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7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1942–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Long v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293, 321 (13). 4. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Gary & Connie Jones Drugs, Inc.green1 sentence1991Although some courts require an express after-acquired clause in the security agreement, “[t]he majority view appears to be to determine the parties’ intent, applying a reasonable man test to the facts and circumstances; that is, if a reasonable man looking at the entire security agreement and financing statement would recognize that the parties intended to secure after acquired [property].” In re Gary & Connie Jones Drugs, supra at 611 (1). | 1 | 1 |
McCurry v. Baileygreen2 sentences1987"The only human resolution of such conflicts can, under our jurisprudence, be made by a jury who alone can impeach, who alone can judge credibility, and who alone can decide issues of fact." McCurry v. Bailey, 224 Ga. 318, 320 ( 162 SE2d 9 ). 1987"The only human resolution of such conflicts can, under our jurisprudence, be made by a jury who alone can impeach, who alone can judge credibility, and who alone can decide issues of fact." McCurry v. Bailey, 224 Ga. 318, 320 ( 162 SE2d 9 ). | 1 | 1 |
Joel v. Publix-Lucas Theatres Inc.green2 sentences1985“But clearly, when the easement being enjoyed is open and observable to any reasonably prudent person, the question of notice is not one of fact but one of law.” Joel v. Publix-Lucas Theatres, 193 Ga. 531, 542 ( 19 SE2d 730 ) (1942). 1985“But clearly, when the easement being enjoyed is open and observable to any reasonably prudent person, the question of notice is not one of fact but one of law.” Joel v. Publix-Lucas Theatres, 193 Ga. 531, 542 ( 19 SE2d 730 ) (1942). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rome Gas-Light Co. v. Meyerhardt
green
2 sentences1985In Rome Gas-Light Co. v. Meyerhardt, 61 Ga. 287 (1) (1878), the Supreme Court held that “[w]hether a purchaser of land through which a gas company had run its pipes by consent of a former owner, took subject to the easement or not, depends upon whether he had notice thereof at the time of purchase, or had notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry.” Since notice in that case was a question of fact, the court held that the trial court correctly submitted the question of notice to the jury. 1942The first is Rome Gas-Light Co. v. Meyer hardt, 61 Ga. 287 , where it was held: “Whether a purchaser of land through which a gas company had run its pipes, by consent of a former owner, took subject to the easement or not, depends upon whether he had notice thereof at the time of the purchase, or had notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry.” The easement there involved related to a gas pipe which the property owner discovered while excavating for his basement. *542 The court properly submitted the question of notice to the jury, and they found in favor of the owner and ag | 2 | 1942–1985 |
Chancellor v. State
green
2 sentences1985In the course of instructing the jury on the law of insanity, the trial judge also charged the jury that “the reasonable-man standard governs a person’s act, and when an act violates that standard and a penal statute, the conduct is criminal unless it is excused by insanity.” This charge has been approved in Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365 (11) ( 301 SE2d 294 ) (1983). 1985In the course of instructing the jury on the law of insanity, the trial judge also charged the jury that “the reasonable-man standard governs a person’s act, and when an act violates that standard and a penal statute, the conduct is criminal unless it is excused by insanity.” This charge has been approved in Chancellor v. State, 165 Ga. App. 365 (11) ( 301 SE2d 294 ) (1983). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Hilton v. State
green
2 sentences1977The charge, viewed as a whole ( Hilton v. State, 233 Ga. 11 ( 209 SE2d 606 ) (1974)), contained no harmful error, as the trial judge clearly charged, at three different points, the correct law on defense of a third person. 6. 1977The charge, viewed as a whole ( Hilton v. State, 233 Ga. 11 ( 209 SE2d 606 ) (1974)), contained no harmful error, as the trial judge clearly charged, at three different points, the correct law on defense of a third person. 6. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.