paramount rule in California

2016DISCUSSION A. Legal Principles Governing the Interpretation of Wills “ ‘The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.’ ” (Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 205 ; § 21102, subd. (a).) The rules of construction in the Probate Code apply “where the intention of the transferor is not indicated by the instrument.” (§ 21102, subd. (b).) Those rules of construction provide that “[t]he words of an in

2015Technical words are not necessary to give effect to a disposition in an instrument.” (See Estate of Goyette (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 67, 70 .) Our Supreme Court has held: “‘The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 205 ; Estate of Hilton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1145, 1168 .) To the extent the probate court’s decision relied upon the language of

2001Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank (1996) 14 Cal.4th 126, 134 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 926 P.2d 969 ] summarized the rules that generally apply in discerning testamentary intent: “ ‘The intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument.’ (§ 21102, subd. (a).) ‘ “The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.” (Estate of Wilson (1920)

2001Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank (1996) 14 Cal.4th 126, 134 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 926 P.2d 969 ] summarized the rules that generally apply in discerning testamentary intent: “ ‘The intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument.’ (§ 21102, subd. (a).) ‘ “The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.” (Estate of Wilson (1920)

1997(See 2 Page on Wills (3d ed. 1960) Revocation, §21.57, pp. 449-450 [doctrine of dependent relative revocation should apply where testator revokes prior will based on material mistake].) “In the construction of wills the paramount rule, to which all others must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.” (Estate of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 6 [ 108 P.2d 893 ].) The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is simply one means of implementing this paramount rule: “[T]he

1997(See 2 Page on Wills (3d ed. 1960) Revocation, §21.57, pp. 449-450 [doctrine of dependent relative revocation should apply where testator revokes prior will based on material mistake].) “In the construction of wills the paramount rule, to which all others must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator, as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.” (Estate of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 6 [ 108 P.2d 893 ].) The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is simply one means of implementing this paramount rule: “[T]he

2022(Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318 ; Ammerman v. Callender (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1072 .) “ ‘The paramount rule in construing [a trust] instrument is to determine intent from the instrument itself and in accordance with applicable law. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘In construing a trust instrument, the intent of the trustor prevails and it must be ascertained from the whole of the trust instrument, not just separate parts of it.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ammerman, at p. 1073; see §§ 21101, 21102, subds. (a) & (b), 21121.) Paragraph 3.4 of the amendment to the trust made a special distr

2018We interpret the Hildis subtrust, as to which the parties did not present extrinsic evidence surrounding its execution, as a matter of law. ( Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311 , 318, 98 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 491 P.2d 385 ; Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861 , 865, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 402 P.2d 839 ; Aviles v. Swearingen (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 485 , 490, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 ; Ammerman v. Callender (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1058 , 1073, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 38 .) The paramount rule in construing the trust is to determine the trustor's intent from the whole of the instrument and in accordan

1958It is well settled that the paramount rule in the construction of a will is that the will must be interpreted according to the intention of the testator (Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 [ 193 P. 581 ]; Estate of Murphy, 157 Cal. 63, 69 [ 106 P. 230 , 137 Am.St.Rep. 110 ]; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 344 [ 55 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423 [ 229 P. 898 ]; 26 Cal.Jur. 897), and that intention must be given effect as far as possible.

1958It is well settled that the paramount rule in the construction of a will is that the will must be interpreted according to the intention of the testator (Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 [ 193 P. 581 ]; Estate of Murphy, 157 Cal. 63, 69 [ 106 P. 230 , 137 Am.St.Rep. 110 ]; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 344 [ 55 P. 1011 ]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423 [ 229 P. 898 ]; 26 Cal.Jur. 897), and that intention must be given effect as far as possible.

1961In short, we are persuaded that the paramount rule which requires that wills be interpreted according to the testator’s intention, and that such intention be given effect as far as possible (see Estate of Thompson, 50 Cal.2d 613, 617 [ 328 P.2d 1 ]) constitutes, in the circumstances of the instant ease, reasonable grounds for a conclusion that the decedent effectively made a gift of her net estate to her friend, Leah Selix, and that such a result was her manifest intention in the preparation and execution of her will.

