likelihood error in New Jersey

2021A reversal based on plain error requires us first to find an error capable of producing an unjust result and second that the likelihood the error caused an unjust result is "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." A-2641-17T2 14 State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323, 336 (2001) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).

2021A reversal based on plain error requires us first to find an error capable of producing an unjust result and second that the likelihood the error caused an unjust result is "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323, 336 (2001) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).

2021A reversal based on plain error requires us first to find an error capable of producing an unjust result and second that the likelihood the error caused an unjust result is "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." A-2641-17T2 14 State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323, 336 (2001) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).

2021A reversal based on plain error requires us first to find an error capable of producing an unjust result and second that the likelihood the error caused an unjust result is "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323, 336 (2001) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)).

2025Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 216 N.J.

2024The Court declined to adopt W.Z.'s argument that the State must prove an individual was "'substantially likely to engage in acts of sexual violence' . . . to satisfy the clear and convincing burden of proof required for commitment under the SVPA." Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted) (citing In re Commitment of W.Z., 339 N.J.

2024In W.Z., the Court upheld the constitutionality of the SVPA and added the "serious difficulty" standard to the likelihood requirement. 173 N.J. at 133-34 .

2024The Court declined to adopt W.Z.'s argument that the State must prove an individual was "'substantially likely to engage in acts of sexual violence' . . . to satisfy the clear and convincing burden of proof required for commitment under the SVPA." Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted) (citing In re Commitment of W.Z., 339 N.J.

2021We will, therefore, disregard the error "unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79 (quoting R. 2:10-2) (citing State v. Robinson, 165 N.J. 32, 47 (2000)).

2019Rather, the issue is whether defendant raised a colorable claim of innocence that should rightly have been decided by a jury." O'Donnell, 435 N.J.

2015In addition, the judge must evaluate the "complexity" of the subject matter involved, and the likelihood10 that the opinion is 10 This likelihood requirement in Rule 808 suggests greater stringency than the test of simple relevance, which entails only a mere "tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination in the action." N.J.R.E. 401 (emphasis added); see State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 116 (1976) (observing that "the test [for relevance] is broad and favors admissibility," although it is subject to countervailing factors under what is now N.J.R.E. 403). 19

2015See, e.g., Kemp v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 430 (2002) (applying the three- part expert admissibility test of State v. Kelly11); see also Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 16-17 (2008) (reaffirming and applying the Kelly test in a civil context).

2015See, e.g., Kemp v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 430 (2002) (applying the three- part expert admissibility test of State v. Kelly11); see also Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 16-17 (2008) (reaffirming and applying the Kelly test in a civil context).

2014Munroe, supra, 210 N.J. at 446 (holding that the court misapplied Slater factor one). 24 A-1889-12T2 "Rather, the issue is whether defendant raised a colorable claim of innocence that should rightly have been decided by a jury." Ibid.

2014Munroe, supra, 210 N.J. at 446 (holding that the court misapplied Slater factor one). 24 A-1889-12T2 "Rather, the issue is whether defendant raised a colorable claim of innocence that should rightly have been decided by a jury." Ibid.

2001The Adult Panel is of the opinion that if Mr. Trantino can successfully enter and complete a correctional halfway house program as an inmate he can achieve his full rehabilitative potential and. therefore will satisfy the punitive aspect of his sentence and meet the substantial likelihood test. [Id. at 453-54, 687 A.2d 274 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).] Consistent with the Parole Board’s express findings, in November 1993, and again in January 1994, Trantino applied to the Department of Corrections for transfer to a halfway house.

2001In its December 1993 notice of decision, the Panel again strongly recommended halfway house placement for Trantino prior to parole release: The Adult Panel is of the opinion that if Mr. Trantino can successfully enter and complete a correctional halfway house program as an inmate he can achieve his full rehabilitative potential and therefore will satisfy the punitive aspect of his sentence and meet the substantial likelihood test. [Id. at 453-54, 687 A.2d 274 .] As directed, Trantino again applied for halfway house placement, which again was denied by the Department of Corrections in 1994.

1990Thus, despite Parker v. Randolph, supra , a pretrial statement of a non-testifying codefendant is not admissible even against the declarant with a limiting instruction, despite defendant's confession, because of the "devastating" impact of the evidence and "the likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded," Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191-193 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 162, 170-172 (1987); compare, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 176 (1987).

1990Thus, despite Parker v. Randolph, supra , a pretrial statement of a non-testifying codefendant is not admissible even against the declarant with a limiting instruction, despite defendant's confession, because of the "devastating" impact of the evidence and "the likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded," Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191-193 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 162, 170-172 (1987); compare, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 176 (1987).

1990Thus, despite Parker v. Randolph, supra , a pretrial statement of a non-testifying codefendant is not admissible even against the declarant with a limiting instruction, despite defendant's confession, because of the "devastating" impact of the evidence and "the likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded," Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191-193 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 162, 170-172 (1987); compare, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 176 (1987).