6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chatterjee v. Mid Atlantic Regional Council of Carpentersgreen2 sentences2009See Thomas v. Nat'l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 961 A.2d 1063, 1066 (D.C.2008) (stating, “the reliance on the evidentiary presumption provided by mailing the notice ... falls short of the substantial evidence needed to support the OAH ruling” where petitioner testified that he did not receive *216 either of two claims determinations); Chatterjee, supra, 946 A.2d at 356 (“Because petitioner’s testimony, credited by the ALJ, fairly called into question the accuracy of the certifícate of service, OAH must engage in a factual inquiry to establish whether the determination letter was mailed on or about 2009See Thomas v. Nat'l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 961 A.2d 1063, 1066 (D.C.2008) (stating, “the reliance on the evidentiary presumption provided by mailing the notice ... falls short of the substantial evidence needed to support the OAH ruling” where petitioner testified that he did not receive *216 either of two claims determinations); Chatterjee, supra, 946 A.2d at 356 (“Because petitioner’s testimony, credited by the ALJ, fairly called into question the accuracy of the certifícate of service, OAH must engage in a factual inquiry to establish whether the determination letter was mailed on or about | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. NATIONAL CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC.green1 sentence2009See Thomas v. Nat'l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 961 A.2d 1063, 1066 (D.C.2008) (stating, “the reliance on the evidentiary presumption provided by mailing the notice ... falls short of the substantial evidence needed to support the OAH ruling” where petitioner testified that he did not receive *216 either of two claims determinations); Chatterjee, supra, 946 A.2d at 356 (“Because petitioner’s testimony, credited by the ALJ, fairly called into question the accuracy of the certifícate of service, OAH must engage in a factual inquiry to establish whether the determination letter was mailed on or about | 1 | 1 |
Rhea v. Designmark Service, Inc.green1 sentence2009See Thomas v. Nat'l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 961 A.2d 1063, 1066 (D.C.2008) (stating, “the reliance on the evidentiary presumption provided by mailing the notice ... falls short of the substantial evidence needed to support the OAH ruling” where petitioner testified that he did not receive *216 either of two claims determinations); Chatterjee, supra, 946 A.2d at 356 (“Because petitioner’s testimony, credited by the ALJ, fairly called into question the accuracy of the certifícate of service, OAH must engage in a factual inquiry to establish whether the determination letter was mailed on or about | 1 | 1 |
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown Universitygreen2 sentences1995See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 36 (lead opinion) (“sexual orientation appears to possess most or all of the characteristics that have persuaded the Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny to legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause”). 1995See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 36 (lead opinion) ("sexual orientation appears to possess most or all of the characteristics that have persuaded the Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny to legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause"). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1992In Smith v. United States, 491 A.2d 1144, 1147 (D.C.1985), after the defense had rested, the prosecutor sought to call a detective to testify in rebuttal regarding a detailed statement that the defendant had given to the police admitting his involvement in an armed robbery. | 1 | 1 |
McCall v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1992The dissent focused on the likelihood that had defense counsel been informed that the witness would have an opportunity to make an in-court identification, he could have taken a number of protective steps, which he did not, “justifiably relying on the prosecutor’s contrary assurance....”, and further, that “[t]he prosecutor’s change of mind did not entitle him to break a promise on which [the defendant’s] counsel had a right to rely.” Id. at 958, 960 (Schwelb, J. dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Starks v. North East Insurance Co.green2 sentences1984This court, in Starks v. North East Insurance Co., 408 A.2d 980, 983 (D.C.1980), applied a three-part test to determine whether an insured’s delay in notifying his insurance company of an occurrence was reasonable: (1) what the insured could reasonably have believed was his obligation under the policy; 8 (2) what the insured could reasonably have believed about the seriousness of the injury and his liability for it; (3) what the insured could reasonably have believed about the likelihood of a claim being made against him. 1984Id. at 983 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Groves v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990Nor need we decide whether the trial court, in deciding whether a factual predicate exists, is to make its own factual determination, see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989) (trial court finding binding unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it), or is simply to determine what a reasonable jury might find, cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (trial court may discretionarily admit evidence of defendant’s prior bad act if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed the act); but see Groves v. U 1990Nor need we decide whether the trial court, in deciding whether a factual predicate exists, is to make its own factual determination, see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989) (trial court finding binding unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it), or is simply to determine what a reasonable jury might find, cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (trial court may discretionarily admit evidence of defendant's prior bad act if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed the act); but see Groves v. U | 1 | 1 |
Groves v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990Nor need we decide whether the trial court, in deciding whether a factual predicate exists, is to make its own factual determination, see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989) (trial court finding binding unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it), or is simply to determine what a reasonable jury might find, cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (trial court may discretionarily admit evidence of defendant’s prior bad act if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed the act); but see Groves v. U 1990Nor need we decide whether the trial court, in deciding whether a factual predicate exists, is to make its own factual determination, see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989) (trial court finding binding unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it), or is simply to determine what a reasonable jury might find, cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (trial court may discretionarily admit evidence of defendant's prior bad act if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed the act); but see Groves v. U | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boyd v. United States
green
2 sentences2011But it is indisputable that if the government had not waited until the last moment to disclose Taylor’s patently exculpatory grand jury testimony, in contravention of this court’s emphatic warnings that “the practice of delayed production must be disapproved and discouraged,” Boyd, 908 A.2d at 57 ; Curry, 658 A.2d at 197 , then the likelihood that the defense could have discovered the Lindsey video in time to use it would have been far greater. 2011But it is indisputable that if the government had not waited until the last moment to disclose Taylor's patently exculpatory grand jury testimony, in contravention of this court's emphatic warnings that "the practice of delayed production must be disapproved and discouraged," Boyd, 908 A.2d at 57 ; Curry, 658 A.2d at 197 , then the likelihood that the defense could have discovered the Lindsey video in time to use it would have been far greater. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Curry v. United States
green
2 sentences2011But it is indisputable that if the government had not waited until the last moment to disclose Taylor’s patently exculpatory grand jury testimony, in contravention of this court’s emphatic warnings that “the practice of delayed production must be disapproved and discouraged,” Boyd, 908 A.2d at 57 ; Curry, 658 A.2d at 197 , then the likelihood that the defense could have discovered the Lindsey video in time to use it would have been far greater. 2011But it is indisputable that if the government had not waited until the last moment to disclose Taylor's patently exculpatory grand jury testimony, in contravention of this court's emphatic warnings that "the practice of delayed production must be disapproved and discouraged," Boyd, 908 A.2d at 57 ; Curry, 658 A.2d at 197 , then the likelihood that the defense could have discovered the Lindsey video in time to use it would have been far greater. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Huddleston v. United States
green
2 sentences1990Nor need we decide whether the trial court, in deciding whether a factual predicate exists, is to make its own factual determination, see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989) (trial court finding binding unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it), or is simply to determine what a reasonable jury might find, cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (trial court may discretionarily admit evidence of defendant’s prior bad act if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed the act); but see Groves v. U 1990Nor need we decide whether the trial court, in deciding whether a factual predicate exists, is to make its own factual determination, see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989) (trial court finding binding unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it), or is simply to determine what a reasonable jury might find, cf. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (trial court may discretionarily admit evidence of defendant’s prior bad act if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed the act); but see Groves v. U | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.