conversion claim in Georgia

2025On appeal, Sterling challenges that conclusion, taking the position that the “matter of ‘ownership’ of the RECs at issue should be determined by reference to the parties’ agreement,” not the courts, and that the trial court erred in determining that RECs are “property” subject to a conversion claim.8 As recognized by the business court, “[t]angible personalty or specific intangible property may be the subject for an action for conversion[.]” Taylor v. Powertel, 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001).

2025On appeal, Sterling challenges that conclusion, taking the position that the “matter of ‘ownership’ of the RECs at issue should be determined by reference to the parties’ agreement,” not the courts, and that the trial court erred in determining that RECs are “property” subject to a conversion claim.8 As recognized by the business court, “[t]angible personalty or specific intangible property may be the subject for an action for conversion[.]” Taylor v. Powertel, 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001).

2025Although Georgia 8 As pointed out by the business court, the only written agreements between the parties expressly stated that “[t]itle to and ownership of RECs purchased under this Agreement shall pass from [GRP] to Sterling Planet” on the specified delivery date. 18 courts do not appear to have addressed whether RECs could be considered “specific intangible property” subject to a conversion claim, this Court has upheld a trial court’s conclusion that social media accounts had been converted, see Bearoff v. Craton, 350 Ga. App. 826, 840-841 (5) (a) ( 830 SE2d 362 ) (2019), and upheld a jury v

2025Although Georgia 8 As pointed out by the business court, the only written agreements between the parties expressly stated that “[t]itle to and ownership of RECs purchased under this Agreement shall pass from [GRP] to Sterling Planet” on the specified delivery date. 18 courts do not appear to have addressed whether RECs could be considered “specific intangible property” subject to a conversion claim, this Court has upheld a trial court’s conclusion that social media accounts had been converted, see Bearoff v. Craton, 350 Ga. App. 826, 840-841 (5) (a) ( 830 SE2d 362 ) (2019), and upheld a jury v

2026Co., 218 Ga. App. 85, 89 (3)(c) ( 460 SE2d 545 ) (1995) (“[M]oney can be the subject of a conversion claim as long as the allegedly converted money is specific and identifiable”).

2026Co., 218 Ga. App. 85, 89 (3)(c) ( 460 SE2d 545 ) (1995) (“[M]oney can be the subject of a conversion claim as long as the allegedly converted money is specific and identifiable”).

2025Although Georgia 8 As pointed out by the business court, the only written agreements between the parties expressly stated that “[t]itle to and ownership of RECs purchased under this Agreement shall pass from [GRP] to Sterling Planet” on the specified delivery date. 18 courts do not appear to have addressed whether RECs could be considered “specific intangible property” subject to a conversion claim, this Court has upheld a trial court’s conclusion that social media accounts had been converted, see Bearoff v. Craton, 350 Ga. App. 826, 840-841 (5) (a) ( 830 SE2d 362 ) (2019), and upheld a jury v

2025Although Georgia 8 As pointed out by the business court, the only written agreements between the parties expressly stated that “[t]itle to and ownership of RECs purchased under this Agreement shall pass from [GRP] to Sterling Planet” on the specified delivery date. 18 courts do not appear to have addressed whether RECs could be considered “specific intangible property” subject to a conversion claim, this Court has upheld a trial court’s conclusion that social media accounts had been converted, see Bearoff v. Craton, 350 Ga. App. 826, 840-841 (5) (a) ( 830 SE2d 362 ) (2019), and upheld a jury v

2025Thus, there is an issue of fact as to whether Sterling could have returned the RECs earlier than it did, and GRP was not entitled to summary judgment on its conversion claim.10 See generally Mitzner v. Hyman, 175 Ga. App. 311, 312-313 (1) ( 333 SE2d 182 ) (1985) (plaintiff not entitled to summary judgment on conversion claim were there was evidence that defendants became unable to return the property to plaintiff). 5.

2025Thus, there is an issue of fact as to whether Sterling could have returned the RECs earlier than it did, and GRP was not entitled to summary judgment on its conversion claim.10 See generally Mitzner v. Hyman, 175 Ga. App. 311, 312-313 (1) ( 333 SE2d 182 ) (1985) (plaintiff not entitled to summary judgment on conversion claim were there was evidence that defendants became unable to return the property to plaintiff). 5.

2002But we have also found money to “be the subject of a conversion claim as long as the allegedly converted money is specific and identifiable.” (Punctuation omitted.) Hudspeth v. A & H Constr., 230 Ga. App. 70, 71 (2) ( 495 SE2d 322 ) (1997).

2002But we have also found money to “be the subject of a conversion claim as long as the allegedly converted money is specific and identifiable.” (Punctuation omitted.) Hudspeth v. A & H Constr., 230 Ga. App. 70, 71 (2) ( 495 SE2d 322 ) (1997).

