6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Asgreen2 sentences2017See In re A.S., 614 A.2d at 540 (―[I]t is clear that the kind of dragnet seizure of three youths who resembled a generalized description cannot be squared with the long standing requirement for particularized, individual suspicion.‖). 2017See In re A.S., 614 A.2d at 540 (“[I]t is clear that the kind of dragnet seizure of three youths who resembled a generalized description cannot be squared with the long standing requirement for particularized, individual suspicion.”). | 1 | 1 |
Simon v. City or New Yorkgreen2 sentences1990In our view, absent any specific statutory provision to the contrary, the same standard of ordinary care applies whenever a marshal or like officer has custody of property under operation of law. 6 See Earl v. United States, 262 A.2d 598, 599 (D.C.1970) (“A United States Marshal is responsible for any damage caused by his negligence to property he handles while carrying out his duties.”); accord, Kessman v. City & County of Denver, 709 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985) (sheriff who has custody of merchandise pursuant to an abatement of nuisance action is liable for ordinary negligence); Simon 1990In our view, absent any specific statutory provision to the contrary, the same standard of ordinary care applies whenever a marshal or like officer has custody of property under operation of law. 6 See Earl v. United States, 262 A.2d 598, 599 (D.C.1970) (“A United States Marshal is responsible for any damage caused by his negligence to property he handles while carrying out his duties.”); accord, Kessman v. City & County of Denver, 709 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985) (sheriff who has custody of merchandise pursuant to an abatement of nuisance action is liable for ordinary negligence); Simon | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. Costellogreen2 sentences1990Holding the District and TMI liable as bailees for hire in this case is consistent with the long standing principle in this jurisdiction that a law enforcement officer who seizes goods under a writ of attachment is bound to exercise ordinary care to prevent their loss and destruction. [5] See Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 406 , 262 F.2d 714, 717 (1958); Snyder v. Hart, 64 App.D.C. 353, 355 , 78 F.2d 237, 239 (1935); Palmer v. Costello, 41 App. D.C. 165, 168-69 (1913). 1990Holding the District and TMI liable as bailees for hire in this case is consistent with the long standing principle in this jurisdiction that a law enforcement officer who seizes goods under a writ of attachment is bound to exercise ordinary care to prevent their loss and destruction. 5 See Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 406 , 262 F.2d 714, 717 (1958); Snyder v. Hart, 64 App.D.C. 353, 355 , 78 F.2d 237, 239 (1935); Palmer v. Costello, 41 App.D.C. 165, 168-69 (1913). | 1 | 1 |
Hester O'Neill Wilson v. Charles O. Bittinger, National Metropolitan Bank of Washington, and Thedistrict of Columbia, Appellesgreen2 sentences1990Holding the District and TMI liable as bailees for hire in this case is consistent with the long standing principle in this jurisdiction that a law enforcement officer who seizes goods under a writ of attachment is bound to exercise ordinary care to prevent their loss and destruction. 5 See Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 406 , 262 F.2d 714, 717 (1958); Snyder v. Hart, 64 App.D.C. 353, 355 , 78 F.2d 237, 239 (1935); Palmer v. Costello, 41 App.D.C. 165, 168-69 (1913). 1990Holding the District and TMI liable as bailees for hire in this case is consistent with the long standing principle in this jurisdiction that a law enforcement officer who seizes goods under a writ of attachment is bound to exercise ordinary care to prevent their loss and destruction. 5 See Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 406 , 262 F.2d 714, 717 (1958); Snyder v. Hart, 64 App.D.C. 353, 355 , 78 F.2d 237, 239 (1935); Palmer v. Costello, 41 App.D.C. 165, 168-69 (1913). | 1 | 1 |
Kessman v. City and County of Denvergreen2 sentences1990In our view, absent any specific statutory provision to the contrary, the same standard of ordinary care applies whenever a marshal or like officer has custody of property under operation of law. [6] See Earl v. United States, 262 A.2d 598, 599 (D.C.1970) ("A United States Marshal is responsible for any damage caused by his negligence to property he handles while carrying out his duties."); accord, Kessman v. City & County of Denver, 709 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985) (sheriff who has custody of merchandise pursuant to an abatement of nuisance action is liable for ordinary negligence); Simo 1990In our view, absent any specific statutory provision to the contrary, the same standard of ordinary care applies whenever a marshal or like officer has custody of property under operation of law. 6 See Earl v. United States, 262 A.2d 598, 599 (D.C.1970) (“A United States Marshal is responsible for any damage caused by his negligence to property he handles while carrying out his duties.”); accord, Kessman v. City & County of Denver, 709 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985) (sheriff who has custody of merchandise pursuant to an abatement of nuisance action is liable for ordinary negligence); Simon | 1 | 1 |
