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112 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1978–2026 51 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turner v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Nor may we consider evidence from the record of another case, unless we take judicial notice of our own records from “the same or related proceedings involving same or nearly same parties.” Turner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. 2024Nor may we consider evidence from the record of another case, unless we take judicial notice of our own records from “the same or related proceedings involving same or nearly same parties.” Turner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. | 48 | 48 |
Janecka v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“It is a long standing principle that [appellate courts] cannot review contentions which depend upon factual assertions outside of the record.” Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 476 (Tex. Crim. 2005"It is a long standing principle that we cannot review contentions which depend upon factual assertions outside of the record." Janecka v. State , 937 S.W.2d 456, 476 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Darty v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Darty v. State, 709 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex. Crim. 1992Darty v. State, 709 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). | 2 | 2 |
Veteto v. Stategreen2 sentences2008The Court [of Criminal Appeals] has not taken issue with this interpretation, and neither will we." 8 S.W.3d at 818 (internal citations omitted). 2008The Court [of Criminal Appeals] has not taken issue with this interpretation, and neither will we.” 8 S.W.3d at 818 (internal citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Murphee Property Holdings, Ltd. v. Sunbelt Savings Ass'n of Texasgreen2 sentences2004Wfliile not exactly on point, a case where redemption was a factor, but not the issue, Murphee Property Holdings, Ltd. v. Sunbelt Savings Ass’n of Texas, 817 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991) in its factual set-up acknowledged the long standing rule: 3 On October 21, 1986, Mission Bend Municipal Utility District No. 1 (“the District”) filed the tax suit against Highway 6 Venture to collect taxes assessed against the 61 acres of land during 1985, and to obtain the judicial foreclosure of the District’s tax hen. 2004While not exactly on point, a case where redemption was a factor, but not the issue, Murphee Property Holdings, Ltd. v. Sunbelt Savings Ass'n of Texas , 817 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991) in its factual set-up acknowledged the long standing rule: (6) On October 21, 1986, Mission Bend Municipal Utility District No. 1 ("the District") filed the tax suit against Highway 6 Venture to collect taxes assessed against the 61 acres of land during 1985, and to obtain the judicial foreclosure of the District's tax lien. | 2 | 2 |
Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of Texasgreen2 sentences1982Abalos v. Oil Development Company of Texas, 544 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex.1976). 1979Parker did not abolish, however, the long standing rule, as restated in Abalos, supra at 631 , that a “plaintiff must prove the existence and violation of a legal duty owed to him by the defendant to establish [negligence] liability.” It was the absence of such a duty upon which the trial court premised its judgment. | 1 | 2 |
McFarlane v. Howellgreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., McFarlane v. Howell, 42 S.W. 853 , 854–55 (Tex. 1897). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Stategreen1 sentence2024App. 1996) (“It is a long standing principle that we cannot review contentions which depend upon factual assertions outside of the record.”); Evans v. State, 622 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Doncer v. Dickersongreen1 sentence2022We agree with the court’s analysis in Treto in applying the presumption of parentage to same-sex spouses, and add the observation that applying the presumption promotes the long- standing principle that the “best interest of the child is always the primary consideration of the court in determining issues of conservatorship and possession of or access to a child.” See Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2002, no pet.), citing 10 The court in Treto also noted that other state courts that have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act have concluded that the marital presumption app | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rossgreen1 sentence2015Id. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)); See also Barnes v. State, 424 S.W. 3d 218, 225 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2014, no pet.) (“But Gant did not diminish the reach of the automobile exception”). | 1 | 1 |
Main v. Royallgreen1 sentence2015Main v. Royall, 348 S. W.3d 381, 390 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2011, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc.green1 sentence2015Burroughs v. APS Int’l, Ltd., 93 S.W.3d 155, 161 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365, 375 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Marcus Wayne Barnes v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Id. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)); See also Barnes v. State, 424 S.W. 3d 218, 225 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2014, no pet.) (“But Gant did not diminish the reach of the automobile exception”). | 1 | 1 |
Burroughs v. APS International, Ltd.green1 sentence2015Burroughs v. APS Int’l, Ltd., 93 S.W.3d 155, 161 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental Constructors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365, 375 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Holcomb v. Lorinogreen2 sentences2015See Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446 , 79 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1935). 2015See Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446 , 79 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1935). | 1 | 1 |
First Alief Bank v. Whitegreen1 sentence2015CONCLUSION Anderson’s arguments ask the Court to layer unsupported exception upon unsupported exception, and require the Court to ignore both the long standing principle that intervention is not permitted after a final judgment, 41 See id. at 468 . 42 See id. (citing First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1982) (“[a] plea in intervention comes too late if filed after judgment and may not be considered unless and until the judgment has been set aside.”) (emphasis added). 43 See id. at 470. -11- and that a Decree cannot be set aside after thirty days, certainly not by a non‐ party | 1 | 1 |
Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Companies v. Searsgreen1 sentence2014Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 608 (Tex. 2002) (“At-will employment is an important and long- standing doctrine in Texas, and we have been reluctant to impose new common-law duties that would alter or conflict with the at-will relationship.” (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Teixeira v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925 , 927– 28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d) (“Because the sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts f | 1 | 1 |
Noland v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925 , 927– 28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d) (“Because the sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts f | 1 | 1 |
Nicholas v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925 , 927– 28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d) (“Because the sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts f | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Stategreen1 sentence2012App. 1998) (citing Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89 ); Thompson v. State, 89 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (“[I]f the prejudice arising from the improper argument is incurable, a mistrial is appropriate and a request for a mistrial will preserve error on appeal.”) (emphasis in original); Nixon v. State, 940 S.W.2d 687, 693 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, pet. ref’d) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals recently overturned the long- standing rule that a defendant need not object to incurable jury argument in order to preserve error. | 1 | 1 |
| Nixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rogers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Entergy Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Red River National Bank v. Fergusongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rocky Mountain v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mills v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davila v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Franklin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Munoz v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crawford v. Georgiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allridge v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heatherington v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gowan v. Reimersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sorola v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCall v. Texas Dragline Service Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard
green
2 sentences2011As noted earlier, however, the long standing rule is that a co-tenant has the right to extract minerals from the common estate without the consent of his cotenants. 21 Wagner & Brown, 282 S.W.3d at 426 . 2011As noted earlier, however, the long standing rule is that a co-tenant has the right to extract minerals - 35 - 04-09-00603-CV from the common estate without the consent of his cotenants. 21 Wagner & Brown, 282 S.W.3d at 426 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Indeed, the Baytown court expressly affirmed this long standing principle and concluded that the broad arbitration provision covered all questions of dispute between the parties, including the issue appellant alleged was not raised in the claims. 886 S.W.2d at 518 . 2005Indeed, the Bay-town court expressly affirmed this long standing principle and concluded that the broad arbitration provision covered all questions of dispute between the parties, including the issue appellant alleged was not raised in the claims. 886 S.W.2d at 518 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences1994Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724 . 1991Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.1990). | 2 | 1991–1994 |
Fuentes v. Shevin
green
2 sentences1986The Court reiterated the long standing rule that such a violation of due process could be avoided only by providing adequate safeguards at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner so as to obviate the danger of an unfair or mistaken deprivation of property. 407 U.S. at 80 . 1986Moore - Page 3 (lM-510) h obviate the danger of an unfair or mistaken deprivation of property. 407 U.S. at 80 . | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1982Jimmerson v. State, supra; Easely v. State, supra. The 1977 amendment to Art. 38.22, supra, now provides that the limitations of the statute apply only to statements that are the product of custodial interrogations; a voluntary oral statement is admissible if it is not the “result of” or does not “stem from custodial interrogation.” The statement from appellant to Mizelle Miller, which was made well after the effective date of the amendment, was not the product of a “custodial interrogation,” as that term is defined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 1982Jimmerson v. State, supra; Easely v. State, supra. The 1977 amendment to Art. 38.22, supra, now provides that the limitations of the statute apply only to statements that are the product of custodial interrogations; a voluntary oral statement is admissible if it is not the “result of” or does not “stem from custodial interrogation.” The statement from appellant to Mizelle Miller, which was made well after the effective date of the amendment, was not the product of a “custodial interrogation,” as that term is defined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 2 | 1981–1982 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)); See also Barnes v. State, 424 S.W. 3d 218, 225 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2014, no pet.) (“But Gant did not diminish the reach of the automobile exception”). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Malone v. Hampton
green
2 sentences2015CONCLUSION Anderson’s arguments ask the Court to layer unsupported exception upon unsupported exception, and require the Court to ignore both the long standing principle that intervention is not permitted after a final judgment, 41 See id. at 468 . 42 See id. (citing First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1982) (“[a] plea in intervention comes too late if filed after judgment and may not be considered unless and until the judgment has been set aside.”) (emphasis added). 43 See id. at 470. -11- and that a Decree cannot be set aside after thirty days, certainly not by a non‐ party 2015CONCLUSION Anderson’s arguments ask the Court to layer unsupported exception upon unsupported exception, and require the Court to ignore both the long standing principle that intervention is not permitted after a final judgment, 41 See id. at 468 . 42 See id. (citing First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1982) (“[a] plea in intervention comes too late if filed after judgment and may not be considered unless and until the judgment has been set aside.”) (emphasis added). 43 See id. at 470. -11- and that a Decree cannot be set aside after thirty days, certainly not by a non‐ party | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Trevino v. State
green
1 sentence2013See, e.g., Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“[I]n order to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.”); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925 , 927– 28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d) (“Because the sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts f | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Cockrell v. State
green
1 sentence2012App. 1998) (citing Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89 ); Thompson v. State, 89 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (“[I]f the prejudice arising from the improper argument is incurable, a mistrial is appropriate and a request for a mistrial will preserve error on appeal.”) (emphasis in original); Nixon v. State, 940 S.W.2d 687, 693 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, pet. ref’d) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals recently overturned the long- standing rule that a defendant need not object to incurable jury argument in order to preserve error. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Guzman v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Jones v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Saunders v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Green v. Regan green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Cervi v. Georgia green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Anderson v. Conner green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Walker v. Packer green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| McElwee v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Polk v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Moffett v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Parasco v. State red | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| McNaulty v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Bates v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Grigsby v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Mauldin v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Mitchell v. Bass green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Starr v. Ferguson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Stoner v. Thompson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Starr v. Ferguson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Haney v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Dunaway v. New York green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Henry v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Beck v. Ohio green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Mott v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| McKellar v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Terry v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.