1961In short, we are persuaded that the paramount rule which requires that wills be interpreted according to the testator’s intention, and that such intention be given effect as far as possible (see Estate of Thompson, 50 Cal.2d 613, 617 [ 328 P.2d 1 ]) constitutes, in the circumstances of the instant ease, reasonable grounds for a conclusion that the decedent effectively made a gift of her net estate to her friend, Leah Selix, and that such a result was her manifest intention in the preparation and execution of her will.

1955(Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66, 67 [ 193 P. 581 ]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423 [ 229 P. 898 ] ; Estate of McCurdy, 197 Cal. 276, 282 [ 240 P. 498 ]; Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752, 756 , [ 190 P. 17 ] ; Estate of Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567, 568, 569 [199 P.783].)” ‘' Of course, as stated in the case of Estate of Wilson, supra, at page 68: 'Of this class of questions it may be said, with more truth, perhaps, than of any other, that each case depends upon its own peculiar facts, and that precedents have comparatively small value.

1955(Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66, 67 [ 193 P. 581 ]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423 [ 229 P. 898 ] ; Estate of McCurdy, 197 Cal. 276, 282 [ 240 P. 498 ]; Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752, 756 , [ 190 P. 17 ] ; Estate of Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567, 568, 569 [199 P.783].)” ‘' Of course, as stated in the case of Estate of Wilson, supra, at page 68: 'Of this class of questions it may be said, with more truth, perhaps, than of any other, that each case depends upon its own peculiar facts, and that precedents have comparatively small value.

1955(Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66, 67 [ 193 P. 581 ]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423 [ 229 P. 898 ] ; Estate of McCurdy, 197 Cal. 276, 282 [ 240 P. 498 ]; Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752, 756 , [ 190 P. 17 ] ; Estate of Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567, 568, 569 [199 P.783].)” ‘' Of course, as stated in the case of Estate of Wilson, supra, at page 68: 'Of this class of questions it may be said, with more truth, perhaps, than of any other, that each case depends upon its own peculiar facts, and that precedents have comparatively small value.

1953(Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 [ 193 Pac. 581 ]; Estate of Newman, 68 Cal.App. 420, 423 [ 229 Pac. 898 ]; Estate of McCurdy, 197 Cal. 276, 282 [ 240 Pac. 498 ]; Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752, 756 [ 190 Pac. 17 ]; Estate of Ritzman, 186 Cal. 567, 568-569 [ 199 Pac. 783 ].)” Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal.2d 1, 6 [ 108 P.2d 893 ].

2018We interpret the Hildis subtrust, as to which the parties did not present extrinsic evidence surrounding its execution, as a matter of law. ( Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311 , 318, 98 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 491 P.2d 385 ; Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861 , 865, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 402 P.2d 839 ; Aviles v. Swearingen (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 485 , 490, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 ; Ammerman v. Callender (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1058 , 1073, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 38 .) The paramount rule in construing the trust is to determine the trustor's intent from the whole of the instrument and in accordan

2018We interpret the Hildis subtrust, as to which the parties did not present extrinsic evidence surrounding its execution, as a matter of law. ( Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311 , 318, 98 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 491 P.2d 385 ; Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861 , 865, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 402 P.2d 839 ; Aviles v. Swearingen (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 485 , 490, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 ; Ammerman v. Callender (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1058 , 1073, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 38 .) The paramount rule in construing the trust is to determine the trustor's intent from the whole of the instrument and in accordan

2025(See Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank (1996) 14 Cal.4th 126, 134 [“ ‘ “The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.” ’ ”].) We conclude that David has failed to demonstrate that the probate court erred by concluding that the Villa property was an asset of the trust.

2005(See Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank (1996) 14 Cal.4th 126, 134 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 926 P.2d 969 ] [“ 1 “The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible” ’ ”].) Moreover, neither a rigid and mechanical view of wills as inoperative for any purpose until the testator’s death nor a policy that insists on documentary formalities to promote the regularity of trust administration provides a compelling reason to

1942As has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of this state (Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal. (2d) 1 [ 108 P. (2d) 893 ] ; Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63 [ 193 Pac. 581 ] ; Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 [ 190 Pac. 17 ]), the paramount rule in the construction of wills is that the intention of the testator must be given effect as far as possible.