Earl v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990In our view, absent any specific statutory provision to the contrary, the same standard of ordinary care applies whenever a marshal or like officer has custody of property under operation of law. [6] See Earl v. United States, 262 A.2d 598, 599 (D.C.1970) ("A United States Marshal is responsible for any damage caused by his negligence to property he handles while carrying out his duties."); accord, Kessman v. City & County of Denver, 709 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985) (sheriff who has custody of merchandise pursuant to an abatement of nuisance action is liable for ordinary negligence); Simo 1990In our view, absent any specific statutory provision to the contrary, the same standard of ordinary care applies whenever a marshal or like officer has custody of property under operation of law. 6 See Earl v. United States, 262 A.2d 598, 599 (D.C.1970) (“A United States Marshal is responsible for any damage caused by his negligence to property he handles while carrying out his duties.”); accord, Kessman v. City & County of Denver, 709 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985) (sheriff who has custody of merchandise pursuant to an abatement of nuisance action is liable for ordinary negligence); Simon | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Hartgreen2 sentences1990Holding the District and TMI liable as bailees for hire in this case is consistent with the long standing principle in this jurisdiction that a law enforcement officer who seizes goods under a writ of attachment is bound to exercise ordinary care to prevent their loss and destruction. 5 See Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 406 , 262 F.2d 714, 717 (1958); Snyder v. Hart, 64 App.D.C. 353, 355 , 78 F.2d 237, 239 (1935); Palmer v. Costello, 41 App.D.C. 165, 168-69 (1913). 1990Holding the District and TMI liable as bailees for hire in this case is consistent with the long standing principle in this jurisdiction that a law enforcement officer who seizes goods under a writ of attachment is bound to exercise ordinary care to prevent their loss and destruction. 5 See Wilson v. Bittinger, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 406 , 262 F.2d 714, 717 (1958); Snyder v. Hart, 64 App.D.C. 353, 355 , 78 F.2d 237, 239 (1935); Palmer v. Costello, 41 App.D.C. 165, 168-69 (1913). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Emerson Ezzellgreen2 sentences1987The points of similarity are “so common ... as to be entirely unhelpful.” United States v. Ezzell, 644 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1981). 1987The points of similarity are "so common ... as to be entirely unhelpful." United States v. Ezzell, 644 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1981). | 1 | 1 |
George v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978In any event, we now hold that to the extent that it conferred on the trial court an absolute sua sponte obligation to issue an immediate cautioning instruction whenever evidence is brought in which is admissible only for a limited purpose, Lofty is overruled. 5 We thus complete the assault on that decision begun in Dixon and continued, recently, in Watts v. United States, supra. 6 In so doing, we return to the long standing principle in this jurisdiction, from which Lofty and the cases on which it relied departed, that: Except upon essential principles of law concerning which it is the duty o 1978In any event, we now hold that to the extent that it conferred on the trial court an absolute sua sponte obligation to issue an immediate cautioning instruction whenever evidence is brought in which is admissible only for a limited purpose, Lofty is overruled. 5 We thus complete the assault on that decision begun in Dixon and continued, recently, in Watts v. United States, supra. 6 In so doing, we return to the long standing principle in this jurisdiction, from which Lofty and the cases on which it relied departed, that: Except upon essential principles of law concerning which it is the duty o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nathan L. Drew v. United States
green
1 sentence2020In analyzing whether or not severance was required, we must remember the long standing principle “in our law that evidence of one crime is inadmissible to prove disposition to commit crime, from which the jury may infer that the defendant committed the crime charged.” Drew, 331 F.2d at 89 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
M. A. P. v. Ryan
green
2 sentences1976A. P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971), a division of this court may not alter or change the rule. 1976A. P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971), a division of this court may not alter or change the rule. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.