conversion claim in North Carolina

2026“There are, in effect, two essential elements of a conversion claim: ownership in the plaintiff and wrongful possession or conversion by the defendant.” Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.2d 744, 747 (2012).

2026Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]here are, in effect, two essential elements of a conversion claim: ownership in the plaintiff and wrongful possession or conversion by the defendant.” Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Sale Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 (2012) (cleaned up).

2023See, e.g., Norman v. Nash Johnson & Son’s Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 390, 414 (2000) (holding that “intangible interests such as business opportunities and expectancy interests [are not] subject to a conversion claim”).

2022Importantly, “only goods and personal property are properly the subjects of a claim for conversion. . . . [I]ntangible interests such as business opportunities and expectancy interests” are not “subject to a conversion claim.” Norman, 140 N.C. App. at 414 , 537 S.E.2d at 264 . ¶ 66 Duffy contends that “existing contracts, orders, payments, and assets of the [Corporation] were diverted to and for the benefit of the New Entity, Camp, and Johnson.” Defendants respond that these assets are either “business opportunities and expectancy interests,” which are not subject to conversion, id., or “contr

2024Defendants contend that these matters should be addressed by this Court now because these issues are interrelated with those raised 8 “[T]he tort of conversion is well defined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.

2024Defendants contend that these matters should be addressed by this Court now because these issues are interrelated with those raised 8 “[T]he tort of conversion is well defined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.

2026We agree in part. 6 “For a conversion claim, damages are determined by the ‘fair market value of the converted property at the time of the conversion, plus interest.’” Heaton-Sides v. Snipes, 233 N.C. App. 1, 5 , 755 S.E.2d 648, 651 (2014) (quoting Bartlett Milling Co., v. Walnut Grove Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C. App. 74, 81 , 665 S.E.2d 478, 485 (2008)).

2026We agree in part. 6 “For a conversion claim, damages are determined by the ‘fair market value of the converted property at the time of the conversion, plus interest.’” Heaton-Sides v. Snipes, 233 N.C. App. 1, 5 , 755 S.E.2d 648, 651 (2014) (quoting Bartlett Milling Co., v. Walnut Grove Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C. App. 74, 81 , 665 S.E.2d 478, 485 (2008)).

2026We agree in part. 6 “For a conversion claim, damages are determined by the ‘fair market value of the converted property at the time of the conversion, plus interest.’” Heaton-Sides v. Snipes, 233 N.C. App. 1, 5 , 755 S.E.2d 648, 651 (2014) (quoting Bartlett Milling Co., v. Walnut Grove Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C. App. 74, 81 , 665 S.E.2d 478, 485 (2008)).

2026We agree in part. 6 “For a conversion claim, damages are determined by the ‘fair market value of the converted property at the time of the conversion, plus interest.’” Heaton-Sides v. Snipes, 233 N.C. App. 1, 5 , 755 S.E.2d 648, 651 (2014) (quoting Bartlett Milling Co., v. Walnut Grove Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C. App. 74, 81 , 665 S.E.2d 478, 485 (2008)).

2022Presumably, the conversion claim (that is, the portion of the claim alleging the conversion of equipment owned by Dunn Foot) is the only claim in the Amended Complaint asserted on behalf of Dunn Foot. possession or conversion by the defendant.” Id. (citing Gadson v. Toney, 69 N.C. App. 244, 246 (1984)). 45.

2017There are “two essential elements of a conversion claim: ownership in the plaintiff and wrongful possession or conversion by the defendant.” Id. (citing Gadson v. Toney, 69 N.C.

2021If a jury concludes that Munn’s denial of access constitutes conversion, then Kixsports “would be permitted to recover at least nominal damages.” Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256 , 264-65 (1981) (reversing grant of summary judgment). 52.

2020See Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 264 , 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (“In this state, conversion is defined as ‘an authorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Peed v. Burleson, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E. 2d 351, 353 (1956)); Horne Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Horne, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 96 , at *9 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2017) (stating that contract rights are “an intangible interest under North Carolina law”).

2022Importantly, “only goods and personal property are properly the subjects of a claim for conversion. . . . [I]ntangible interests such as business opportunities and expectancy interests” are not “subject to a conversion claim.” Norman, 140 N.C. App. at 414 , 537 S.E.2d at 264 . ¶ 66 Duffy contends that “existing contracts, orders, payments, and assets of the [Corporation] were diverted to and for the benefit of the New Entity, Camp, and Johnson.” Defendants respond that these assets are either “business opportunities and expectancy interests,” which are not subject to conversion, id., or “contr

2022Importantly, “only goods and personal property are properly the subjects of a claim for conversion. . . . [I]ntangible interests such as business opportunities and expectancy interests” are not “subject to a conversion claim.” Norman, 140 N.C. App. at 414 , 537 S.E.2d at 264 . ¶ 66 Duffy contends that “existing contracts, orders, payments, and assets of the [Corporation] were diverted to and for the benefit of the New Entity, Camp, and Johnson.” Defendants respond that these assets are either “business opportunities and expectancy interests,” which are not subject to conversion, id., or “contr

2021Co., 80 N.C. App. 692, 695 , 343 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1986). ¶ 49 Appellants concede Defendant Vickrey owned vehicles and hunting equipment located on Plaintiff Woody’s parcel prior to August of 2017, and further concede the personal property was removed.

