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10 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1972–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mackellgreen2 sentences2015I agree with the District Court’s statement that courts “cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent” (People v Lemma, 39 Misc 3d 399, 412 [Nassau Dist Ct 2013], quoting Mackell, 47 AD2d at 218-219 ). 1983“What amounts to a violation of this section depends, of course, entirely on the circumstances of the particular conduct.” (People v Haney, supra, at p 335 .) And, “we cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 , affd 40 NY2d 59 .) Thus, it has oft been repeated that “[a] distance separates the negligence which renders one criminally liable from that which establishes civil liability.” (People v Rosenheimer, 209 NY 115, 123 ; cf. People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 306 ; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53 | 2 | 3 |
People v. Lemmagreen1 sentence2015I agree with the District Court’s statement that courts “cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent” (People v Lemma, 39 Misc 3d 399, 412 [Nassau Dist Ct 2013], quoting Mackell, 47 AD2d at 218-219 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stumppgreen1 sentence2013Without criminal intent there is no crime here.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 [2d Dept 1975] [conviction of District Attorney of official misconduct for failing to disclose knowledge of scheme to defraud reversed].) Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree The second count against the defendant is obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 195.05, which provides, in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Yuklgreen1 sentence1988(People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]; People v Brown, 104 AD2d 696 [3d Dept 1984], supra.) Applying this objective standard it is clear that Police Officer Nivar’s initial conversation with the couple in the park was not custodial in nature. | 1 | 1 |
People v. . Tomlinsgreen1 sentence1986In People v Tomlins ( 213 NY 240, 244 [1914]), Judge Cardozo once more enunciated the reasonable man standard: "We think that if the situation justified the defendant os a reasonable man in believing that he was about to be murderously attacked, he had the right to stand his ground.” (Emphasis added.) In People v Ligouri ( 284 NY 309, 316 [1940]), the Court of Appeals was unequivocal, using the following language: "If the circumstances justified the belief on his part that he is in danger of inevitable and irreparable injury, although it should turn out he was mistaken, an ordinarily prudent m | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ligourigreen1 sentence1986In People v Tomlins ( 213 NY 240, 244 [1914]), Judge Cardozo once more enunciated the reasonable man standard: "We think that if the situation justified the defendant os a reasonable man in believing that he was about to be murderously attacked, he had the right to stand his ground.” (Emphasis added.) In People v Ligouri ( 284 NY 309, 316 [1940]), the Court of Appeals was unequivocal, using the following language: "If the circumstances justified the belief on his part that he is in danger of inevitable and irreparable injury, although it should turn out he was mistaken, an ordinarily prudent m | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cherrygreen1 sentence1986In People v Tomlins ( 213 NY 240, 244 [1914]), Judge Cardozo once more enunciated the reasonable man standard: "We think that if the situation justified the defendant os a reasonable man in believing that he was about to be murderously attacked, he had the right to stand his ground.” (Emphasis added.) In People v Ligouri ( 284 NY 309, 316 [1940]), the Court of Appeals was unequivocal, using the following language: "If the circumstances justified the belief on his part that he is in danger of inevitable and irreparable injury, although it should turn out he was mistaken, an ordinarily prudent m | 1 | 1 |
Perrotti v. Bennettgreen1 sentence1979(See Herman v City of Buffalo, 214 NY 316 ; Seifert v City of Brooklyn, 101 NY 136 ; see, also, Perrotti v Bennett, 94 Conn 533; Nuisance — Municipal Liability, Ann. 56 ALR2d 1415.) The court in Weiss v Fote ( 7 NY2d 579 , supra) in effect recognized this distinction as well, when it backed away from absolute immunity and applied the reasonable man standard of professional malpractice to a case where there existed an underlying duty to keep a street or highway in a reasonably safe condition. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Stumpp
neutral
1 sentence2013Without criminal intent there is no crime here.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 [2d Dept 1975] [conviction of District Attorney of official misconduct for failing to disclose knowledge of scheme to defraud reversed].) Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree The second count against the defendant is obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 195.05, which provides, in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Licari v. Elliott
green
1 sentence1989"It is incumbent upon the court to decide in the first instance whether plaintiff has a cause of action to assert within the meaning of the statute” (Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 237 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence1988(People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]; People v Brown, 104 AD2d 696 [3d Dept 1984], supra.) Applying this objective standard it is clear that Police Officer Nivar’s initial conversation with the couple in the park was not custodial in nature. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Patterson v. District Court of Oklahoma
green
1 sentence1988(People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]; People v Brown, 104 AD2d 696 [3d Dept 1984], supra.) Applying this objective standard it is clear that Police Officer Nivar’s initial conversation with the couple in the park was not custodial in nature. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Claim of Harris v. Hart & Crouse Corp.
green
1 sentence1983(Restatement, Torts 2d, § 496D; Scharf v Manson, 27 AD2d 613 .) The defendant bears the burden of proof as to the risk plaintiff allegedly assumed. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. . Rosenheimer
green
1 sentence1983“What amounts to a violation of this section depends, of course, entirely on the circumstances of the particular conduct.” (People v Haney, supra, at p 335 .) And, “we cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 , affd 40 NY2d 59 .) Thus, it has oft been repeated that “[a] distance separates the negligence which renders one criminally liable from that which establishes civil liability.” (People v Rosenheimer, 209 NY 115, 123 ; cf. People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 306 ; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Biss v. Tenneco, Inc.
