10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heinze v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617 , 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945). 2016Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617 , 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chaneygreen2 sentences2012See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 508 , 27 A.3d 153, 163 (2011) (citations omitted) (stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179-81 , 825 A.2d 452, 458-59 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing the long standing presumption that “trial judges know the law and apply it properly ...”); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md.App. 598, 613 , 587 A.2d 1133, 1140 (1991) (citations omitted) (“ 2012See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 508 , 27 A.3d 153, 163 (2011) (citations omitted) (stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179-81 , 825 A.2d 452, 458-59 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing the long standing presumption that “trial judges know the law and apply it properly ...”); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md.App. 598, 613 , 587 A.2d 1133, 1140 (1991) (citations omitted) (“ | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Keinergreen2 sentences2012See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 508 , 27 A.3d 153, 163 (2011) (citations omitted) (stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179-81 , 825 A.2d 452, 458-59 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing the long standing presumption that “trial judges know the law and apply it properly ...”); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md.App. 598, 613 , 587 A.2d 1133, 1140 (1991) (citations omitted) (“ 2012See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 508 , 27 A.3d 153, 163 (2011) (citations omitted) (stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179-81 , 825 A.2d 452, 458-59 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing the long standing presumption that “trial judges know the law and apply it properly ...”); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md.App. 598, 613 , 587 A.2d 1133, 1140 (1991) (citations omitted) (“ | 1 | 1 |
Rock v. Rockgreen2 sentences2012See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 508 , 27 A.3d 153, 163 (2011) (citations omitted) (stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179-81 , 825 A.2d 452, 458-59 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing the long standing presumption that “trial judges know the law and apply it properly ...”); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md.App. 598, 613 , 587 A.2d 1133, 1140 (1991) (citations omitted) (“ 2012See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 508 , 27 A.3d 153, 163 (2011) (citations omitted) (stating that “barring explicit evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that any hearing judge in conducting ... any [ ] legal proceeding, understands and carries out his or her obligation to follow the law”); State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179-81 , 825 A.2d 452, 458-59 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing the long standing presumption that “trial judges know the law and apply it properly ...”); Rock v. Rock, 86 Md.App. 598, 613 , 587 A.2d 1133, 1140 (1991) (citations omitted) (“ | 1 | 1 |
County Commissioners v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Caroline County Comm’rs v. Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83 , 747 A.2d 600 (2000), and cases cited therein, where we reiterated the long standing doctrine in Maryland that a person making a claim based *347 upon an express contract, generally, may not also rely on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 4 . 2008See Caroline County Comm’rs v. Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83 , 747 A.2d 600 (2000), and cases cited therein, where we reiterated the long standing doctrine in Maryland that a person making a claim based *347 upon an express contract, generally, may not also rely on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 4 . | 1 | 1 |
McGrath v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See McGrath v. State, 356 Md. 20, 24 , 736 A.2d 1067, 1069 (1999). 1999See McGrath v. State, 356 Md. 20, 24 , 736 A.2d 1067, 1069 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Lohman v. Lohmangreen2 sentences1993The case before us is distinguished from [Altman ] and its progeny, because there is no foreign divorce, but rather a Maryland divorce granted to a resident of Maryland against an absconding spouse who clearly attempted to evade process.” 93 Md.App. at 591-92 , 613 A.2d at 1017 (citations omitted). 1993The case before us is distinguished from [Altman ] and its progeny, because there is no foreign divorce, but rather a Maryland divorce granted to a resident of Maryland against an absconding spouse who clearly attempted to evade process.” 93 Md.App. at 591-92 , 613 A.2d at 1017 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Salisbury Ice Co.green2 sentences1977Vol. I.” We think this statutory provision was not intended to extend in any material way the long standing rule of law reiterated in Williams v. Ice Co., 176 Md. 13, 26 , 3 A. 2d 507, 513 (1939), wherein it was said: “In a word, if the question involved is one concerning the internal management of corporate affairs, void of acts ultra vires, fraudulent, or illegal, courts of equity will refrain from granting relief to a minority stockholder, or, as stated in McDoughall v. Gardiner, L.R. 1 Ch. 1977Vol. I.” We think this statutory provision was not intended to extend in any material way the long standing rule of law reiterated in Williams v. Ice Co., 176 Md. 13, 26 , 3 A. 2d 507, 513 (1939), wherein it was said: “In a word, if the question involved is one concerning the internal management of corporate affairs, void of acts ultra vires, fraudulent, or illegal, courts of equity will refrain from granting relief to a minority stockholder, or, as stated in McDoughall v. Gardiner, L.R. 1 Ch. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1993Wilson v. Wilson, 87 Md.App. 547, 552-53 , 590 A.2d 579 (1991) (quoting Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490-92 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978); Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 265 , 208 A.2d 611 (1965)). 1993Wilson v. Wilson, 87 Md.App. 547, 552-53 , 590 A.2d 579 (1991) (quoting Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490-92 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978); Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 265 , 208 A.2d 611 (1965)). | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Upham v. Upham