2021Co., 80 N.C. App. 692, 695 , 343 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1986). ¶ 49 Appellants concede Defendant Vickrey owned vehicles and hunting equipment located on Plaintiff Woody’s parcel prior to August of 2017, and further concede the personal property was removed.

1957This Court said in Pearson v. Assurance Society, 212 N.C. 731 , 194 S.E. 661 : “It (the conversion privilege clause) grants the insured employee a privilege or option under certain conditions therein stipulated.

1957This Court said in Pearson v. Assurance Society, 212 N.C. 731 , 194 S.E. 661 : “It (the conversion privilege clause) grants the insured employee a privilege or option under certain conditions therein stipulated.

2022To the extent that the property that Duffy alleges was misappropriated includes business opportunities, expectancy interests, and contract rights, summary judgment was appropriate. ¶ 67 We also note that Duffy specifically alleges that “Camp contacted existing clients of the [Corporation], providing them with the New Entity’s financial information, and instruct[ed] said clients to refrain from certain payments and billing to the [Corporation] until the New Entity’s information [wa]s in place.” Duffy further contends that “Camp instruct[ed] that certain completed work be placed under new contra

2015App. ___, 762 S.E.2d 477 , 489–90 (2014). {35} Plaintiff’s brief opposing the Motion to Dismiss implies that he alleged a conversion claim against the Moving Entity Defendants.

2016See id. at 85 , 712 S.E.2d at 228-29 (holding that statute of limitations for unjust enrichment and conversion claims applied, rather than statute of limitations that applied to claims seeking relief on the ground of fraud or mistake where heir of estate was in essence pursuing a conversion claim).

2015SREMC contends that Ellen Estate’s UDTP claim, arising from the same factual predicate, is likewise barred, but by a four-year statute of limitations. {65} Plaintiff contends that the Ellen Estate’s unjust enrichment and UDTP claims are premised on fraud or mutual mistake and are governed by the discovery rule provided by section 1-52(9) of the General Statutes, and therefore that the claims did not accrue “until the administrator discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraud or mistake.” (Pl.’s Br. 14 (citing Stratton v. Royal Bank of Can., 211 N

2026For unjust enrichment, the measure of damages “is the reasonable value of the goods and services to the defendant.” Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570 , 369 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988) (citation omitted).

2026For unjust enrichment, the measure of damages “is the reasonable value of the goods and services to the defendant.” Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570 , 369 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988) (citation omitted).

2025In Estate of Redden v. Redden, the defendant appealed a partial summary judgment order that disposed of a conversion claim regarding ownership of a bank account—while also ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff $150,000.00 plus costs; this Court affirmed summary judgment on the conversion claim but remanded on the issue of damages for conversion. 179 N.C. App. 113, 119-20 , 632 S.E.2d 794, 799 (2006).

2025In Estate of Redden v. Redden, the defendant appealed a partial summary judgment order that disposed of a conversion claim regarding ownership of a bank account—while also ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff $150,000.00 plus costs; this Court affirmed summary judgment on the conversion claim but remanded on the issue of damages for conversion. 179 N.C. App. 113, 119-20 , 632 S.E.2d 794, 799 (2006).

2025Partnership v. Johnston, 145 N.C. App. 525, 532 , 551 S.E.2d 546, 552 (2001) (showing that a conversion claim may coexist with a breach of contract claim); Di Frega v. Pugliese, 164 N.C. App. 499, 509 , 596 S.E.2d 456 , 463-64 (2004) (holding the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the conversion claim, even with the existence of a lease agreement).

2025Partnership v. Johnston, 145 N.C. App. 525, 532 , 551 S.E.2d 546, 552 (2001) (showing that a conversion claim may coexist with a breach of contract claim); Di Frega v. Pugliese, 164 N.C. App. 499, 509 , 596 S.E.2d 456 , 463-64 (2004) (holding the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the conversion claim, even with the existence of a lease agreement).