green
1 sentence1983Co., 43 NY2d 583, 590 ; Micallef v Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, 39 NY2d 376, 387 ; Bolm v Triumph Corp., 33 NY2d 151, 158-159 ; Biss v Tenneco, Inc., 64 AD2d 204, 205-207 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Micallef v. Miehle Co.
green
1 sentence1983Co., 43 NY2d 583, 590 ; Micallef v Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, 39 NY2d 376, 387 ; Bolm v Triumph Corp., 33 NY2d 151, 158-159 ; Biss v Tenneco, Inc., 64 AD2d 204, 205-207 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Bolm v. Triumph Corp.
green
1 sentence1983Co., 43 NY2d 583, 590 ; Micallef v Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, 39 NY2d 376, 387 ; Bolm v Triumph Corp., 33 NY2d 151, 158-159 ; Biss v Tenneco, Inc., 64 AD2d 204, 205-207 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Haney
green
2 sentences1983“What amounts to a violation of this section depends, of course, entirely on the circumstances of the particular conduct.” (People v Haney, supra, at p 335 .) And, “we cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 , affd 40 NY2d 59 .) Thus, it has oft been repeated that “[a] distance separates the negligence which renders one criminally liable from that which establishes civil liability.” (People v Rosenheimer, 209 NY 115, 123 ; cf. People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 306 ; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53 1983“What amounts to a violation of this section depends, of course, entirely on the circumstances of the particular conduct.” (People v Haney, supra, at p 335 .) And, “we cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 , affd 40 NY2d 59 .) Thus, it has oft been repeated that “[a] distance separates the negligence which renders one criminally liable from that which establishes civil liability.” (People v Rosenheimer, 209 NY 115, 123 ; cf. People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 306 ; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Mackell
green
1 sentence1983“What amounts to a violation of this section depends, of course, entirely on the circumstances of the particular conduct.” (People v Haney, supra, at p 335 .) And, “we cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 , affd 40 NY2d 59 .) Thus, it has oft been repeated that “[a] distance separates the negligence which renders one criminally liable from that which establishes civil liability.” (People v Rosenheimer, 209 NY 115, 123 ; cf. People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 306 ; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment Co.
green
1 sentence1983Co., 43 NY2d 583, 590 ; Micallef v Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, 39 NY2d 376, 387 ; Bolm v Triumph Corp., 33 NY2d 151, 158-159 ; Biss v Tenneco, Inc., 64 AD2d 204, 205-207 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Warner-Lambert Co.
green
1 sentence1983“What amounts to a violation of this section depends, of course, entirely on the circumstances of the particular conduct.” (People v Haney, supra, at p 335 .) And, “we cannot substitute a reasonable man test for the essential requirement of criminal intent.” (People v Mackell, 47 AD2d 209, 218-219 , affd 40 NY2d 59 .) Thus, it has oft been repeated that “[a] distance separates the negligence which renders one criminally liable from that which establishes civil liability.” (People v Rosenheimer, 209 NY 115, 123 ; cf. People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 306 ; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53 | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Seifert v. . City of Brooklyn
green
1 sentence1979(See Herman v City of Buffalo, 214 NY 316 ; Seifert v City of Brooklyn, 101 NY 136 ; see, also, Perrotti v Bennett, 94 Conn 533; Nuisance — Municipal Liability, Ann. 56 ALR2d 1415.) The court in Weiss v Fote ( 7 NY2d 579 , supra) in effect recognized this distinction as well, when it backed away from absolute immunity and applied the reasonable man standard of professional malpractice to a case where there existed an underlying duty to keep a street or highway in a reasonably safe condition. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Herman v. . City of Buffalo
green
1 sentence1979(See Herman v City of Buffalo, 214 NY 316 ; Seifert v City of Brooklyn, 101 NY 136 ; see, also, Perrotti v Bennett, 94 Conn 533; Nuisance — Municipal Liability, Ann. 56 ALR2d 1415.) The court in Weiss v Fote ( 7 NY2d 579 , supra) in effect recognized this distinction as well, when it backed away from absolute immunity and applied the reasonable man standard of professional malpractice to a case where there existed an underlying duty to keep a street or highway in a reasonably safe condition. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Weiss v. Fote
green
1 sentence1979(See Herman v City of Buffalo, 214 NY 316 ; Seifert v City of Brooklyn, 101 NY 136 ; see, also, Perrotti v Bennett, 94 Conn 533; Nuisance — Municipal Liability, Ann. 56 ALR2d 1415.) The court in Weiss v Fote ( 7 NY2d 579 , supra) in effect recognized this distinction as well, when it backed away from absolute immunity and applied the reasonable man standard of professional malpractice to a case where there existed an underlying duty to keep a street or highway in a reasonably safe condition. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Harvey
green
1 sentence1972In People v. Harvey ( 307 N. Y. 588, 592 ), it stated 16 We do not think that the statute gauges criminality by the impressions made on an annoyed or disgruntled citizen. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.