conversion claim in Ohio

2026Id. “‘When a defendant to a conversion claim moves for summary judgment, the court should grant the motion if the plaintiff fails to produce evidence on any of’ these three elements.” Hanneman Family Funeral Home & Crematorium v. Orians, 2022-Ohio-984, ¶ 47 (3d Dist.), quoting Minix v. Collier, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1427 , *11 (4th Dist.

2025Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1990). “‘The elements of conversion are: (1) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; (2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) damages.’” Id., quoting Miller v. Cass, 2010-Ohio-1930, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.). {¶24} The trial court, relying on the March 14, 2023 magistrate’s order, determined that the Lyon Trust’s conversion claim was ripe for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because Lyon was permitted to remove her personal belongings by May 15, 2023, and any

2023In the same case, the Supreme Court cautioned that “courts must be careful not to extend the scope of conversion to rights that are ‘more appropriately considered under wholly distinct legal principles’ lest the extension lead to ‘confusing, unnecessary, and improper’ results.’” Id. at ¶ 35, quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 227 (1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 563 (1977). {¶27} This Court asked the parties to brief the question of whether the cash at issue in this case was properly the subject of a conversion claim.

2022Accordingly, we held that the plaintiff’s conversion claim failed, and we cautioned that while “[j]udicial ingenuity could perhaps award damages and find a res said to be sold,” extending the scope of conversion to the rights claimed by the plaintiff, which “are more appropriately considered under wholly distinct legal principles,” would be “confusing, unnecessary, and improper.” Id. {¶ 22} Here, Firman contends that Bunta’s conversion claim must fail because Bunta’s membership interest in VacuPress is not the type of intangible property that is subject to conversion.

2026Conversion Claim {¶68} “The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) a plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession in property at the time of conversion; (2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of the plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) damages.” Pertuset v. Hull, 2022-Ohio-2348 , ¶ 33 (4th Dist.), citing Mitchell v. Thompson, 2007-Ohio-5362, ¶ 37 (4th Dist.).

2024“To prevail on a conversion claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) ownership or right to WASHINGTON, 23CA5 74 possession of the property at the time of the conversion; (2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of the plaintiff’s property right, and (3) damages.” Bender v. Logan, 2016-Ohio-5317 , ¶ 74 (4th Dist.), citing Mitchell v. Thompson, 2007-Ohio-5362, ¶ 37 (4th Dist.), and Orebaugh v. Am.

2025Accord Pond, 2024-Ohio-800, at ¶ 21 (10th Dist.) (“Because ‘a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage,’ the Ponds were not required to establish actual ownership of any vehicle they claimed to own for their claims to survive dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).”), quoting York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 144-145 . -15- Case No. 8-24-07 {¶27} Consequently, based on the question of legal ownership of the disputed items, dismissal of the Lyon Trust’s conversion claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was premature.

2024See Bugoni v. C & M Towing, 2012-Ohio-4508 , ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (trial court’s order granting Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 6 motion to dismiss reversed on appeal; allegation that defendants took the plaintiff’s vehicle without consent and are refusing to return the vehicle unless plaintiff pays them money sufficiently stated a conversion claim); Pond v. E and E Towing and Recovery, LLC, 2024-Ohio-800, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.) (plaintiffs complied with Civ.R. 8(A), and sufficiently stated a conversion claim, where they alleged that they were the owners of the vehicles, the defendant removed the vehicles, and they su

2023Toma v. Corrigan, 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 592 (2001), quoting Joyce v. Gen.

2012Toma v. Corrigan, 92 Ohio St. 3d 589, 592 (2001) (quoting Joyce v. Gen.

2006See, DeSantis v. Smedley (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 218 . {¶ 52} An award of prejudgment interest on a conversion claim is within the trial court's discretion as part of the compensatory award.

2001See, also Desantis v. Smedley (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 218 ; Lyle v. Durham (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 1 .

2023Equip. & Sales Inc. v. Hadler Realty Co., 24 Ohio App.3d 91, 94 (10th Dist.1985). {¶19} “[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving all the elements necessary to sustain [a conversion claim] by a preponderance of the evidence.” Hutchings v. Hutchings, 6th Dist.

