reasonable man inquiry in Illinois

1983(Smith v. Grubb (1949), 402 Ill. 451, 464-65 ; German-American National Bank v. Martin (1917), 277 Ill. 629, 649 ; Burnex Oil Co. v. Floyd (1969), 106 Ill.

1977One having knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable man on inquiry is chargeable with knowledge of other facts which would have been discovered on diligent inquiry. ( Smith v. Grubb (1949), 402 Ill. 451 , 84 N.E.2d 421 ; German-American National Bank v. Martin (1917), 277 Ill. 629 , 115 N.E.2d 721 .) Although the affidavit attached to appellant's application for a tax deed order, subscribed and sworn before appellant, recited inter alia that a search had been made of the appropriate records of the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, it is clear that a proper search of those recor

1977One having knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable man on inquiry is chargeable with knowledge of other facts which would have been discovered on diligent inquiry. ( Smith v. Grubb (1949), 402 Ill. 451 , 84 N.E.2d 421 ; German-American National Bank v. Martin (1917), 277 Ill. 629 , 115 N.E.2d 721 .) Although the affidavit attached to appellant's application for a tax deed order, subscribed and sworn before appellant, recited inter alia that a search had been made of the appropriate records of the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, it is clear that a proper search of those recor

1977One having knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable man on inquiry is chargeable with knowledge of other facts which would have been discovered on diligent inquiry. ( Smith v. Grubb (1949), 402 Ill. 451 , 84 N.E.2d 421 ; German-American National Bank v. Martin (1917), 277 Ill. 629 , 115 N.E.2d 721 .) Although the affidavit attached to appellant's application for a tax deed order, subscribed and sworn before appellant, recited inter alia that a search had been made of the appropriate records of the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County, it is clear that a proper search of those recor

1994App. 3d 523 , a case involving fraudulent misrepresentation, this court stated: "In determining whether there was justified reliance, it is necessary to consider all of the facts in plaintiff’s actual knowledge as well as those which he could have discovered by the exercise of ordinary prudence. [Citation.] While a person may rely on a statement without investigation if the party making the statement creates a false sense of security or blocks further inquiry [citation], it must be determined whether the facts were such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry.” ( 137 Ill.

1987App. 3d 329, 335 , 463 N.E.2d 1359 ), and while a person may rely on a misrepresentation without investigation if the party making the statement creates a false sense of security or blocks further inquiry, it must be determined whether the facts were such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry (Marino v. United Bank of Illinois (1985), 137 Ill.

1988(Keeshin v. Levin (1975), 31 Ill.

1985(Keeshin v. Levin (1975), 31 Ill.

1988App. 3d 314, 319 , 457 N.E.2d 1335 ), it must be determined whether the facts were such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry.

1985App. 3d 314, 319 , 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 ), it must be determined whether the facts were such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry.

1978Cir. 1967), 382 F.2d 158, 161 .) When, however, the apprehension engendered in an arrestee, even if such apprehension can be said to be reasonably held by the particular arrestee, does not coincide with what the reasonable, innocent man would have thought, then assessments of whether an arrest occurred must be guided by the reasonable man standard and not by the subjective belief of the arrestee.

1977Cir. 1967), 382 F.2d 158, 161 .) When, however, the apprehension engendered in an arrestee, even if such apprehension can be said to be reasonably held by the particular arrestee, does not coincide with what the reasonable, innocent man would have thought, then assessments of whether an arrest occurred must be guided by the reasonable man standard and not by the subjective belief of the arrestee.

1973This notion results from the fact that the any-evidence standard has always been stated in relation to the direction of verdicts, while, in contradiction to this, no case has been found since Briske v. Village of Burnham, 379 Ill. 193 , in which we said that the reasonable-man test should be applied for this purpose (cf. Seeds), the latter standard having consistently been stated as determining the circumstances under which negligence or contributory negligence becomes a question of law.

1967This notion results from the fact that the any-evidence standard has always been stated in relation to the direction of verdicts, while, in contradistinction to this, no case has been found since Briske v. Village of Burnham, 379 Ill. 193 , in which we said that the reasonable-man test should be applied for this purpose (cf. Seeds), the latter standard having consistently been stated as determining the circumstances under which negligence or contributory negligence becomes a question of law.

1992App. 3d 572 , 362 N.E.2d 1335 , the court held that one having knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable man on inquiry is chargeable with knowledge of other facts which would have been discovered on diligent inquiry.

