likelihood error in Texas

2024“In considering the likelihood that the error adversely affected the jury’s verdict, appellate courts should consider everything in the record, including the evidence admitted, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how it might be considered with other evidence in the 15 case.” Eggert v. State, 395 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim.

2024“In considering the likelihood that the error adversely affected the jury’s verdict, 4 appellate courts should consider everything in the record, including the evidence admitted, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how it might be considered with other evidence in the case.” Eggert v. State, 395 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim.

2024Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373 ; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355 .

2024Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373 ; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56; Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim.

2010Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518-19 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2009Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518-19 (Tex. Crim.

2003One court' observed that “as a general rule, the greater the time period between the charged and extraneous offenses, the greater the likelihood of error in admitting the evidence of the extraneous offense.” Reyes v. State, 69 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd.).

2003One court observed that "as a general rule, the greater the time period between the charged and extraneous offenses, the greater the likelihood of error in admitting the evidence of the extraneous offense." Reyes v. State , 69 S.W.3d. 725, 740 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd.) .

2016Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 ; Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim.

2015Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 582 (Tex. Crim.

1996However, a harm analysis is not to be applied in situations in which the appellate record “will not reveal any concrete data from which an appellate court can meaningfully gauge or quantify the effect of the error.” Sodipo v. State, 815 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); see also Roberts v. State, 784 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (“[i]n eases involving breach of many procedural statutes the record will contain no concrete data from which an appellant court can meaningfully gauge the likelihood that the error did or did not contribute to the conviction or punishment of the accused”).

1994In Roberts v. State, 784 S.W.2d 430 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), the Court of Criminal Appeals explained why some mandatory statutes are not subject to the harm analysis: In eases involving breach of many procedural statutes the record will contain no concrete data from which an appellate court can meaningfully gauge the likelihood that the error did or did not contribute to the conviction or punishment of the accused.

2015As the United States Supreme Court has noted, ″such denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error.’″ Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692 n.37 (quoting Edwards v. National Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1977)).

2007Evidence of a media defendant’s knowledge that a public figure plaintiff has denied harmful allegations or offered an alternative explanation of events is not evidence that the defendant doubted the allegations for purposes of establishing actual malice, because “[i]n the world of politics, ‘such denials are so commonplace [that] ... they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error.’ ” Cantu, 168 S.W.3d at 858 ; see also Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692 n. 37, 109 S.Ct. 2678 ; Skeen, 159 S.W.3d at 639 ; Huckabee, 19 S.W.3d at 427 .

2022Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim.

2016Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 ; Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim.

2016Our focus is on the error itself in the context of the trial as a whole, to determine the likelihood that the error “genuinely corrupted the fact-finding process.” Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 819 ; see also Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim.

2014Our focus is on the error itself in the context of the trial as a whole, and the purpose of that focus to determine the likelihood that the error “genuinely corrupted the fact-finding process.” Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 819 ; see also Clay, 240 S.W.3d at 904 (entire record must be considered in harmless error analysis).

2016Our focus is on the error itself in the context of the trial as a whole, to determine the likelihood that the error “genuinely corrupted the fact-finding process.” Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 819 ; see also Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim.

2014Our focus is on the error itself in the context of the trial as a whole, and the purpose of that focus to determine the likelihood that the error “genuinely corrupted the fact-finding process.” Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 819 ; see also Clay, 240 S.W.3d at 904 (entire record must be considered in harmless error analysis).

2024Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim.

2024Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373 ; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56; Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim.

1997In Sodipo v. State, 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that some cases involving breach of procedural statutes contain no concrete data from which an appellate court can meaningfully gauge the likelihood that the error did or did not contribute to the conviction or punishment of the accused.

1997In Sodipo v. State, 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that some cases involving breach of procedural statutes contain no concrete data from which an appellate court can meaningfully gauge the likelihood that the error did or did not contribute to the conviction or punishment of the accused.

2024“In considering the likelihood that the error adversely affected the jury’s verdict, appellate courts should consider everything in the record, including the evidence admitted, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how it might be considered with other evidence in the 15 case.” Eggert v. State, 395 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim.

2024“In considering the likelihood that the error adversely affected the jury’s verdict, 4 appellate courts should consider everything in the record, including the evidence admitted, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how it might be considered with other evidence in the case.” Eggert v. State, 395 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim.

