paramount rule in Indiana

2003Id.

2001Appellants cite 3 Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied, for the following proposition: [The paramount rule for interpretation of covenants [is] so to expound them as to give effect to the actual intent of the parties, as determined from the language used, the motives of the parties and the purposes they sought to accomplish.

1903Unless the intention be plainly declared on the face of the assignment that the assignee is to share pro rata in the secur ity with the assignor, the equitable construction of it is that it must in the first place be applied for the payment of the part of the debt which was assigned.” In State Bank v. Tweedy, 8 Blackf. 447 , 46 Am.

1872In The State Bank v. Tweedy, 8 Blackf. 447 , the rights of parties holding notes secured by the same mortgage, first came before this court, and it was then said by the learned judge who delivered the opinion, after alluding to-the fact that it was a question for the first time before the court, and after a reference to authorities: “It cannot be stated then, as a general proposition, that in this State, the assignment of any one of the notes secured by a mortgage, carries with it, either pro rata or pro tanto, a corresponding portion of the mortgage security; but, as appears from what has bee

2006Further, when there is an ambiguity, "the paramount rule for interpretation is to give effect to the actual intent of the parties . . . as collected from the whole instrument. . . ." Renfro, 799 N.E.2d at 547 .

2006Further, when there is an ambiguity, "the paramount rule for interpretation is to give effect to the actual intent of the parties ... as collected from the whole instrument...." Renfro, 799 N.E.2d at 547 .

1984Where subordinate rules for the measure of damages [fair market value for personal property] run counter to the paramount rule of fair and just compensation, the former must yield to the principle underlying all such rules.” Aufderheide v. Fulk, 112 N.E. at 400 .

1978Wardius v. Oregon, (1973) 412 U.S. 470 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 ; Bernard v. State, supra. Therefore, one of the paramount factors in criminal discovery in this state is the discretion of the trial court in ordering disclosures and balancing the discovery privileges between the parties, State ex rel.

1978Wardius v. Oregon, (1973) 412 U.S. 470 , 93 S.Ct. 2208 , 37 L.Ed.2d 82 ; Bernard v. State, supra. Therefore, one of the paramount factors in criminal discovery in this state is the discretion of the trial court in ordering disclosures and balancing the discovery privileges between the parties, State ex rel.

1978Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, (1974) 262 Ind. 420 , 317 N.E.2d 433 .

1978Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County, (1974) 262 Ind. 420 , 317 N.E.2d 433 .

1975The paramount principle in the proper construction of a legislative enactment is to ascertain the legislative will, implicitly or explicitly expressed, in the enactment as a whole, Schulz v. Graham (1955), 234 Ind. 243 , 126 N.E.2d 1 ; and to harmonize, if possible, words and phrases of a particular section with other sections of the statute, Indiana State Highway Comm. v. White (1973), 259 Ind. 690 , 291 N.E.2d 550 .

1975The paramount principle in the proper construction of a legislative enactment is to ascertain the legislative will, implicitly or explicitly expressed, in the enactment as a whole, Schulz v. Graham (1955), 234 Ind. 243 , 126 N.E.2d 1 ; and to harmonize, if possible, words and phrases of a particular section with other sections of the statute, Indiana State Highway Comm. v. White (1973), 259 Ind. 690 , 291 N.E.2d 550 .

1975The paramount principle in the proper construction of a legislative enactment is to ascertain the legislative will, implicitly or explicitly expressed, in the enactment as a whole, Schulz v. Graham (1955), 234 Ind. 243 , 126 N.E.2d 1 ; and to harmonize, if possible, words and phrases of a particular section with other sections of the statute, Indiana State Highway Comm. v. White (1973), 259 Ind. 690 , 291 N.E.2d 550 .

1975The paramount principle in the proper construction of a legislative enactment is to ascertain the legislative will, implicitly or explicitly expressed, in the enactment as a whole, Schulz v. Graham (1955), 234 Ind. 243 , 126 N.E.2d 1 ; and to harmonize, if possible, words and phrases of a particular section with other sections of the statute, Indiana State Highway Comm. v. White (1973), 259 Ind. 690 , 291 N.E.2d 550 .

1938See Sieb, Gdn. v. Miller (1936), 102 Ind. App. 389 , 2 N. E. (2d) 794; Beck v. Dickinson, Exr. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 463 , 192 N. E. 899 ; Abernathy v. McCoy et al. (1930), 91 Ind. App. 574 , 154 N. E. 682 .

1938See Sieb, Gdn. v. Miller (1936), 102 Ind. App. 389 , 2 N. E. (2d) 794; Beck v. Dickinson, Exr. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 463 , 192 N. E. 899 ; Abernathy v. McCoy et al. (1930), 91 Ind. App. 574 , 154 N. E. 682 .

1938See Sieb, Gdn. v. Miller (1936), 102 Ind. App. 389 , 2 N. E. (2d) 794; Beck v. Dickinson, Exr. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 463 , 192 N. E. 899 ; Abernathy v. McCoy et al. (1930), 91 Ind. App. 574 , 154 N. E. 682 .

1938See Sieb, Gdn. v. Miller (1936), 102 Ind. App. 389 , 2 N. E. (2d) 794; Beck v. Dickinson, Exr. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 463 , 192 N. E. 899 ; Abernathy v. McCoy et al. (1930), 91 Ind. App. 574 , 154 N. E. 682 .

1909The ease of Lathrop v. Smith, supra, was decided by a divided court, and the dissenting opinion rendered in the ease presents unanswerable reasons why the prevailing opinion should not be followed.

1877In the present case, the mortgage was prior to the petitioner’s claim ” (a mechanic’s lien), “ and the sale under the mortgage, was antecedent to his; and the whole of the land, and the whole of the interest, were gone, so that the present applicant obtained nothing by his bid.” In Cross v. Zane, 47 Cal. 602 , the plaintiff in an execution had purchased thereon certain real estate, to which the defendant had no title; and it was held, that the sheriff’s sale should be set aside, and the judgment reversed.

1873The cases of Belcher v. The Hartford Bank, 15 Conn. 381 , and of The Stamford Bank v. Benedict, 15 Conn. 437 , have no application to the present case.

1873The cases of Belcher v. The Hartford Bank, 15 Conn. 381 , and of The Stamford Bank v. Benedict, 15 Conn. 437 , have no application to the present case.

1873This has heretofore been the firmly settled and well known rule in this State, but by the judgment pronounced in this case by a majority of the court, this rule is in legal effect destroyed; for the effect of the judgment is to give to the owner of the second note priority over the owner of the first, and this is done, although the rule was laid down in 1847, and has been firmly adhered to ever since, that the holder of a second or subsequent note holds the same, “ subject to the paramount claim of notes previously due.” Nor does the decision of the majority of the court stop here, but it goes

1873This would do no injustice to the holders of the second note, for they held subject to the prior and paramount claim of the holder of the first note, and, as was said by this court in Colgrove v. Cox, 22 Ind. 43 , that if the replevin bail had not paid the judgment, the mortgage security would have been resorted to and the mortgaged property would have been taken from them, or they would have been driven to redeem to secure the benefit of their security.