paramount rule in Texas

2012“In evaluating the needs of the child, and, thus, the exercise of the court’s discretion in determining those needs, we are guided by the paramount principle in child support decisions: the best interest of the child.” Nordstrom, 965 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 417 n.3).

2004In determining the needs of the child, we direct courts to continue to follow the paramount principle: " the best interests of the child ." 860 S.W.2d 414 , 418 n.3 (Tex. 1993) (emphasis in original).

2009See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez , 860 S.W.2d 414 , 417 n.3 (Tex. 1993); Hollifield v. Hollifield , 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ).

2009See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414 , 417 n. 3 (Tex.1993); Hollifield v. Hollifield, 925 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, no writ).

1980See Calvert v. BritisbAmerican Oil Producing CO., 397 S.W. 2d 839, 842 (Tex. 1965);city of Mason v. West Texas Utilities mm&e v. Waples, Co.. 237 S.W. 188278 2d 273.

1980See Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co., 397 S.W.2d 839 , 842 (Tex. 1965); City of Mason v. West Texas Utilities Co., 237 S.W.2d 273 , 278 (Tex. 1951); State v. Dyer, 200 S.W.2d 813 , 815 (Tex. 1947); Gilmore v. Waples, 188 S.W. 1037 , 1038 (Tex. 1916); Tex.-Louisiana Power Co. v. Farmersville, 67 S.W.2d 235 , 237 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933).

2018In reaching its conclusion that the disclaimer-of-reliance clause clearly and specifically negated the plaintiff’s fraud claims, the Forest Oil court noted that the Schlumberger decision was relatively similar and rested on the paramount principle that Texas courts should uphold contracts that are negotiated at arms’ length and that when parties elect to include a disclaimer-of-reliance provision in their agreement, the Court will generally enforce it. 268 S.W.3d at 58 .

2011Id. at 58 (“Our analysis in Sehlumberger rested on the paramount principle that Texas courts should uphold contracts negotiated at arm’s length by knowledgeable and sophisticated business players represented by highly competent and able legal counsel, a principle that applies with equal force to contracts that reserve future claims as to contracts that settle all claims.” (internal quotations omitted)).

1935In Dolan v. Walker, 121 Tex. 361 , 49 S.W.2d 695 , 697, the Supreme Court of this State has restated a long accepted principle, *Page 642 as follows: "The paramount rule in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature." This rule seems peculiarly applicable where it is questionable whether certain acts complained of come within the denunciation of a criminal statute.

1935In Dolan v. Walker, 121 Tex. 361 , 49 S.W.2d 695 , 697, the Supreme Court of this State has restated a long accepted principle, *Page 642 as follows: "The paramount rule in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature." This rule seems peculiarly applicable where it is questionable whether certain acts complained of come within the denunciation of a criminal statute.

2010“Although the FAA requires an arbitration agreement to be written, it does not expressly require the agreement to be signed by the parties.” In re Big 8 Food Stores, Ltd., 166 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding); see Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. McKay, 763 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987).

2010LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE , § 8.5(c) (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009). 38 See United States v. Jiminez, 419 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the lessee of an apartment where defendant was residing could not consent to a search of the defendant’s room where the lessee characterized defendant’s bedroom as “his space” and said she did not enter the room “as a regular matter”); People v. Mullaney, 306 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a defendant’s sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom, and explicitly stating tha

2010“Although the FAA requires an arbitration agreement to be written, it does not expressly require the agreement to be signed by the parties.” In re Big 8 Food Stores, Ltd., 166 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding); see Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. McKay, 763 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987).

2010LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE , § 8.5(c) (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009). 38 See United States v. Jiminez, 419 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the lessee of an apartment where defendant was residing could not consent to a search of the defendant’s room where the lessee characterized defendant’s bedroom as “his space” and said she did not enter the room “as a regular matter”); People v. Mullaney, 306 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a defendant’s sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom, and explicitly stating tha

2010LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE , § 8.5(c) (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009). 38 See United States v. Jiminez, 419 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the lessee of an apartment where defendant was residing could not consent to a search of the defendant’s room where the lessee characterized defendant’s bedroom as “his space” and said she did not enter the room “as a regular matter”); People v. Mullaney, 306 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a defendant’s sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom, and explicitly stating tha

2010“Although the FAA requires an arbitration agreement to be written, it does not expressly require the agreement to be signed by the parties.” In re Big 8 Food Stores, Ltd., 166 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding); see Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. McKay, 763 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987).

2010LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE , § 8.5(c) (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009). 38 See United States v. Jiminez, 419 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the lessee of an apartment where defendant was residing could not consent to a search of the defendant’s room where the lessee characterized defendant’s bedroom as “his space” and said she did not enter the room “as a regular matter”); People v. Mullaney, 306 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a defendant’s sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom, and explicitly stating tha

2003Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1989).

1980The Paramount test was relied upon in Gala Homes, Inc. v. Fritz, 393 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1965, writ ref’d n. r. e.), a suit for specific performance of a contract providing for forfeiture of down payment in event of default.

1980The Paramount test was relied upon in Gala Homes, Inc. v. Fritz, 393 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1965, writ ref’d n. r. e.), a suit for specific performance of a contract providing for forfeiture of down payment in event of default.

1970El Paso Electric Co. v. Safeway Stores, 257 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1970El Paso Electric Co. v. Safeway Stores, 257 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex. Civ.App., El Paso 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).