conversion claim in North Carolina

2026“There are, in effect, two essential elements of a conversion claim: ownership in the plaintiff and wrongful possession or conversion by the defendant.” Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.2d 744, 747 (2012).

2026“There are, in effect, two essential elements of a conversion claim: ownership in the plaintiff and wrongful possession or conversion by the defendant.” Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.2d 744, 747 (2012).

2022Importantly, “only goods and personal property are properly the subjects of a claim for conversion. . . . [I]ntangible interests such as business opportunities and expectancy interests” are not “subject to a conversion claim.” Norman, 140 N.C.

2021Ct. 11 Oct. 2017) (“North Carolina law is clear that ‘intangible interests such as business opportunities and expectancy interests’ are not subject to a conversion claim.”) (quoting Norman, 140 N.C.

2024Defendants contend that these matters should be addressed by this Court now because these issues are interrelated with those raised 8 “[T]he tort of conversion is well defined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.

2024Defendants contend that these matters should be addressed by this Court now because these issues are interrelated with those raised 8 “[T]he tort of conversion is well defined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.” Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523 , 723 S.E.

2026We agree in part. 6 “For a conversion claim, damages are determined by the ‘fair market value of the converted property at the time of the conversion, plus interest.’” Heaton-Sides v. Snipes, 233 N.C.

2026“For a conversion claim, damages are determined by the ‘fair market value of the converted property at the time and place of the conversion, plus interest.’” Heaton-Sides, 233 N.C.

2026App. 1, 5 , 755 S.E.2d 648, 651 (2014) (quoting Bartlett Milling Co., v. Walnut Grove Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C.

2014For a conversion claim, damages are determined by the “fair market value of the converted property at the time of the conversion, plus interest.” Bartlett Milling Co., v. Walnut Grove Auction & Realty Co., 192 N.C.

2022Presumably, the conversion claim (that is, the portion of the claim alleging the conversion of equipment owned by Dunn Foot) is the only claim in the Amended Complaint asserted on behalf of Dunn Foot. possession or conversion by the defendant.” Id. (citing Gadson v. Toney, 69 N.C.

2017There are “two essential elements of a conversion claim: ownership in the plaintiff and wrongful possession or conversion by the defendant.” Id. (citing Gadson v. Toney, 69 N.C.

2020See Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 264 , 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (“In this state, conversion is defined as ‘an authorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Peed v. Burleson, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E. 2d 351, 353 (1956)); Horne Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Horne, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 96 , at *9 (N.C.

2020See Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 264 , 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (“In this state, conversion is defined as ‘an authorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Peed v. Burleson, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439 , 94 S.E. 2d 351, 353 (1956)); Horne Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Horne, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 96 , at *9 (N.C.

1957This Court said in Pearson v. Assurance Society, 212 N.C. 731 , 194 S.E. 661 : “It (the conversion privilege clause) grants the insured employee a privilege or option under certain conditions therein stipulated.

1957This Court said in Pearson v. Assurance Society, 212 N.C. 731 , 194 S.E. 661 : “It (the conversion privilege clause) grants the insured employee a privilege or option under certain conditions therein stipulated.

2022App. at 414 , 537 S.E.2d at 264 . ¶ 66 Duffy contends that “existing contracts, orders, payments, and assets of the [Corporation] were diverted to and for the benefit of the New Entity, Camp, and Johnson.” Defendants respond that these assets are either “business opportunities and expectancy interests,” which are not subject to conversion, id., or “contract rights,” which are similarly intangible, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 141 N.C.

2021Ct. 2 Jan. 2018) (noting that “deprivation to the owner” is an essential element of a conversion claim and, therefore, “retention of customer names and contact information” “cannot constitute conversion under current North Carolina law”); Horne Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 2017 NCBC LEXIS 96 , at *9 (dismissing claim for conversion of contract rights, which are “deemed an intangible interest under North Carolina law”) (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 141 N.C.

2016See id. at 85 , 712 S.E.2d at 228-29 (holding that statute of limitations for unjust enrichment and conversion claims applied, rather than statute of limitations that applied to claims seeking relief on the ground of fraud or mistake where heir of estate was in essence pursuing a conversion claim).