2018See Reyes v. State, 69 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2002); Messenger v. State, 638 S.W.2d at 885 (Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a conviction where nineteen days elapsed between the extraneous offense and the offense charged and tried before the trial court), overruled on other grounds by Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 157 (Tex. Crim.

2002Siqueiros, 685 S.W.2d at 68 (twenty-six days; upheld); Dickey, 646 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), (five days; affirmed); Messenger, 638 S.W.2d at 885 (nineteen days; reversed); Bachhofer v. State, 633 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (fifty-two months; reversed); Ford, 484 S.W.2d at 731 (two months, reversed); Collazo, 623 S.W.2d at 648 (one year; reversed); Wintters v. State, 616 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (two months; affirmed); Collins v. State, 577 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Crim.App.1979) (twelve days; affirmed); James v. State, 554 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (thirty-thre

2002Siqueiros, 685 S.W.2d at 68 (twenty-six days; upheld); Dickey, 646 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), (five days; affirmed); Messenger, 638 S.W.2d at 885 (nineteen days; reversed); Bachhofer v. State, 633 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (fifty-two months; reversed); Ford, 484 S.W.2d at 731 (two months, reversed); Collazo, 623 S.W.2d at 648 (one year; reversed); Wintters v. State, 616 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (two months; affirmed); Collins v. State, 577 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Crim.App.1979) (twelve days; affirmed); James v. State, 554 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (thirty-thre

2002Siqueiros , 685 S.W.2d at 68 (twenty-six days; upheld); Dickey , 646 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. Crim.

2002Siqueiros, 685 S.W.2d at 68 (twenty-six days; upheld); Dickey, 646 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), (five days; affirmed); Messenger, 638 S.W.2d at 885 (nineteen days; reversed); Bachhofer v. State, 633 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (fifty-two months; reversed); Ford, 484 S.W.2d at 731 (two months, reversed); Collazo, 623 S.W.2d at 648 (one year; reversed); Wintters v. State, 616 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (two months; affirmed); Collins v. State, 577 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Crim.App.1979) (twelve days; affirmed); James v. State, 554 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (thirty-thre

2002Siqueiros , 685 S.W.2d at 68 (twenty-six days; upheld); Dickey , 646 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. Crim.

2019Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 39 .

2015Id.

2015Although there was reason to question the informant’s veracity, just as there was reason to doubt Thompson’s story, the editors did not interview a witness who had the same access to the facts as the informant and did not look at films that revealed what actually happened [*693] at the game in question. 38 This evidence of an intent to avoid the truth was not only sufficient to convince the plurality that there had been an extreme departure from professional publishing standards, but it was also sufficient to satisfy the more demanding New York Times standard applied by Chief Justice [**2699]

2015As the United States Supreme Court has noted, ″such denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error.’″ Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692 n.37 (quoting Edwards v. National Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1977)).

2007Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1998Id. at 587 .

2024See Weems, 575 S.W.3d at 365–66 (“The necessity of expert testimony to prove or refute the merits of a claim against a physician or health care provider is sufficient to establish that the claim is a health care liability claim.”). 15 Solomon states in her reply brief in this court that she was seen by “Buckle during an appointment that lasted approximately 10 minutes.” Solomon argues that this was her only appointment with Buckle, and that Buckle told her “an MRI was needed before a determination could be made” about her knee injury, so “a physical exam was not completed” at the brief appoint

2023See Simpson, 447 S.W.3d at 266 (“To implement [the presumption of innocence], courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process and ‘guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Williams, 425 U.S. at 503 )). - 17 - 04-21-00295-CR Accordingly, we hold the trial court setting in the jail courtroom created an unacceptable risk that the presumption of innocence afforded to Nixon was eroded. 2.

2023See Simpson, 447 S.W.3d at 266 (“To implement [the presumption of innocence], courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process and ‘guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Williams, 425 U.S. at 503 )). - 17 - 04-21-00295-CR Accordingly, we hold the trial court setting in the jail courtroom created an unacceptable risk that the presumption of innocence afforded to Nixon was eroded. 2.

2018See Reyes v. State, 69 S.W.3d 725, 740 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2002); Messenger v. State, 638 S.W.2d at 885 (Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a conviction where nineteen days elapsed between the extraneous offense and the offense charged and tried before the trial court), overruled on other grounds by Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 157 (Tex. Crim.