likelihood test in California

2025(Id. at pp. 295, 305-306.) But “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact 84 or influence that might theoretically affect their vote,” and “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation.” (Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217 .) Thus, “whether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity ‘ “ ‘is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.’ ” ’ ” (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296 .) “Any presumption of prejudice is rebutted, a

2025(Id. at pp. 295, 305-306.) But “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact 83 or influence that might theoretically affect their vote,” and “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation.” (Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217 .) Thus, “whether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity ‘ “ ‘is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.’ ” ’ ” (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296 .) “Any presumption of prejudice is rebutted, a

2021Code, § 1150.) “[W]hether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity ‘ “ ‘is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Any presumption of 6 prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.” (In re Hamilt

2015(People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578 (Nesler); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 836 .) This presumption “excuses the defendant from affirmatively proving prejudice when that cannot be done” and “prevails ‘ “unless the contrary appears.” ’ ” (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657 .) Notwithstanding the presumption of prejudice that arises from a juror’s concealment of material information, “we determine whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct by applying a substantial likelihood test.

2015VI, § 13.) Reversal is justified ‘only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more *725 favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; see 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Reversible Error, § 7, p. 450.) A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability; the likelihood that the error affected the outcome need not be greater than the li

2015VI, § 13.) Reversal is justified ‘only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more *725 favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; see 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Reversible Error, § 7, p. 450.) A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability; the likelihood that the error affected the outcome need not be greater than the li

2015(College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898 , 882 P.2d 894 ].) The test is satisfied, and prejudice appears, if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable probabilities.’ (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837 .)” (In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078-1079 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 868 ].) In his papers, defendant acknowledged that he continued to contact plaintiff until he “gave up for good on August 9, 2013, when [he] got a call from an El Dorado sheriff.” This was one week prior to the date on which plaintiff requested a restraining

2015(College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898 , 882 P.2d 894 ].) The test is satisfied, and prejudice appears, if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable probabilities.’ (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837 .)” (In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078-1079 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 868 ].) In his papers, defendant acknowledged that he continued to contact plaintiff until he “gave up for good on August 9, 2013, when [he] got a call from an El Dorado sheriff.” This was one week prior to the date on which plaintiff requested a restraining

2025VI, § 13.) Reversal is justified ‘only when the court, “after an 11. examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ [Citations.] A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability; the likelihood that the error affected the outcome need not be greater than the likelihood that it did not. [Citation.] The test is satisfied, and prejudice appears, if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable p

2016VI, § 13.) Reversal is justified ‘only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ [Citations.] A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability; the likelihood that the error affected the outcome need not be greater than the likelihood that it did not. [Citation.]” (In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078-1079 (J.S.).) Our courts have previously held that this “

2021Code, § 1150.) “[W]hether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity ‘ “ ‘is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Any presumption of 6 prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.” (In re Hamilt

2015(People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578 (Nesler); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 836 .) This presumption “excuses the defendant from affirmatively proving prejudice when that cannot be done” and “prevails ‘ “unless the contrary appears.” ’ ” (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657 .) Notwithstanding the presumption of prejudice that arises from a juror’s concealment of material information, “we determine whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct by applying a substantial likelihood test.

2025(See Harte–Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989) 491 U.S. 657, 692, fn. 37 [“ ‘denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error’ ”].) Collins, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 70 , which OneTaste relies on to support its arguments, provides a useful contrast.

2012However, because she is a public official, denials alone do not establish malice. “[T]he press need not accept ‘denials, however vehement; such denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error.’ [Citation.]” (Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 692, fn. 37 .) “A denial only serves to buttress a case for actual malice when there is something in the content of the denial or supporting evidence produced in conjunction with the denial that carries a

2016(See D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 ; In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463-464 [erroneous decision to apply section 361 rather than section 361.2 could not be “reverse[d] . . . unless . . . ‘“it [was] reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error”’”]; cf. J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1079-1080 [juvenile court’s failure to make findings required under § 361.2, subd. (c) subject to harmless error analysis].) In D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 202 , the court found that a juvenile c

2015(See, e.g., In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 304 [court’s failure to comply with statutory directive to consider whether placement with noncustodial parent would be detrimental to children was not prejudicial]; In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463 [court’s failure to consider whether placement with noncustodial parent would be detrimental was prejudicial because more favorable outcome was “reasonably probable”]; In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492 , 1507–1508 [court’s error in selecting unauthorized permanent plan at disposition hearing not prejudicial]; J.S.,

2024(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 710, 712 (Fuiava).) Juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice, but “we determine whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct by applying a substantial likelihood test.” (In re Boyette (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 889 .) On review, we defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations and factual findings supported by substantial evidence.

2018Although the referee found the omission was not intentional, the omission had the effect of depriving Cowan of his right to intelligently challenge the juror peremptorily or for cause. ( Boyette , supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. 889-890, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 301 P.3d 530 .) Nevertheless, "an honest mistake on voir dire cannot disturb a judgment in the absence of proof that the juror's wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror's actual bias." ( Hamilton , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 300 , 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 975 P.2d 600 .) "[W]hether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irre

2015(People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 307 .) Whether an individual verdict must be overturned as a result of such juror exposure or irregularity "'"'is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.'"'" (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296 .) In Hamilton, the California Supreme Court held that "[a]ny presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of

2015(People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 307 .) Whether an individual verdict must be overturned as a result of such juror exposure or irregularity "'"'is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.'"'" (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296 .) In Hamilton, the California Supreme Court held that "[a]ny presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of

2022(Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 87 .) “A judgment adverse to the defendant in a criminal case must be reversed or vacated ‘whenever . . . the court finds a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial matter relating to the defendant or to the case itself that was not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury.’ ” (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907 , 950–951.) “ ‘The ultimate issue of influence on the juror is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.

