In determining the meaning of a trust provision, the paramount rule of construction is that the settlor’s intent is controlling and such intention must be ascertained primarily from the trust instrument as a whole.” Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Blasdel, 141 S.W.3d 434, 443 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).

2021“We endeavor to ascertain the settlor’s intent at the time of the creation of the trust.” Id. (emphasis added).

2006“It must be remembered that courts must decide the meaning of a testator by what he said in his will, and not by attempting ‘to guess what he meant or what he might have done under certain conditions if not expressed in his will.’ ” Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 611 , 98 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1936) (quoting St.

2006“It must be remembered that courts must decide the meaning of a testator by what he said in his will, and not by attempting ‘to guess what he meant or what he might have done under certain conditions if not expressed in his will.’ ” Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 611 , 98 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1936) (quoting St.

2020In their second point, Appellants 7 assert that the trial court’s judgment was “against the weight of the evidence and includes errors of law in that, if Paul and Dean are Primary Beneficiaries, the Judgment orders distributions that would exceed 5% of the value of Paul’s GST Exempt Trust because Paul already received cash distributions.” And in their third point, Appellants contend that the trial court’s judgment was “against the weight of the evidence and includes errors of law in that Paul should have been removed as trustee because Paul lacks sufficient skills and experience to serve as tr

2017O’Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 406 (Mo.App.W.D. 2013) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. banc 1962)).

2019Feinberg Hotel Trust, 922 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996).

2001Feinberg Hotel Trust, 922 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Mo.App.1996).

2006Analysis As a starting point in any analysis of a testamentary document, we note that the paramount rule of will or trust construction is to discern the intent of the settlor. 3 First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. Waldron, 406 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Mo.1966); Scullin v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 361 Mo. 337 , 234 S.W.2d 597 , *157 601 (1950).

1985Louis County National Bank, 551 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Mo.App.1977); First National Bank of Kansas City v. Waldron, 406 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Mo.1966); and First National Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo.1962), where the court said, “In determining the meaning of a trust provision, the paramount rule of construction is that the sett-lor’s intent is controlling and such intention must be ascertained primarily from the trust instrument as a whole.” From the instrument involved here, it is abundantly clear that Bruce’s father intended that payments from the trust to or for Bruce were to su

2006Boatmen’s Trust Co. v. Sugden, 827 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Mo. App.1992).

1998Boatmen’s Trust Co. v. Sugden, 827 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Mo.App.

1998Similarly, in Murphy v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 731 S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Mo.App.1987), we affirmed the trial judge’s grant of JNOV on plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur theory, but remanded for submission on specific negligence, stating: That practice of peremptory reversal for failure of proof, however, is subject to the paramount rule of fair adjudications.

1998Similarly, in Murphy v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 731 S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Mo.App.1987), we affirmed the trial judge’s grant of JNOV on plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur theory, but remanded for submission on specific negligence, stating: That practice of peremptory reversal for failure of proof, however, is subject to the paramount rule of fair adjudications.

1990First National Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d at 652 [1]; Tidrow v. Director, Missouri State Division of Family Services, 688 S.W.2d 9, 12 [1] (Mo. App.1985).

1990First National Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d at 652 [1]; Tidrow v. Director, Missouri State Division of Family Services, 688 S.W.2d 9, 12 [1] (Mo. App.1985).

2022Blue Ridge Bank & Trust Co. v. McFall, 207 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Mo. App. 2006).

2018Blue Ridge Bank & Trust Co. v. McFall , 207 S.W.3d 149 , 156 (Mo. App. 2006).

2021Ayers Trust instrument “specifically prohibits an election under [§ 469.411.5(2)].” “In determining the meaning of trust provisions, the paramount rule of construction is that the grantor’s intent is controlling and such intention must be ascertained primarily from the trust instrument as a whole.” Arthaud v. Arthaud, 600 S.W.3d 882 , 888 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 530 S.W.3d 35, 41 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)).

2020In their second point, Appellants 7 assert that the trial court’s judgment was “against the weight of the evidence and includes errors of law in that, if Paul and Dean are Primary Beneficiaries, the Judgment orders distributions that would exceed 5% of the value of Paul’s GST Exempt Trust because Paul already received cash distributions.” And in their third point, Appellants contend that the trial court’s judgment was “against the weight of the evidence and includes errors of law in that Paul should have been removed as trustee because Paul lacks sufficient skills and experience to serve as tr

2007Id. at 443 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo.1962)); Feinberg v. Adolph K.

1999In re McDonald Revocable Trust, 942 S.W.2d 926, 931 (Mo.App.1997); In re Nelson, 926 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo.App.1996); Marvin F. Hall Trust v. Hall, 810 S.W.2d 710, 713-14 (Mo.App.1991); First National Bank v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 662 (Mo.1962).

2021When interpreting a trust instrument, we “must consider the ‘general scheme or intention as shown by the entire document.’” In Matter of Edwin Meissner Testamentary Trust, 497 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (quoting Mercantile Trust Co. v. Sowell, 359 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 1962)).

2021When interpreting a trust instrument, we “must consider the ‘general scheme or intention as shown by the entire document.’” In Matter of Edwin Meissner Testamentary Trust, 497 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (quoting Mercantile Trust Co. v. Sowell, 359 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 1962)).

2015“In determining the meaning of a trust provision, the paramount rule of construction is that the settlor’s intent is controlling and such intention must be ascertained primarily from the trust instrument as a whole.” Hudson v. UMB Bank, N.A., 447 S.W.3d 714, 721 (Mo. App. 2014) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. 1962)).

2007On appeal, the Dugans contend the court erred in relying on parol evidence to alter the meaning of an unambiguous trust agreement. “ ‘In determining the meaning of a trust provision, the paramount rule of construction is that the [grantor’s] intent is controlling and such intention must be ascertained primarily from the trust instrument as a whole.’ ” In re Living Trust of Johnson, 190 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Mo.App.2006) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Kansas City v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo.1962)).

2001Holdener v. Fieser, 971 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Mo.App.

1999In re McDonald Revocable Trust, 942 S.W.2d 926, 931 (Mo.App.1997); In re Nelson, 926 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo.App.1996); Marvin F. Hall Trust v. Hall, 810 S.W.2d 710, 713-14 (Mo.App.1991); First National Bank v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 662 (Mo.1962).

1995Hollis v. Estate of Hollis, 845 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Mo.App.1993); Hall, 810 S.W.2d at 713-14 [1].

1991Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. banc 1983).

1991Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. banc 1983).

1987Thus, where the failure of proof results from a misconceived theory of recovery, but the evidence nevertheless shows a state of facts which may entitle the plaintiff to recover under a proper theory, in the interests of justice — and where the theory asserted at the trial was not for strategic advantage — “ ‘the judgment will not be reversed outright, but instead, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the case will be remanded to give [the plaintiff] the opportunity to amend his petition, if so advised, so as to state a case upon the theory which his evidence discloses.’ ” [emphasis