2015SREMC contends that Ellen Estate’s UDTP claim, arising from the same factual predicate, is likewise barred, but by a four-year statute of limitations. {65} Plaintiff contends that the Ellen Estate’s unjust enrichment and UDTP claims are premised on fraud or mutual mistake and are governed by the discovery rule provided by section 1-52(9) of the General Statutes, and therefore that the claims did not accrue “until the administrator discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraud or mistake.” (Pl.’s Br. 14 (citing Stratton v. Royal Bank of Can., 211 N

2025In Estate of Redden v. Redden, the defendant appealed a partial summary judgment order that disposed of a conversion claim regarding ownership of a bank account—while also ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff $150,000.00 plus costs; this Court affirmed summary judgment on the conversion claim but remanded on the issue of damages for conversion. 179 N.C.

2025App. 113, 119-20 , 632 S.E.2d 794, 799 (2006).

2025App. 525, 532 , 551 S.E.2d 546, 552 (2001) (showing that a conversion claim may coexist with a breach of contract claim); Di Frega v. Pugliese, 164 N.C.

2019As such, the Court does not read the fourth exception as eliminating the requirement that “a plaintiff must allege a duty owed to him by the defendant separate and distinct from any duty owed under a contract,” Akzo Nobel Coatings, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 42 , at *48 (quoting Kelly v. Georgia Pacific LLC, 671 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791 (E.D.N.C. 2009)), to avoid the dismissal of a conversion claim under the economic loss rule, see Legacy Data, 889 F.3d at 166 (“[W]here a defendant simply violates a contractual provision and undertakes no independent legal duty, like that of a bailee, the economic loss rule

2019As such, the Court does not read the fourth exception as eliminating the requirement that “a plaintiff must allege a duty owed to him by the defendant separate and distinct from any duty owed under a contract,” Akzo Nobel Coatings, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 42 , at *48 (quoting Kelly v. Georgia Pacific LLC, 671 F. Supp. 2d 785, 791 (E.D.N.C. 2009)), to avoid the dismissal of a conversion claim under the economic loss rule, see Legacy Data, 889 F.3d at 166 (“[W]here a defendant simply violates a contractual provision and undertakes no independent legal duty, like that of a bailee, the economic loss rule

2018App. 321, 331 , 572 S.E.2d 200, 207 (2002) (holding “proprietary information, including customer lists, contact lists, records and historical data” was the proper subject of a conversion claim); Addison Whitney, LLC, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 51 , at *16.

2017See, e.g., Thyroff, 8 N.Y. 3d at 292 (“Similarly, electronic documents and records stored on a computer can also be converted by simply pressing the delete button.”). 45.

2017See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300 , 303–04 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying California law).

2017(Compl. ¶ 28.) Having already dismissed the conversion claim, the Court further agrees with Defendants that “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 107 N.C.

2017App. 53, 62 , 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (1992). 22.

2016See id. at 85 , 712 S.E.2d at 228-29 (holding that statute of limitations for unjust enrichment and conversion claims applied, rather than statute of limitations that applied to claims seeking relief on the ground of fraud or mistake where heir of estate was in essence pursuing a conversion claim).

2015This complies with the two essential elements of a claim for conversion.”).) However, the Complaint does not allege that any of the Moving Entity Defendants converted Plaintiff’s property.3 (Compl. ¶¶ 43–49.) The conversion claim is then limited to Brown, and to the extent Plaintiff asserts a conversion claim against the Moving Entity Defendants, any such claim is DISMISSED. v. Plaintiff’s Fraud-Based Claims Are Not Stated with Sufficient Particularity {36} A claim of actual fraud requires: “(1) [f]alse representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3)

2015This complies with the two essential elements of a claim for conversion.”).) However, the Complaint does not allege that any of the Moving Entity Defendants converted Plaintiff’s property.3 (Compl. ¶¶ 43–49.) The conversion claim is then limited to Brown, and to the extent Plaintiff asserts a conversion claim against the Moving Entity Defendants, any such claim is DISMISSED. v. Plaintiff’s Fraud-Based Claims Are Not Stated with Sufficient Particularity {36} A claim of actual fraud requires: “(1) [f]alse representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3)

2015See White, 166 N.C.