2025In Beck v. American Bankers Life Assurance Company, the defendant appealed a “somewhat ambiguous” partial summary judgment order for the plaintiff in a 3 The cases cited by Defendants that use the exact language “immediate payment of a significant amount of money” are Redden, 179 N.C. App. at 117 , 632 S.E.2d at 798 ; Fifth Third Bank, 217 N.C. App. at 205 , 719 S.E.2d at 175 ; Beasley, 259 N.C. App. at 742 , 816 S.E.2d at 873 ; and Porters Neck, 276 N.C. App. at 99, 855 S.E.2d at 824. -7- wrongful termination claim. 36 N.C. App. 218, 220 , 243 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1978).

2025In Beck v. American Bankers Life Assurance Company, the defendant appealed a “somewhat ambiguous” partial summary judgment order for the plaintiff in a 3 The cases cited by Defendants that use the exact language “immediate payment of a significant amount of money” are Redden, 179 N.C. App. at 117 , 632 S.E.2d at 798 ; Fifth Third Bank, 217 N.C. App. at 205 , 719 S.E.2d at 175 ; Beasley, 259 N.C. App. at 742 , 816 S.E.2d at 873 ; and Porters Neck, 276 N.C. App. at 99, 855 S.E.2d at 824. -7- wrongful termination claim. 36 N.C. App. 218, 220 , 243 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1978).

2025In Beck v. American Bankers Life Assurance Company, the defendant appealed a “somewhat ambiguous” partial summary judgment order for the plaintiff in a 3 The cases cited by Defendants that use the exact language “immediate payment of a significant amount of money” are Redden, 179 N.C. App. at 117 , 632 S.E.2d at 798 ; Fifth Third Bank, 217 N.C. App. at 205 , 719 S.E.2d at 175 ; Beasley, 259 N.C. App. at 742 , 816 S.E.2d at 873 ; and Porters Neck, 276 N.C. App. at 99, 855 S.E.2d at 824. -7- wrongful termination claim. 36 N.C. App. 218, 220 , 243 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1978).

2025In Beck v. American Bankers Life Assurance Company, the defendant appealed a “somewhat ambiguous” partial summary judgment order for the plaintiff in a 3 The cases cited by Defendants that use the exact language “immediate payment of a significant amount of money” are Redden, 179 N.C. App. at 117 , 632 S.E.2d at 798 ; Fifth Third Bank, 217 N.C. App. at 205 , 719 S.E.2d at 175 ; Beasley, 259 N.C. App. at 742 , 816 S.E.2d at 873 ; and Porters Neck, 276 N.C. App. at 99, 855 S.E.2d at 824. -7- wrongful termination claim. 36 N.C. App. 218, 220 , 243 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1978).

2024Defendants contend that these matters should be addressed by this Court now because these issues are interrelated with those raised 8 “[T]he tort of conversion is well defined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.

2024Defendants contend that these matters should be addressed by this Court now because these issues are interrelated with those raised 8 “[T]he tort of conversion is well defined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.

2021See Wall v. Colvard, Inc., 268 N.C. 43, 49 (1966) (“After an act of conversion has become complete, an offer to return or restore the property by the wrongdoer will not bar the cause of action for conversion.” (citations omitted)); Wining Taylors, LLC v. CE Precision, Inc., 2019 NCBC LEXIS 26 , at *9-10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2019) (noting that an offer to return property after demand and refusal does not bar a conversion claim). 51.

2019As such, the Court does not read the fourth exception as eliminating the requirement that “a plaintiff must allege a duty owed to him by the defendant separate and distinct from any duty owed under a contract,” Akzo Nobel Coatings, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 42 , at *48 (quoting Kelly v. Georgia Pacific LLC, 671 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791 (E.D.N.C. 2009)), to avoid the dismissal of a conversion claim under the economic loss rule, see Legacy Data, 889 F.3d at 166 (“[W]here a defendant simply violates a contractual provision and undertakes no independent legal duty, like that of a bailee, the economic loss rule

2019As such, the Court does not read the fourth exception as eliminating the requirement that “a plaintiff must allege a duty owed to him by the defendant separate and distinct from any duty owed under a contract,” Akzo Nobel Coatings, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 42 , at *48 (quoting Kelly v. Georgia Pacific LLC, 671 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791 (E.D.N.C. 2009)), to avoid the dismissal of a conversion claim under the economic loss rule, see Legacy Data, 889 F.3d at 166 (“[W]here a defendant simply violates a contractual provision and undertakes no independent legal duty, like that of a bailee, the economic loss rule

2018App. 321, 331 , 572 S.E.2d 200, 207 (2002) (holding “proprietary information, including customer lists, contact lists, records and historical data” was the proper subject of a conversion claim); Addison Whitney, LLC, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 51 , at *16.