1942As has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of this state (Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal. (2d) 1 [ 108 P. (2d) 893 ] ; Estate of Wilson, 184 Cal. 63 [ 193 Pac. 581 ] ; Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 [ 190 Pac. 17 ]), the paramount rule in the construction of wills is that the intention of the testator must be given effect as far as possible.

2004Judicial precedent on similar facts may be relevant, but “[establishing terminological uniformity throughout our codified law is less important than discerning ‘ “the intent of the Legislature so as *783 to effectuate the purpose” ’ of each individual statute.” (Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 42 .) Ultimately, “the ascertainment of legislative intent is the paramount principle of statutory interpretation.” (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 289 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ].) For the following reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal that section 425.13’s limitations on action

2004Judicial precedent on similar facts may be relevant, but “[establishing terminological uniformity throughout our codified law is less important than discerning ‘ “the intent of the Legislature so as *783 to effectuate the purpose” ’ of each individual statute.” (Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 42 .) Ultimately, “the ascertainment of legislative intent is the paramount principle of statutory interpretation.” (In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 289 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 224 , 747 P.2d 1152 ].) For the following reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal that section 425.13’s limitations on action

1995Although there are numerous principles of testamentary construction available to guide our analysis, they all yield to the paramount rule requiring that the testator’s intention must, as far as possible, be given effect. “[T]estamentary intent must of necessity be determined on a case-by-case basis.’’ (Estate of Huntington (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 197, 206 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 787 ].) Where the evidence of intent at the time of the execution of the will is sufficiently clear to establish the testator’s intention, the expression of intent may be found in the instrument itself.

1995Although there are numerous principles of testamentary construction available to guide our analysis, they all yield to the paramount rule requiring that the testator’s intention must, as far as possible, be given effect. “[T]estamentary intent must of necessity be determined on a case-by-case basis.’’ (Estate of Huntington (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 197, 206 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 787 ].) Where the evidence of intent at the time of the execution of the will is sufficiently clear to establish the testator’s intention, the expression of intent may be found in the instrument itself.

1991Practices Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 764 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 787 , 799 P.2d 1220 ]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) In contrast, where the language of a statute is clear, there is no room for interpretation.

1991Practices Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 764 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 787 , 799 P.2d 1220 ]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) In contrast, where the language of a statute is clear, there is no room for interpretation.

1978Further ambiguity appears in the juxtaposition and descriptive language of the key paragraphs themselves: (1) the tax-relief clause follows immediately after the fourth paragraph *225 rather than the third to which appellants argue it is singularly restricted; (2) paragraph FIFTH expressly applies to "all the specific bequests above made, " (italics added) directory language which under appellants' theory would be rendered mere surplusage, a concept repugnant to basic principles of construction. (§ 102; Estate of Newmark (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 350, 356 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 628 ].) It has been repea

1978Further ambiguity appears in the juxtaposition and descriptive language of the key paragraphs themselves: (1) the tax-relief clause follows immediately after the fourth paragraph *225 rather than the third to which appellants argue it is singularly restricted; (2) paragraph FIFTH expressly applies to "all the specific bequests above made, " (italics added) directory language which under appellants' theory would be rendered mere surplusage, a concept repugnant to basic principles of construction. (§ 102; Estate of Newmark (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 350, 356 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 628 ].) It has been repea

1977(Reagh v. Kelley (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1088-1089 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 425 ].) The paramount rule of interpretation is that the will must be construed in accordance with the intention of the testator as expressed in the will (Estate of Johnston (1956) 47 Cal.2d 265, 269 [ 303 P.2d 1 ]), and each case depends upon its own peculiar facts (Estate of Axcelrod (1944) 23 Cal.2d 761, 766-767 [ 147 P.2d 1 ]).

1977(Reagh v. Kelley (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1088-1089 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 425 ].) The paramount rule of interpretation is that the will must be construed in accordance with the intention of the testator as expressed in the will (Estate of Johnston (1956) 47 Cal.2d 265, 269 [ 303 P.2d 1 ]), and each case depends upon its own peculiar facts (Estate of Axcelrod (1944) 23 Cal.2d 761, 766-767 [ 147 P.2d 1 ]).

