reasonable man standard (Virginia) · Go Syfert
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reasonable man standard in Virginia

8 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Kauffmangreen
pa · 1984 · cited in 6 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1991–2024
2 sentences

2024In other words, felony hit and run requires “subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to the fact or extent of the injury.” Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 810 (1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 470 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. Super.

2024This requires the Commonwealth to prove “subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to the fact or extent of the injury.” Kil, 12 Va. App. at 810 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 470 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. Super.

66
Kil v. Commonwealthgreen
vactapp · 1991 · cited in 6 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2024
2 sentences

2024This Court has characterized this approach as “requiring subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to the fact or extent of the injury.” Id. (quoting Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 810 (1991)).

2024This requires the Commonwealth to prove “subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to the fact or extent of the injury.” Kil, 12 Va. App. at 810 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 470 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. Super.

36
People v. Cartergreen
calctapp · 1966 · cited in 2 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2008
2 sentences

2008We determined that “[knowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver ‘where the fact of personal injury is visible or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.’ ” Neel, 49 Va.App. at 395 , 641 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting People v. Carter, 243 Cal.App.2d 239 , 52 Cal.Rptr. 207, 208 (1966)).

2008We determined that “[knowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver ‘where the fact of personal injury is visible or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.’ ” Neel, 49 Va.App. at 395 , 641 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting People v. Carter, 243 Cal.App.2d 239 , 52 Cal.Rptr. 207, 208 (1966)).

22
Calvin Darnell Butcher v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen
vactapp · 2018 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Thus, the statute requires the Commonwealth to prove that a driver had “subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to [knowledge of] the fact or extent of the injury[.]” Kil v. 2 Appellant’s call to law enforcement the next day is too far removed from the accident to satisfy the statutory requirement that such communication occur “forthwith.” See Butcher v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 406, 418-19 (2018) (discussing meaning of “forthwith” as used in Code § 46.2-894). -6- Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 810 (1991) (quoting Commonwealth v.

11
Parks v. Commonwealthgreen
va · 1980 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Knowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver “where the fact of personal injury is visible or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.” People v. Carter, 243 Cal.App.2d 239 , 52 Cal.Rptr. 207, 208 (1966) (citation omitted) (holding that where impact “slightly dam aged” bumper or fender of both cars and bumper had to be pulled away from wheel of one so it could be moved, “collision was not of sufficient magnitude to compel the conclusion that injuries had probably occurred”); see also Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation

2007Knowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver “where the fact of personal injury is visible or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.” People v. Carter, 243 Cal.App.2d 239 , 52 Cal.Rptr. 207, 208 (1966) (citation omitted) (holding that where impact “slightly dam aged” bumper or fender of both cars and bumper had to be pulled away from wheel of one so it could be moved, “collision was not of sufficient magnitude to compel the conclusion that injuries had probably occurred”); see also Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation

11
Touchstone v. Stategreen
alactapp · 1963 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Neel v. Commonwealth green
vactapp · 2007
2 sentences

2024This Court has characterized this approach as “requiring subjective knowledge of the collision while holding the driver to a stricter reasonable man standard as to the fact or extent of the injury.” Id. (quoting Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 810 (1991)).

2024We have also explained that “[k]nowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver ‘where the fact of personal injury is visible or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Neel, 49 Va. App. at 395 ).

22008–2024
Smith v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. green
vaccrichmondcty · 1991
1 sentence

2005The Benson law review article cited above argues persuasively that “the applicable test as to what constitutes materials prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation’ should be a reasonable man test” such that if “a reasonable man, in the shoes of the party resisting discoveiy when the requested material was produced, would have anticipated or reasonably foreseen litigation, the subject matter should receive the qualified protection of Rule 4:1(b)(3).” Benson, supra at p. 295; Smith, 22 Va. Cir. at 351 .

12005–2005
State v. Wall green
kan · 1971
2 sentences

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

11991–1991
State v. Sidway green
vt · 1981
2 sentences

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

11991–1991
State v. Blevins green
arizctapp · 1981
2 sentences

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

11991–1991
State v. Carpenter green
iowa · 1983
1 sentence

1991See, e.g., Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141 , 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); State v. Blevins, 128 Ariz. 64 , 623 P.2d 853 (App. 1981); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983); State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760 , 482 P.2d 41 (1971); State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480 , 431 A.2d 1237 (1981).

11991–1991

Statutes the citing opinions construe

VA § Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-894 (6) VA § Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-413 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

LA 33 (1966–2008) IL 23 (1884–1994) CA 17 (1935–2025) PA 17 (1973–2020) AZ 13 (1963–2026) AL 12 (1901–2014) TX 12 (1915–2015) IN 10 (1968–2019) NY 10 (1972–2015) NC 9 (1978–2024) MN 9 (1970–2012) VA 8 (1991–2024) MA 8 (1985–2009) GA 7 (1942–1994) FL 7 (1967–2005) KS 6 (1980–1995) MS 6 (1991–1997) OR 5 (1973–2017) UT 5 (1950–2007) MI 5 (1918–2020) MO 4 (1921–1925) NJ 4 (1962–2003) HI 3 (1968–2025) ID 3 (1967–1974) OH 3 (1983–2002) MT 3 (1977–1985) SD 3 (1960–1986) TN 3 (1970–1985) NM 2 (1982–1989) WA 2 (1967–1976) DC 2 (1985–2018) OK 2 (1979–1994) DE 2 (1990–2018) ME 2 (1979–2017) WY 2 (1982–2018) SC 2 (1970–1996) WV 2 (1907–2023) IA 2 (1985–1988)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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