likelihood waiver in New York

1997That the rule diminishes the likelihood of a waiver or self incriminating statements is immaterial to our system of justice" ( People v Rogers , 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173 , supra ).

1997That the rule diminishes the likelihood of a waiver or self incriminating statements is immaterial to our system of justice” (People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167, 173 , supra).

1985(Cf. People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148 .) The New York Court of Appeals, in its quest to protect the rights of the accused from being systematically vitiated by the law enforcement community, has repeatedly held that the right to counsel “indelibly” attaches in particular circumstances so that this fundamental right may not be waived outside the presence of the defendant’s attorney.

1979That the rule diminishes the likelihood of a waiver or self incriminating statements is immaterial to our system of justice (see People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154, 164 , supra; People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148, 152 ).

2014The Second Department, in a case affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has held that the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (2) applies to such a claim (see Stettine v County of Suffolk, 105 AD2d 109, 113 [1984], affd 66 NY2d 354 [1985]).

1997Notwithstanding the fact that defendant's statements might pertain to a matter unrelated to the formal representation on a pending charge upon which defendant was in custody, suppression is mandated under Rogers which, in the absence of a counseled waiver, bars further custodial interrogation of a suspect "on any matter" ( People v Bing , 76 NY2d, at 340 ).

1997Notwithstanding the fact that defendant’s statements might pertain to a matter unrelated to the formal representation on a pending charge upon which defendant was in custody, suppression is mandated under Rogers which, in the absence of a counseled waiver, bars further custodial interrogation of a suspect "on any matter” (People v Bing, 76 NY2d, at 340 ).

1997Plaintiff’s telephone call to the reporter who wrote the article, in which plaintiff denied the truth of an earlier article by the same reporter that was substantially to the same effect as the article in issue, does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of malice; "such denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error” (Edwards v National Audubon Socy., 556 F2d 113, 121, cert denied 434 US 1002 ; see also, Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 383 , cert

1993As stated in Edwards v National Audubon Socy. ( 556 F.2d 113 ): "Surely liability under the `clear and convincing proof' standard of New York Times v. Sullivan cannot be predicated on mere denials, however vehement; such denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error" ( id. , at 121).

1993As stated in Edwards v National Audubon Socy. ( 556 F.2d 113 ): "Surely liability under the `clear and convincing proof' standard of New York Times v. Sullivan cannot be predicated on mere denials, however vehement; such denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error" ( id. , at 121).

1979B. v Shelly (430 F2d 215, 218, affg 305 F Supp 55 ) the court held that a 16-year-old boy did not effectively waive his Miranda rights, stating: "We are not constrained to hold that there is a per se rule barring all waivers by minors; but in the circumstances of this case Stephen’s age was made all the more crucial by attendant factors that heightened the likelihood that his waiver was other than intelligent and voluntary, and which make it virtually impossible for the state to satisfy the 'heavy burden’ imposed upon it by Miranda.” The "attendant factors” relied on by the court in Stephen J.

1979This court has held that, in deciding whether or not to reverse a criminal conviction due to a trial court’s erroneous use of a confession charge, the entire record must be considered to determine the likelihood that the error affected the jury’s verdict (People v Lewis, 282 App Div 267 ).

1979The Court of Appeals has stated that the possibility of prejudice will vary with the degree to which the court’s description of the defendant’s statement departs from the facts (People v Kingston, 8 NY2d 384, 388 ).

1979That the rule diminishes the likelihood of a waiver or self incriminating statements is immaterial to our system of justice (see People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154, 164 , supra; People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148, 152 ).

1974(Consider Commonwealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39 , cert. den. 393 U. S. 882 .) In short, even absent an unwarned, oral confession like that made by the instant respondent, there is a greater likelihood of a waiver of Miranda rights by a poor unsophisticated suspect than by an “affluent” or “professional” criminal (see Miranda, 384 U. S. 436, 472, 470 ); the Miranda rules, even if interpreted as in the Federal decisions in Stephen J.

1974(Consider Commonwealth v. Moody, 429 Pa. 39 , cert. den. 393 U. S. 882 .) In short, even absent an unwarned, oral confession like that made by the instant respondent, there is a greater likelihood of a waiver of Miranda rights by a poor unsophisticated suspect than by an “affluent” or “professional” criminal (see Miranda, 384 U. S. 436, 472, 470 ); the Miranda rules, even if interpreted as in the Federal decisions in Stephen J.

1962Instead, it is justifiable to assume that he would, especially while it was in a fresh state, have called the promise of a suspended sentence to the attention of the Judge and asserted it as a legal right in the interest of defendant (People v. Woodruff, 32 Misc 2d 213 ), and, if found to be necessary, have taken whatever legal measures that were available in those days to enforce it, and not have allowed such right, carrying with it release from prison confinement, to go by the board and, as a result, to ripen into the likelihood of a waiver.