long standing rule in Massachusetts

2026A. P. 1 (c), as amended, 487 Mass. 1601 (2019) (defining "appeal"). 13 . . . that appeal does not lie from an issuance of a writ of habeas corpus"); Stokes v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 389 Mass. 883, 885 (1983) (citing Wyeth for "long standing rule of the Commonwealth . . . that exceptions do not lie from an issuance of the writ of habeas corpus" [citation omitted]); Hennessy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Framingham, 386 Mass. 848, 850 (1982) (declining to abandon Wyeth rule that "an appeal does not lie from the issuance of the writ"); Pina v. Superinten

1983“The long standing rule of the Commonwealth is that exceptions do not lie from an issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.” Pina v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 376 Mass. 659, 664 (1978), citing Wyeth v. Richardson, 10 Gray 240 , 241 (1857).

2026A. P. 1 (c), as amended, 487 Mass. 1601 (2019) (defining "appeal"). 13 . . . that appeal does not lie from an issuance of a writ of habeas corpus"); Stokes v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 389 Mass. 883, 885 (1983) (citing Wyeth for "long standing rule of the Commonwealth . . . that exceptions do not lie from an issuance of the writ of habeas corpus" [citation omitted]); Hennessy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Framingham, 386 Mass. 848, 850 (1982) (declining to abandon Wyeth rule that "an appeal does not lie from the issuance of the writ"); Pina v. Superinten

2002“The long standing rule of the Commonwealth is that [an appeal] do[es] not lie from an issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.” Stokes v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 389 Mass. at 885 (citations omitted).

1977For these reasons we apply the long standing rule of statutory interpretation stated as follows in Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, 352 (1939): "As there is no express repeal, it is contended that there is a repeal by implication.

1977For these reasons we apply the long standing rule of statutory interpretation stated as follows in Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, 352 (1939): “As there is no express repeal, it is contended that there is a repeal by implication.

2026See, e.g., Newton, petitioner, 357 Mass. 346, 353 (1970) (examining merits of Superior Court judge's allowance of writ of habeas corpus and ordering petition dismissed without discussing propriety of appeal); King's Case, 161 Mass. 46, 48, 50 (1894) (noting that in Wyeth "it was decided that exceptions do not lie to the discharge of a prisoner on habeas corpus by a single judge," but later stating that "[w]hether at a hearing on habeas corpus before a single justice sitting as a court exceptions can be taken to any ruling on any question of law, or an appeal can be taken from any judgment upon

2026A. P. 1 (c), as amended, 487 Mass. 1601 (2019) (defining "appeal"). 13 . . . that appeal does not lie from an issuance of a writ of habeas corpus"); Stokes v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 389 Mass. 883, 885 (1983) (citing Wyeth for "long standing rule of the Commonwealth . . . that exceptions do not lie from an issuance of the writ of habeas corpus" [citation omitted]); Hennessy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Framingham, 386 Mass. 848, 850 (1982) (declining to abandon Wyeth rule that "an appeal does not lie from the issuance of the writ"); Pina v. Superinten

2026See, e.g., Newton, petitioner, 357 Mass. 346, 353 (1970) (examining merits of Superior Court judge's allowance of writ of habeas corpus and ordering petition dismissed without discussing propriety of appeal); King's Case, 161 Mass. 46, 48, 50 (1894) (noting that in Wyeth "it was decided that exceptions do not lie to the discharge of a prisoner on habeas corpus by a single judge," but later stating that "[w]hether at a hearing on habeas corpus before a single justice sitting as a court exceptions can be taken to any ruling on any question of law, or an appeal can be taken from any judgment upon

2002See Averett, petitioner, 404 Mass. at 32 .

1998See Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 360 (1914), and cases cited.

1993P., Rule 54(a), ‘The terms ‘judgment’ and ‘final judgment’ include a decree and mean the act of the trial court finally adjudicating the rights of the parties affected by the judgment....” As stated in Brown v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 371 Mass. 395 (1976), “ It has been a long standing requirement that even when a final decree is upheld on appeal, a new final decree must be entered in the trial court after our rescript.” Carilli v. Hersey, 303 Mass. 82, 84 (1939).

1990Larabee v. Patvin Lumber Co., Inc., 390 Mass. 636, 643 (1983).

1983See Chambers’s Case, 221 Mass. 178, 179 (1915).

1983Co. v. Sambo’s of Mass., Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 818 (1979), and cases cited.

1977The long standing rule in Massachusetts on the admissibility of such a statement, as stated in Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 197 (1892), and recently applied in Commonwealth v. Pleasant, 366 Mass. 100, 102 (1974), is that “[i]f a defendant is charged with crime, and unequivocally denies it, and this is the whole conversation, it cannot be introduced in evidence against him as an admission.” The response of the defendant here was unequivocal, and it should have been struck as hearsay unless it was admissible for another purpose.

1977The long standing rule in Massachusetts on the admissibility of such a statement, as stated in Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 197 (1892), and recently applied in Commonwealth v. Pleasant, 366 Mass. 100, 102 (1974), is that “[i]f a defendant is charged with crime, and unequivocally denies it, and this is the whole conversation, it cannot be introduced in evidence against him as an admission.” The response of the defendant here was unequivocal, and it should have been struck as hearsay unless it was admissible for another purpose.