1987(Forman, 112 Ill.

1987App. 3d at 1074 .) Bécause satisfaction in these cases is judged by a reasonable man standard and is open to judicial scrutiny ( 112 Ill.

1987App. 3d 329, 335 , 463 N.E.2d 1359 ), and while a person may rely on a misrepresentation without investigation if the party making the statement creates a false sense of security or blocks further inquiry, it must be determined whether the facts were such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry (Marino v. United Bank of Illinois (1985), 137 Ill.

1985In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (Tex. 1984), 665 S.W.2d 414 , it was charged that the airplane in which the plaintiff's decedent had been receiving instruction was operated at less than a safe flying speed.

1985In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (Tex. 1984), 665 S.W.2d 414 , it was charged that the airplane in which the plaintiff’s decedent had been receiving instruction was operated at less than a safe flying speed.

1985Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504, 513 ).

1985Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504, 513 ).

1984In that case we said: “[R]eferring to statutes for the recording of real property-interests *** when a purchaser has notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry, the purchaser is charged with notice of all of the facts he could have discovered by a diligent inquiry.” Provident Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Realty Centre, Ltd. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 187, 193 .

1984The plaintiffs rely on 2140 Lincoln Park West v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1980), 88 Ill.

1984(Long v. City of New Boston (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 456 , 440 N.E.2d 625 .) A person may not knowingly expose himself to the danger of injury which might have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care.

1984(Long v. City of New Boston (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 456 , 440 N.E.2d 625 .) A person may not knowingly expose himself to the danger of injury which might have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care.

1983(Smith v. Grubb (1949), 402 Ill. 451, 464-65 ; German-American National Bank v. Martin (1917), 277 Ill. 629, 649 ; Burnex Oil Co. v. Floyd (1969), 106 Ill.

1983Reeves; Wood Machine Co. v. Smith (1883), 50 Mich. 565 , 15 N.W. 906 .

1983Reeves; Wood Machine Co. v. Smith (1883), 50 Mich. 565 , 15 N.W. 906 .

1983Cal. 1973), 409 F. Supp. 1396 .) The adequacy of the grounds of a determination in this class are open to judicial scrutiny and are judged by a reasonable man standard.

1983Cal. 1973), 409 F. Supp. 1396 .) The adequacy of the grounds of a determination in this class are open to judicial scrutiny and are judged by a reasonable man standard.

1983It is a long settled rule as asserted in Doyle v. Cavanaugh (1908), 139 Ill.

1976App. 3d 643, 648 , 295 N.E.2d 78, 82 , the court cited Lowe v. United States (9th Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 1391 , with approval for the proposition that the following objective standard should be used in determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes: “* * * a reasonable man standard should be applied to determine if a defendant reasonably believed that he was not free to leave the scene of the questioning or was merely acting voluntarily.” In In re Orr (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 417 , 231 N.E.2d 424 , the Supreme Court, in concluding that a statement was volunteered and the product

1976(People v. Carlton (1975), 26 Ill.

1976App. 3d 643, 648 , 295 N.E.2d 78, 82 , the court cited Lowe v. United States (9th Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 1391 , with approval for the proposition that the following objective standard should be used in determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes: “* * * a reasonable man standard should be applied to determine if a defendant reasonably believed that he was not free to leave the scene of the questioning or was merely acting voluntarily.” In In re Orr (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 417 , 231 N.E.2d 424 , the Supreme Court, in concluding that a statement was volunteered and the product

1976App. 3d 643, 648 , 295 N.E.2d 78, 82 , the court cited Lowe v. United States (9th Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 1391 , with approval for the proposition that the following objective standard should be used in determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes: “* * * a reasonable man standard should be applied to determine if a defendant reasonably believed that he was not free to leave the scene of the questioning or was merely acting voluntarily.” In In re Orr (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 417 , 231 N.E.2d 424 , the Supreme Court, in concluding that a statement was volunteered and the product

1976App. 3d 643, 648 , 295 N.E.2d 78, 82 , the court cited Lowe v. United States (9th Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 1391 , with approval for the proposition that the following objective standard should be used in determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes: “* * * a reasonable man standard should be applied to determine if a defendant reasonably believed that he was not free to leave the scene of the questioning or was merely acting voluntarily.” In In re Orr (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 417 , 231 N.E.2d 424 , the Supreme Court, in concluding that a statement was volunteered and the product

1976In People v. Richards (1970), 120 Ill.