2017See id. at 322-23 (holding that the four-year statute of limitation for a conversion claim began to run on the date of the alleged conversion); Logan v. Tucker, 224 Ga. App. 404, 406 (2) ( 480 SE2d 860 ) (1997) (“As a general rule, a right of action for wrongful conversion accrues on the date of the conversion.”).

2017And according to their complaint, the distribution EMCs (of which the appellants were former members) “have never refunded patronage capital originally allocated to them 64 Stewart v. Warner, 257 Ga. App. 322, 323 ( 571 SE2d 189 ) (2002). 65 See id. at 322-23 (holding that the four-year statute of limitation for a conversion claim began to run on the date of the alleged conversion); Logan v. Tucker, 224 Ga. App. 404, 406 (2) ( 480 SE2d 860 ) (1997) (“As a general rule, a right of action for wrongful conversion accrues on the date of the conversion.”). 36 by Oglethorpe and [GTC] . . . .”66 Thus

2017See id. at 322-23 (holding that the four-year statute of limitation for a conversion claim began to run on the date of the alleged conversion); Logan v. Tucker, 224 Ga. App. 404, 406 (2) ( 480 SE2d 860 ) (1997) (“As a general rule, a right of action for wrongful conversion accrues on the date of the conversion.”).

2017See id. at 322-23 (holding that the four-year statute of limitation for a conversion claim began to run on the date of the alleged conversion); Logan v. Tucker, 224 Ga. App. 404, 406 (2) ( 480 SE2d 860 ) (1997) (“As a general rule, a right of action for wrongful conversion accrues on the date of the conversion.”).

2020The acceptance of that sum of money did not and does not waive Foxfire Acres’ rights to recover additional legal damages over and above said sums.” See generally Long v. McIntosh, 129 Ga. 660 ( 59 SE 779 ) (1907) (discussing special and nominal damages within the context of a conversion claim); Grant v. Newsome, 201 Ga. App. 710, 710-711 (1) ( 411 SE2d 796 ) (1991) (contemplating that a plaintiff in a conversion action may recover, inter alia, lost interest, punitive damages, as well as 15 v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 597 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (“[A] settlement agreement ordinarily extinguis

2020The acceptance of that sum of money did not and does not waive Foxfire Acres’ rights to recover additional legal damages over and above said sums.” See generally Long v. McIntosh, 129 Ga. 660 ( 59 SE 779 ) (1907) (discussing special and nominal damages within the context of a conversion claim); Grant v. Newsome, 201 Ga. App. 710, 710-711 (1) ( 411 SE2d 796 ) (1991) (contemplating that a plaintiff in a conversion action may recover, inter alia, lost interest, punitive damages, as well as 15 v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 597 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (“[A] settlement agreement ordinarily extinguis

2020Adler v. Hertling, 215 Ga. App. 769, 773-774 (2) ( 451 SE2d 91 ) (1994).

2020Adler v. Hertling, 215 Ga. App. 769, 773-774 (2) ( 451 SE2d 91 ) (1994).

2026Accord Rubenstein v. Palatchi, 359 15 Ga. App. 139, 142 (1) ( 857 SE2d 81 ) (2021) (“A money-based conversion claim may proceed only if the money comprises a specific, separate, identifiable fund set aside from other money.”) (punctuation omitted).

2025For a Georgia court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident tortfeasor, subsection (3) requires that the tortfeasor “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state.” OCGA § 9-10-91 (3); see Innovative Clinical & Consulting Svcs., 279 Ga. at 676, n.4 . (“subsection (3) requires ‘regular,’ ‘persistent’ or ‘substantial’ contact with this State”).

2024Williams & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 764, 766 (1) ( 426 SE2d 601 ) (1992) (recognizing that failure to pay money owed under a contract may support a conversion claim where allegations add something “beyond breach of contract”). 11 4.

2024Williams & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 764, 766 (1) ( 426 SE2d 601 ) (1992) (recognizing that failure to pay money owed under a contract may support a conversion claim where allegations add something “beyond breach of contract”). 11 4.

2023See Decatur Auto Center, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 276 Ga. 817, 820-821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003).

2023See Decatur Auto Center, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 276 Ga. 817, 820-821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003).

2022Indeed, because it is a jury’s prerogative to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the evidence submitted, generally the question of [intent and good faith] is a question for the jury.21 Accordingly, based on the record before us, the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment to The Crafty Yank on its breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conversion claims. 20 For example, the Crafty Yank’s conversion claim is predicated in part on a computer that remained in Broe’s possession, but it is also based on “failing to account for tens of thousands of dollars of the Compan

2022Indeed, because it is a jury’s prerogative to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the evidence submitted, generally the question of [intent and good faith] is a question for the jury.21 Accordingly, based on the record before us, the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment to The Crafty Yank on its breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conversion claims. 20 For example, the Crafty Yank’s conversion claim is predicated in part on a computer that remained in Broe’s possession, but it is also based on “failing to account for tens of thousands of dollars of the Compan

2021Svcs., Inc., supra, 286 Ga. App. at 819-820 (3) (a) (holding that the trial court properly denied motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict on the conversion claim); Efstathiou v. Reiss, 227 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) (b) ( 490 SE2d 426 ) (1997) (holding that the trial court did not err by denying a motion for directed verdict where the evidence did not demand a verdict in the moving party’s favor).

