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15 Virginia opinions name it 8 courts 1988–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Powell v. Hollandgreen2 sentences1997Under “the paramount rule of testamentary construction, viz, that courts must give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator unless to do so would offend some rule of law,” Powell v. Holland, 224 Va. 609, 615 , 299 S.E.2d 509 (1983), the general scheme of disposition developed by Mrs. Andrews must be honored. 1997Under “the paramount rule of testamentary construction, viz, that courts must give effect to what appears to be the intention of the testator unless to do so would offend some rule of law,” Powell v. Holland, 224 Va. 609, 615 , 299 S.E.2d 509 (1983), the general scheme of disposition developed by Mrs. Andrews must be honored. | 3 | 5 |
Thomas v. Copenhavergreen2 sentences2005Thomas v. Copenhaver, 235 Va. 124, 128 , 365 S.E.2d 760 (1988). 2005Thomas v. Copenhaver, 235 Va. 124, 128 , 365 S.E.2d 760 (1988). | 2 | 4 |
City of Lynchburg v. Suttenfieldgreen2 sentences2021“Thus, the paramount principle of statutory interpretation is ‘to interpret the statute as written.’” Id. at 542 (quoting City of Lynchburg v. Suttenfield, 177 Va. 212, 221 (1941)). 2019“Thus, the paramount principle of statutory interpretation is ‘to interpret the statute as written.’” Id. at 542 (quoting City of Lynchburg v. Suttenfield, 177 Va. 212, 221 (1941)). | 2 | 3 |
Prillaman v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2019In determining the plain meaning of a statute, appellate courts have “long recognized that ‘statutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great, connected, homogenous system, or a single and complete statutory arrangement.’” Id. at 543 (quoting Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405 (1957)). | 1 | 1 |
Penick's v. Walkergreen2 sentences2000“The primary consideration and rule of construction is to determine the intention of the testator from the language which he has used.” Penick v. Walker, 125 Va. 274, 278 , 99 S.E. 559, 560 (1919); accord Coffman v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 463 , 109 S.E. 454, 457 (1921). 2000“The primary consideration and rule of construction is to determine the intention of the testator from the language which he has used.” Penick v. Walker, 125 Va. 274, 278 , 99 S.E. 559, 560 (1919); accord Coffman v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 463 , 109 S.E. 454, 457 (1921). | 1 | 1 |
Coffman's Adm'r v. Coffmangreen2 sentences2000“The primary consideration and rule of construction is to determine the intention of the testator from the language which he has used.” Penick v. Walker, 125 Va. 274, 278 , 99 S.E. 559, 560 (1919); accord Coffman v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 463 , 109 S.E. 454, 457 (1921). 2000“The primary consideration and rule of construction is to determine the intention of the testator from the language which he has used.” Penick v. Walker, 125 Va. 274, 278 , 99 S.E. 559, 560 (1919); accord Coffman v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 463 , 109 S.E. 454, 457 (1921). | 1 | 1 |
Gillespie v. Davisgreen2 sentences1992Gillespie v. Davis, 242 Va. 300, 303 , 410 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1991). 1992Gillespie v. Davis, 242 Va. 300, 303 , 410 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elterich v. Leicht Real Estate Co.
green
2 sentences2009Elterich v. Leicht Real Estate Co., 130 Va. 224, 239 , 107 S.E. 735 (1921). 2009Elterich v. Leicht Real Estate Co., 130 Va. 224, 239 , 107 S.E. 735 (1921). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Waldrop v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2005Where penal statutes defining the elements of a criminal offense conflict and cannot be harmonized, we must apply the paramount principle that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth, see Waldrop, 255 Va. at 214 , 495 S.E.2d at 825 . 2005Where penal statutes defining the elements of a criminal offense conflict and cannot be harmonized, we must apply the paramount principle that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the Commonwealth, see Waldrop, 255 Va. at 214 , 495 S.E.2d at 825 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
West v. Hines
green
2 sentences2001West v. Hines, 245 Va. 379 , 429 S.E.2d 1 (1993). 2001West v. Hines, 245 Va. 379 , 429 S.E.2d 1 (1993). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Picot v. Picot
green
2 sentences1997Virginia has long followed the “doctrine which enjoins upon the expositor to look for the intention of the testator in the general tenor and context of the instrument and to qualify or even reject any clause or phrase that may be found incompatible with it; and though first expressed, this general intent shall overrule the particular intent afterwards disclosed.” Hooe v. Hooe, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 245 , 251 (1856), as quoted in Picot v. Picot, 237 Va. 686, 689-90 , 379 S.E.2d 364 (1989) (emphasis added by Senior Justice Poff in the Picot opinion). 1997Virginia has long followed the “doctrine which enjoins upon the expositor to look for the intention of the testator in the general tenor and context of the instrument and to qualify or even reject any clause or phrase that may be found incompatible with it; and though first expressed, this general intent shall overrule the particular intent afterwards disclosed.” Hooe v. Hooe, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 245 , 251 (1856), as quoted in Picot v. Picot, 237 Va. 686, 689-90 , 379 S.E.2d 364 (1989) (emphasis added by Senior Justice Poff in the Picot opinion). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Westmoreland County Volunteer Rescue Squad v. Melnick
green
1 sentence1997“The paramount rule in will construction is that the testator’s intention controls; the problem is to ascertain it. [Citation omitted.] This intention must be ascertained, if possible from the language of the document.” Westmoreland, supra, 243 Va. at 224 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Bowles v. Kinsey
green
2 sentences1994Conclusions of Law As the Supreme Court noted in Bowles v. Kinsey, 246 Va. 298, 301-302 , 435 S.E.2d 129 (1993): The paramount rule of will construction is that the intention of the testator controls, unless such intent is contrary to an established principle of law. 1994Conclusions of Law As the Supreme Court noted in Bowles v. Kinsey, 246 Va. 298, 301-302 , 435 S.E.2d 129 (1993): The paramount rule of will construction is that the intention of the testator controls, unless such intent is contrary to an established principle of law. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.