1999Still, whether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity “ ‘ “is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.” ’ ” ( Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th 97, 118 , quoting Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d 907, 950-951 , quoting 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, com. to std. 8-3.7 (2d ed. 1980) p. 8.58.) Any presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is

2014Such situations may include attempts by nonjurors to tamper with the jury, as by bribery or intimidation. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘[T]ampering contact or 15 communication with a sitting juror[] usually raises a rebuttable “presumption” of prejudice. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Still, whether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity “‘“is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.”’” [Citation.] Any presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, i

2013Such situations may include attempts by nonjurors to tamper with the jury, as by bribery or intimidation. [Citations.]‟ [Citation.] „[T]ampering contact or communication with a sitting juror[ ] usually raises a rebuttable “presumption” of prejudice. [Citations.]‟ [Citation.] „Still, whether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity “ „ “is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard.” ‟ ” [Citation.] Any presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case,

2023That is, the ‘presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.’” (In re Boyette (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866 , 889–890.) “‘Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct … is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court’s independent determination.’ … However, ‘[w]e a

2022(See generally In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296 [discussing prejudice and the substantial likelihood test].) Juror No. 5’s remarks amount to “comments of wonderment and curiosity,” which, although misconduct, were “innocuous, particularly when [the] comment[s] stand[] alone without any further discussion.” ( Hord, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 727-728.) The presumption of prejudice was rebutted by the other jurors’ statements that it was defendant’s constitutional right not to testify, that this choice cannot be considered in deliberations, and by the fact that there was no further d

2023(See People v. Lavender (2014) 60 Cal.4th 679, 687 .) “‘“Misconduct by a juror … usually raises a rebuttable ‘presumption’ of prejudice.”’” (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691 , 746–747.) “[W]e determine whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct by applying a substantial likelihood test.

2022(See generally In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296 [discussing prejudice and the substantial likelihood test].) Juror No. 5’s remarks amount to “comments of wonderment and curiosity,” which, although misconduct, were “innocuous, particularly when [the] comment[s] stand[] alone without any further discussion.” ( Hord, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 727-728.) The presumption of prejudice was rebutted by the other jurors’ statements that it was defendant’s constitutional right not to testify, that this choice cannot be considered in deliberations, and by the fact that there was no further d

2019Indeed, defining likely in this way essentially turns Aguilar's likelihood standard into a question of whether the object is capable of causing serious injury, which promotes the very error our Supreme Court identified in B.M. - upholding aggravated assault convictions based on speculation "as to how the object could have been used or what injury might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently." ( B.M. , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 530 , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 , italics added.) This error calls out for correction and underscores the fact that lower courts need guidan

2019Indeed, defining likely in this way essentially turns Aguilar's likelihood standard into a question of whether the object is capable of causing serious injury, which promotes the very error our Supreme Court identified in B.M. - upholding aggravated assault convictions based on speculation "as to how the object could have been used or what injury might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently." ( B.M. , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 530 , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 , italics added.) This error calls out for correction and underscores the fact that lower courts need guidan

2016(See D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 ; In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463-464 [erroneous decision to apply section 361 rather than section 361.2 could not be “reverse[d] . . . unless . . . ‘“it [was] reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error”’”]; cf. J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1079-1080 [juvenile court’s failure to make findings required under § 361.2, subd. (c) subject to harmless error analysis].) In D’Anthony D., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 202 , the court found that a juvenile c

2015(See, e.g., In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 304 [court’s failure to comply with statutory directive to consider whether placement with noncustodial parent would be detrimental to children was not prejudicial]; In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463 [court’s failure to consider whether placement with noncustodial parent would be detrimental was prejudicial because more favorable outcome was “reasonably probable”]; In re Nickolas T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1492 , 1507–1508 [court’s error in selecting unauthorized permanent plan at disposition hearing not prejudicial]; J.S.,

2025The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197 (Riel); see also People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1312 [“a case in which the mere failure to object would rise to such a level as to implicate one's state and federal constitutional 16 right to the effective assistance of counsel would be an unusual one”].) “Effective attorneys do not always make an objection merely because it might be successful . . . .” (Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1197 .) For example, defense counsel could have d

2025The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197 (Riel); see also People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1312 [“a case in which the mere failure to object would rise to such a level as to implicate one's state and federal constitutional 16 right to the effective assistance of counsel would be an unusual one”].) “Effective attorneys do not always make an objection merely because it might be successful . . . .” (Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1197 .) For example, defense counsel could have d

2025The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.’” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197 (Riel); see also People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1312 [“a case in which the mere failure to object would rise to such a level as to implicate one's state and federal constitutional 16 right to the effective assistance of counsel would be an unusual one”].) “Effective attorneys do not always make an objection merely because it might be successful . . . .” (Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1197 .) For example, defense counsel could have d