conversion claim in Massachusetts

2025In a similar context, we have found that even after a jury trial and entry of separate and final judgment on a non-93A claim, "the subject matter of a c. 93A claim is sufficiently distinct so that a judge sitting independently on the c. 93A claim may arrive at findings different from those of the jury sitting on the non–93A claims." Wyler v. Bonnell Motors, Inc., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 568 (1993).

2024Because the issue may arise in further proceedings in the trial court, we do address one limited aspect of the defendant's response to that claim -- that one coowner cannot seek a remedy for conversion by the other, "since both are equally entitled to possession and the possession of one is the possession of both." Johnson v. Nourse, 258 Mass. 417, 419 (1927).

2024See Lavoie, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 20 - 21. 9 Because the judge's decision was not dependent on the inclusion of David Wojcik as a plaintiff, we need not address the Wojciks' argument that he was improperly dismissed as a party; we need not address the dismissal of the conversion claim because it is not argued in the brief.

2015See Palriwala v. Palriwala Corp., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 663, 669-671 (2005).

2014See id. at 982-83 .

2005Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503, 506 (1869).

2004So viewed, the Bank’s groundless conversion claim was tor tiously used as an “instrument of persuasion rather than a means of satisfaction,” Koonce v. Aldo Realty Trust, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 199, 201 (1979), and constituted an abuse of process. 3.

2002See Princeton Capital Finance Co., LLC v. Marketechs, Inc., 10 Mass. L.

2001See MacNeil v. Hazelton, 306 Mass. 366, 367 (1940).

1993Ross v. Ross, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 502, 508 (1974).

1992As we have said, how *207 ever, the instructions to the jury on the notice to quit were confused and erroneous. 12 General Laws c. 93A, § 2(<z)(1988 ed.), provides: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” Section 1 (b) (1988 ed.) provides, in pertinent part: “‘Trade’ and ‘commerce’ shall include ... the offering for sale, rent or lease, the sale, rent, lease or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed . . . .” 13 On the conversion claim,

1992If GMAC prevails, then Abington will be forced to bring a conversion suit against the drawee bank for payment of the check on a missing endorsement. 8 See, e.g., Middle States Leasing Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 62 A.D.2d 273, 279 (N.Y. 1978) (drawee bank liable to drawer for payment of check without copayee’s endorsement).

1992Aubuchon Co., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 529 (1990). 10 In view of our conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support the conversion claim, we need not consider this aspect of the instruction, although the principles we discuss with respect to negligence are the same. 11 He also instructed that a similar result would follow from a finding of a violation of G.