1996Equip. & Sales, Inc. v. Hadler Realty Co. (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 91, 93-94 , 24 OBR 160, 162-164, 493 N.E.2d 289, 291-293 ; however, we need not consider the conversion doctrine in light of the express contractual provisions permitting deductions for uncollected fees and expenses.

2024Family Ins., 2007-Ohio-3891, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.). {¶111} Additionally, conversion only applies to personal property, not real property.

2013To the contrary, as Dr. Hansing testified both when called as on cross and during his own case, he lost a great deal of his own capital in an attempt to keep Kigezi financially solvent. {¶ 21} The second problem with applying a conversion claim is that, as we noted above, no conversion of property can occur without some kind of “wrongful act.” See Dunlop, supra at ¶8; Mitchell, supra at ¶37 ; Orebaugh, supra, at ¶27 .

2024No. 14AP-482, 2015- Ohio-2166, ¶ 30, citing Dice v. White Family Cos., 173 Ohio App.3d 472 , 2007-Ohio-5755, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). {¶ 23} Here, the Ponds alleged that they were “the owners of the motor vehicles identified in the attached Exhibit A and other personal property Defendant removed from the Dublin Road Property which is described in the affidavit of David Pond filed in support of the Motion for Order of Possession of Property filed herein.” (Sept. 15, 2022 Compl. at ¶ 36.) This allegation satisfies the requirement that a conversion claim allege that “the plaintiff had ownership or right

2024No. 14AP-482, 2015- Ohio-2166, ¶ 30, citing Dice v. White Family Cos., 173 Ohio App.3d 472 , 2007-Ohio-5755, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). {¶ 23} Here, the Ponds alleged that they were “the owners of the motor vehicles identified in the attached Exhibit A and other personal property Defendant removed from the Dublin Road Property which is described in the affidavit of David Pond filed in support of the Motion for Order of Possession of Property filed herein.” (Sept. 15, 2022 Compl. at ¶ 36.) This allegation satisfies the requirement that a conversion claim allege that “the plaintiff had ownership or right

2026See KSMAC Holdings, 2022-Ohio-1456, at ¶ 58 (7th Dist.) (concluding that the plaintiff’s claim -18- Case No. 8-26-02 for conversion was precluded by its existing breach of contract claim because the plaintiff introduced no evidence demonstrating an independent duty).

2026See Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ill.

2026Id. “‘When a defendant to a conversion claim moves for summary judgment, the court should grant the motion if the plaintiff fails to produce evidence on any of’ these three elements.” Hanneman Family Funeral Home & Crematorium v. Orians, 2022-Ohio-984, ¶ 47 (3d Dist.), quoting Minix v. Collier, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1427 , *11 (4th Dist.

2026Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1994). -4- Case No. 8-26-02 Analysis {¶9} On appeal, the Lyon Trust argues that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the Berrys becuase (1) the trial court erroneously applied the parol evidence rule to bar the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims because the personal property agreement and the residential purchase agreement involve completely different subject matters; (2) the trial court improperly barred the fraud claim because the alleged misrepresentations are not directly contradicted by a signed writing; (3) a genuine issue

2025In Landskroner at ¶ 27 , this court found that “[b]ecause the property subject to appellant’s conversion claim is not identifiable, personal property but rather comprises monies appellant claims are due and owing him under an agreement, appellant can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to recover on his claim for conversion.” See Marshall v. Cooper, 2017-Ohio-5813, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (applied Landskroner and sustained appellant’s breach-of-contract claim and then found summary judgment was appropriate as to the appellant’s conversion claim since it fell within the ambit of Landskroner a

2025Holman v. Wiser, 2023-Ohio-4095, ¶ 54 (11th Dist.).

2025Accord Pond, 2024-Ohio-800, at ¶ 21 (10th Dist.) (“Because ‘a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage,’ the Ponds were not required to establish actual ownership of any vehicle they claimed to own for their claims to survive dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).”), quoting York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 144-145 . -15- Case No. 8-24-07 {¶27} Consequently, based on the question of legal ownership of the disputed items, dismissal of the Lyon Trust’s conversion claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was premature.