1975In any event, the rule is that where there is an absence of circumstances putting a reasonable man on inquiry, that person is justified in relying upon the representation without engaging in further inquiry (Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Fischer (1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 315, 324 , 214 N.E.2d 612 ), particularly where the misrepreservations concern matters which may be assumed to be within the knowledge of the party making them (Pustelniak v. Vilimas (1933), 352 Ill. 270, 276 , 185 N.E. 611 ; Bergman & Lefkow Insurance Agency v. Flash Cab Co. (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 415, 430 , 249 N.E.2d 7

1975In any event, the rule is that where there is an absence of circumstances putting a reasonable man on inquiry, that person is justified in relying upon the representation without engaging in further inquiry (Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Fischer (1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 315, 324 , 214 N.E.2d 612 ), particularly where the misrepreservations concern matters which may be assumed to be within the knowledge of the party making them (Pustelniak v. Vilimas (1933), 352 Ill. 270, 276 , 185 N.E. 611 ; Bergman & Lefkow Insurance Agency v. Flash Cab Co. (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 415, 430 , 249 N.E.2d 7

1975In any event, the rule is that where there is an absence of circumstances putting a reasonable man on inquiry, that person is justified in relying upon the representation without engaging in further inquiry (Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Fischer (1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 315, 324 , 214 N.E.2d 612 ), particularly where the misrepreservations concern matters which may be assumed to be within the knowledge of the party making them (Pustelniak v. Vilimas (1933), 352 Ill. 270, 276 , 185 N.E. 611 ; Bergman & Lefkow Insurance Agency v. Flash Cab Co. (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 415, 430 , 249 N.E.2d 7

1975In any event, the rule is that where there is an absence of circumstances putting a reasonable man on inquiry, that person is justified in relying upon the representation without engaging in further inquiry (Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Fischer (1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 315, 324 , 214 N.E.2d 612 ), particularly where the misrepreservations concern matters which may be assumed to be within the knowledge of the party making them (Pustelniak v. Vilimas (1933), 352 Ill. 270, 276 , 185 N.E. 611 ; Bergman & Lefkow Insurance Agency v. Flash Cab Co. (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 415, 430 , 249 N.E.2d 7

1975In any event, the rule is that where there is an absence of circumstances putting a reasonable man on inquiry, that person is justified in relying upon the representation without engaging in further inquiry (Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Fischer (1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 315, 324 , 214 N.E.2d 612 ), particularly where the misrepreservations concern matters which may be assumed to be within the knowledge of the party making them (Pustelniak v. Vilimas (1933), 352 Ill. 270, 276 , 185 N.E. 611 ; Bergman & Lefkow Insurance Agency v. Flash Cab Co. (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 415, 430 , 249 N.E.2d 7

1975In any event, the rule is that where there is an absence of circumstances putting a reasonable man on inquiry, that person is justified in relying upon the representation without engaging in further inquiry (Citizens Savings & Loan Association v. Fischer (1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 315, 324 , 214 N.E.2d 612 ), particularly where the misrepreservations concern matters which may be assumed to be within the knowledge of the party making them (Pustelniak v. Vilimas (1933), 352 Ill. 270, 276 , 185 N.E. 611 ; Bergman & Lefkow Insurance Agency v. Flash Cab Co. (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 415, 430 , 249 N.E.2d 7

1967(In actual practice Kentucky appears to apply the reasonable-man test, for a verdict cannot there be sustained when reasonable men could not reach that verdict.) Massachusetts—Adams v. Herbert, 188 N.E.2d 577 ; cf. West v. Molders Foundry Co., 171 N.E.2d 860 ; Hannon v. Hayes-Bickford Lunch System, 145 N.E.2d 191 .

1967(In actual practice Kentucky appears to apply the reasonable-man test, for a verdict cannot there be sustained when reasonable men could not reach that verdict.) Massachusetts—Adams v. Herbert, 188 N.E.2d 577 ; cf. West v. Molders Foundry Co., 171 N.E.2d 860 ; Hannon v. Hayes-Bickford Lunch System, 145 N.E.2d 191 .

1967North Dakota—State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. Skjonsby, 142 N.W.2d 98 ; Anderson v. Stokkeland, 125 N.W.2d 665 ; Hadland v. St.