1966Accord, Moore v. Wood, 26 Cal.2d 621, 629-630 [ 160 P.2d 772 ]; Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819, 826-827 [ 167 P.2d 719 , 164 A.L.R. 685 ]; Estate of Wunderle, 30 Cal.2d 274, 280 [ 181 P.2d 874 ]; Estate of Fleming, 31 Cal.2d 514, 523 [ 190 P.2d 611 ]; Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 381 [ 267 P.2d 257 ].)" We start with the settled rule repeated in many cases and stated in the Estate of Lawrence, [ 17 Cal.2d 1 [ 108 P.2d 893 ], at p. 6, as follows: "In the construction of wills the paramount rule, to which all others must yield, is that a will is to be c

1966Accord, Moore v. Wood, 26 Cal.2d 621, 629-630 [ 160 P.2d 772 ]; Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819, 826-827 [ 167 P.2d 719 , 164 A.L.R. 685 ]; Estate of Wunderle, 30 Cal.2d 274, 280 [ 181 P.2d 874 ]; Estate of Fleming, 31 Cal.2d 514, 523 [ 190 P.2d 611 ]; Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal.2d 376, 381 [ 267 P.2d 257 ].)" We start with the settled rule repeated in many cases and stated in the Estate of Lawrence, [ 17 Cal.2d 1 [ 108 P.2d 893 ], at p. 6, as follows: "In the construction of wills the paramount rule, to which all others must yield, is that a will is to be c

2015Technical words are not necessary to give effect to a disposition in an instrument.” (See Estate of Goyette (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 67, 70 .) Our Supreme Court has held: “‘The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 205 ; Estate of Hilton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1145, 1168 .) To the extent the probate court’s decision relied upon the language of

1992II DISCUSSION (1) "`The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.'" ( Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 205 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 , 444 P.2d 353 ].) (2) In reviewing a trial court's construction of a will, we are free to independently interpret the instrument as a matter of law unless the trial court's interpretation turned upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence or required resolution of a

1996(See Estate of Joslyn (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1428 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 616 ]; Estate of Newmark (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 350 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 628 ].) “The intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument.” (§ 21102, subd. (a).) “ ‘The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.’ (Estate of Wilson (1920) 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 [ 193 P. 5

1996(See Estate of Joslyn (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1428 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 616 ]; Estate of Newmark (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 350 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 628 ].) “The intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument.” (§ 21102, subd. (a).) “ ‘The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible.’ (Estate of Wilson (1920) 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 [ 193 P. 5

1978Further ambiguity appears in the juxtaposition and descriptive language of the key paragraphs themselves: (1) the tax-relief clause follows immediately after the fourth paragraph *225 rather than the third to which appellants argue it is singularly restricted; (2) paragraph FIFTH expressly applies to "all the specific bequests above made, " (italics added) directory language which under appellants' theory would be rendered mere surplusage, a concept repugnant to basic principles of construction. (§ 102; Estate of Newmark (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 350, 356 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 628 ].) It has been repea

1971(See Estate of Russell, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 208-211.) (9) Secondly, as we have said many times, "The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible." ( Estate of Wilson (1920) 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 [ 193 P. 581 ].) [14] (10) The presumption *325 of a technical meaning established by section 106 is subordinate to the dominant purpose of finding and effecting the testator's intent ( Estate of Kruger (1942

1978Further ambiguity appears in the juxtaposition and descriptive language of the key paragraphs themselves: (1) the tax-relief clause follows immediately after the fourth paragraph *225 rather than the third to which appellants argue it is singularly restricted; (2) paragraph FIFTH expressly applies to "all the specific bequests above made, " (italics added) directory language which under appellants' theory would be rendered mere surplusage, a concept repugnant to basic principles of construction. (§ 102; Estate of Newmark (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 350, 356 [ 136 Cal. Rptr. 628 ].) It has been repea

1971(See Estate of Russell, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 208-211.) (9) Secondly, as we have said many times, "The paramount rule in the construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible." ( Estate of Wilson (1920) 184 Cal. 63, 66-67 [ 193 P. 581 ].) [14] (10) The presumption *325 of a technical meaning established by section 106 is subordinate to the dominant purpose of finding and effecting the testator's intent ( Estate of Kruger (1942