2021Svcs., Inc., supra, 286 Ga. App. at 819-820 (3) (a) (holding that the trial court properly denied motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict on the conversion claim); Efstathiou v. Reiss, 227 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) (b) ( 490 SE2d 426 ) (1997) (holding that the trial court did not err by denying a motion for directed verdict where the evidence did not demand a verdict in the moving party’s favor).

2021Svcs., Inc., supra, 286 Ga. App. at 819-820 (3) (a) (holding that the trial court properly denied motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict on the conversion claim); Efstathiou v. Reiss, 227 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) (b) ( 490 SE2d 426 ) (1997) (holding that the trial court did not err by denying a motion for directed verdict where the evidence did not demand a verdict in the moving party’s favor).

2021See id. at 891 (2) (a).

2021Generally, however, money is not the type of personal property subject to a conversion claim because it is intangible, fungible, and “belongs to a class of property which cannot be differentiated by specific identification[.]” City of Atlanta, supra (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020The acceptance of that sum of money did not and does not waive Foxfire Acres’ rights to recover additional legal damages over and above said sums.” See generally Long v. McIntosh, 129 Ga. 660 ( 59 SE 779 ) (1907) (discussing special and nominal damages within the context of a conversion claim); Grant v. Newsome, 201 Ga. App. 710, 710-711 (1) ( 411 SE2d 796 ) (1991) (contemplating that a plaintiff in a conversion action may recover, inter alia, lost interest, punitive damages, as well as 15 v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 597 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (“[A] settlement agreement ordinarily extinguis

2020The acceptance of that sum of money did not and does not waive Foxfire Acres’ rights to recover additional legal damages over and above said sums.” See generally Long v. McIntosh, 129 Ga. 660 ( 59 SE 779 ) (1907) (discussing special and nominal damages within the context of a conversion claim); Grant v. Newsome, 201 Ga. App. 710, 710-711 (1) ( 411 SE2d 796 ) (1991) (contemplating that a plaintiff in a conversion action may recover, inter alia, lost interest, punitive damages, as well as 15 v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 597 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (“[A] settlement agreement ordinarily extinguis

2017(Emphasis supplied.) Hamburger, 286 Ga. App. at 388 (4) (punctuation omitted); accord Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. Frame, 269 Ga. 844, 846 (1) ( 507 SE2d 411 ) (1998).

2017Commc’ns. & Research LLC, 274 Ga. App. 807, 811 (2) ( 619 SE2d 481 ) (2005) (holding that an unjust-enrichment claim failed as a matter of law when any benefit conferred on the defendants was triggered by a contract provision, the validity of which was not challenged); Bonem v. Golf Club of Ga., 264 Ga. App. 573, 578-79 (3) ( 591 SE2d 462 ) (2003) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to 57 (c) Conversion As previously explained in Division 3 supra, the former-member appellants’ conversion claim relates to specific transactions that occurred between 1990 and 1997, and, as a result, are barr

2017Commc’ns. & Research LLC, 274 Ga. App. 807, 811 (2) ( 619 SE2d 481 ) (2005) (holding that an unjust-enrichment claim failed as a matter of law when any benefit conferred on the defendants was triggered by a contract provision, the validity of which was not challenged); Bonem v. Golf Club of Ga., 264 Ga. App. 573, 578-79 (3) ( 591 SE2d 462 ) (2003) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to 57 (c) Conversion As previously explained in Division 3 supra, the former-member appellants’ conversion claim relates to specific transactions that occurred between 1990 and 1997, and, as a result, are barr

2017But they have abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of their claim for injunctive relief by failing to cite to any legal authority to support it.109 As to their claim for declaratory relief, Georgia’s Declaratory Judgment Act is to be construed forgivingly, and “all that is required to state a claim for declaratory judgment is the presence in the declaratory action of a summary judgment on defendant’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment where the dispute governed by legal contract); Eastside Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 144 Ga. App. 580, 580 ( 241 SE2d 466 ) (1978) (“Logically, . . . when one

2017But they have abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of their claim for injunctive relief by failing to cite to any legal authority to support it.109 As to their claim for declaratory relief, Georgia’s Declaratory Judgment Act is to be construed forgivingly, and “all that is required to state a claim for declaratory judgment is the presence in the declaratory action of a summary judgment on defendant’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment where the dispute governed by legal contract); Eastside Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 144 Ga. App. 580, 580 ( 241 SE2d 466 ) (1978) (“Logically, . . . when one