green
2 sentences1993Wilson v. Wilson, 87 Md.App. 547, 552-53 , 590 A.2d 579 (1991) (quoting Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490-92 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978); Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 265 , 208 A.2d 611 (1965)). 1993Wilson v. Wilson, 87 Md.App. 547, 552-53 , 590 A.2d 579 (1991) (quoting Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490-92 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978); Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 265 , 208 A.2d 611 (1965)). | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Altman v. Altman
green
2 sentences1993Wilson v. Wilson, 87 Md.App. 547, 552-53 , 590 A.2d 579 (1991) (quoting Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490-92 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978); Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 265 , 208 A.2d 611 (1965)). 1993Wilson v. Wilson, 87 Md.App. 547, 552-53 , 590 A.2d 579 (1991) (quoting Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 490-92 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978); Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 265 , 208 A.2d 611 (1965)). | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Whalen v. United States
green
1 sentence1999Unlike the federal approach, see Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. at 691 , 100 S.Ct. 1482 , under this Court’s decisions, the required evidence test is more than simply another rule of statutory construction, but instead is a long standing rule of law to determine whether one offense is included within another when both are based on the same act or acts. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Atkinson v. Sapperstein
green
2 sentences1981This court restated this long standing principle in McGlaughlin v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 78 , 23 A.2d 12 (1941): In accordance with the great weight of authority in this country, this Court has consistently held that the purpose of the constitutional provision here invoked is sufficiently complied with if the title of the proposed legislation fairly advises the General Assembly, and the public, of the real nature, and subject matter, of the legislation sought to be accomplished, and in testing conformity of a title of a statute to constitutional requirements that the subject should be describe 1981This court restated this long standing principle in McGlaughlin v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 78 , 23 A.2d 12 (1941): In accordance with the great weight of authority in this country, this Court has consistently held that the purpose of the constitutional provision here invoked is sufficiently complied with if the title of the proposed legislation fairly advises the General Assembly, and the public, of the real nature, and subject matter, of the legislation sought to be accomplished, and in testing conformity of a title of a statute to constitutional requirements that the subject should be describe | 1 | 1981–1981 |
McGlaughlin v. Warfield
green
2 sentences1981This court restated this long standing principle in McGlaughlin v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 78 , 23 A.2d 12 (1941): In accordance with the great weight of authority in this country, this Court has consistently held that the purpose of the constitutional provision here invoked is sufficiently complied with if the title of the proposed legislation fairly advises the General Assembly, and the public, of the real nature, and subject matter, of the legislation sought to be accomplished, and in testing conformity of a title of a statute to constitutional requirements that the subject should be describe 1981This court restated this long standing principle in McGlaughlin v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 78 , 23 A.2d 12 (1941): In accordance with the great weight of authority in this country, this Court has consistently held that the purpose of the constitutional provision here invoked is sufficiently complied with if the title of the proposed legislation fairly advises the General Assembly, and the public, of the real nature, and subject matter, of the legislation sought to be accomplished, and in testing conformity of a title of a statute to constitutional requirements that the subject should be describe | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Markoff v. Kreiner
green
1 sentence1971Mar koff v. Kreiner, 180 Md. 150 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Ware v. State
green
1 sentence1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
1 sentence1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Carnley v. Cochran
green
1 sentence1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
CUMMINGS, ETC. v. Warden
green
1 sentence1968Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702 ; Ware v. State, 235 Md. 131 ; Montgomery v. Warden, supra. The classic definition of waiver of a federal constitutional right is that contained in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 , i.e., “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” In Manning v. State, supra, the Maryland Court of Appeals gave explicit recognition to the holding of the Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 , viz.: “Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.