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8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Stanley G. Miller v. Diane Storeygreen1 sentence2023See id. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Briggsgreen2 sentences2020See Smith v. Briggs, 64 Wis. 497, 499 , 25 N.W. 558 (1885). 2020See Smith v. Briggs, 64 Wis. 497, 499 , 25 N.W. 558 (1885). | 1 | 1 |
Christensen v. Milbank Insurance Co.green1 sentence2010Instead, our reading of these cases comports with Enterprise's assessment that "[t]he 'initial permission' rule is a court made canon that has been adopted by Minnesota courts and applied to interpret both the statutorily imposed owner liability and the contractual liability of an insurer." (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 584-85 (explaining that "[i]n construing the scope of coverage created by omnibus clauses, courts have followed one of three rules: (1) the strict or conversion rule; (2) the initial permission rule; or (3) the minor deviation rule" and that Minnesota | 1 | 1 |
Coulter Corp. v. Leinertgreen2 sentences2006Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not based on information determined to be a trade secret, could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D. 2006P'ship v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 827, 830 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (concluding that to the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F.Supp.2d 652, 658-59 (E.D.Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not based on information determined to be a trade secret, could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F.Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.Mo. 1994) (concluding that only those claims that are premised entirely on a trade secret are abrogated); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455 , 465 n. 3, 9 | 1 | 1 |
AutoMed Technologies, Inc. v. Ellergreen1 sentence2006P'ship v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 827, 830 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (concluding that to the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F.Supp.2d 652, 658-59 (E.D.Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not based on information determined to be a trade secret, could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F.Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.Mo. 1994) (concluding that only those claims that are premised entirely on a trade secret are abrogated); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455 , 465 n. 3, 9 | 1 | 1 |
Paint Brush Corp. v. Neugreen1 sentence2006July 18, 2001) (concluding that claim was not abrogated insofar as it was not based on the misappropriation of a trade secret); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 108 F.Supp.2d 968, 972-73 (N.D.Ill.2000) (concluding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was based solely on misappropriation of trade secret and therefore, abrogated by the UTSA); Paint Brush Corp. v. Neu, 599 N.W.2d 384, 391-93 (S.D.1999) (holding that where a breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on evidence that employee was taking steps to compete with employer while still employed was not abrogated by trade secrets statut | 1 | 1 |
Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. Partnership v. Airtek, Inc.green1 sentence2006P'ship v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 827, 830 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (concluding that to the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F.Supp.2d 652, 658-59 (E.D.Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not based on information determined to be a trade secret, could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F.Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.Mo. 1994) (concluding that only those claims that are premised entirely on a trade secret are abrogated); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455 , 465 n. 3, 9 | 1 | 1 |
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.green1 sentence2006July 18, 2001) (concluding that claim was not abrogated insofar as it was not based on the misappropriation of a trade secret); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 108 F.Supp.2d 968, 972-73 (N.D.Ill.2000) (concluding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was based solely on misappropriation of trade secret and therefore, abrogated by the UTSA); Paint Brush Corp. v. Neu, 599 N.W.2d 384, 391-93 (S.D.1999) (holding that where a breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on evidence that employee was taking steps to compete with employer while still employed was not abrogated by trade secrets statut | 1 | 1 |
Stone Castle Financial, Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co.green2 sentences2006Ill. 1997) (concluding that to the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658-59 (E.D. 2006P'ship v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 827, 830 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (concluding that to the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F.Supp.2d 652, 658-59 (E.D.Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not based on information determined to be a trade secret, could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F.Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.Mo. 1994) (concluding that only those claims that are premised entirely on a trade secret are abrogated); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455 , 465 n. 3, 9 | 1 | 1 |
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp.green1 sentence2006P'ship v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 827, 830 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (concluding that to the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F.Supp.2d 652, 658-59 (E.D.Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not based on information determined to be a trade secret, could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F.Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.Mo. 1994) (concluding that only those claims that are premised entirely on a trade secret are abrogated); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455 , 465 n. 3, 9 | 1 | 1 |
Production Credit Ass'n of Chippewa Falls v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Ass'ngreen2 sentences1996See Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Ass'n, 82 Wis. 2d 5, 10 , 261 N.W.2d 127, 129 (1978) (U.C.C. case); see also Farm Credit Bank of St. 1996See Production Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop Livestock Sales Ass'n, 82 Wis. 2d 5, 10 , 261 N.W.2d 127, 129 (1978) (U.C.C. case); see also Farm Credit Bank of St. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Frantz v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2006P'ship v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 827, 830 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (concluding that to the extent materials did not constitute a trade secret, plaintiff could maintain a conversion claim); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F.Supp.2d 652, 658-59 (E.D.Va. 2002) (concluding that alternate claims, not based on information determined to be a trade secret, could proceed); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F.Supp. 732, 734-35 (E.D.Mo. 1994) (concluding that only those claims that are premised entirely on a trade secret are abrogated); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455 , 465 n. 3, 9 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Methodist Manor Health Center, Inc. v. Py
green
2 sentences2023“Thus, a person may be liable for conversion where the person has exercised control over property even though he or she may be unaware of the existence of the rights with which he or she interferes.” Methodist Manor Health Ctr. v. Py, 2008 WI App 31 , ¶14, 307 Wis. 2d 501 , 746 N.W.2d 824 (citation omitted). ¶42 Third, the fact that Martin might have acted on behalf of Portal Properties or Gilbert is also not a defense to a conversion claim. 2023“Thus, a person may be liable for conversion where the person has exercised control over property even though he or she may be unaware of the existence of the rights with which he or she interferes.” Methodist Manor Health Ctr. v. Py, 2008 WI App 31 , ¶14, 307 Wis. 2d 501 , 746 N.W.2d 824 (citation omitted). ¶42 Third, the fact that Martin might have acted on behalf of Portal Properties or Gilbert is also not a defense to a conversion claim. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Pettit
green
2 sentences2023Unlike a statutory civil theft claim, a conversion claim does not require that the “defendant knew that the owner did not consent.” Id. (citation omitted); see also WIS JI—CIVIL 2200 (2014). 2023Unlike a statutory civil theft claim, a conversion claim does not require that the “defendant knew that the owner did not consent.” Id. (citation omitted); see also WIS JI—CIVIL 2200 (2014). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
METHODIST MANOR HEALTH CENTER, INC. v. Py
green
2 sentences2023“Thus, a person may be liable for conversion where the person has exercised control over property even though he or she may be unaware of the existence of the rights with which he or she interferes.” Methodist Manor Health Ctr. v. Py, 2008 WI App 31 , ¶14, 307 Wis. 2d 501 , 746 N.W.2d 824 (citation omitted). ¶42 Third, the fact that Martin might have acted on behalf of Portal Properties or Gilbert is also not a defense to a conversion claim. 2023“Thus, a person may be liable for conversion where the person has exercised control over property even though he or she may be unaware of the existence of the rights with which he or she interferes.” Methodist Manor Health Ctr. v. Py, 2008 WI App 31 , ¶14, 307 Wis. 2d 501 , 746 N.W.2d 824 (citation omitted). ¶42 Third, the fact that Martin might have acted on behalf of Portal Properties or Gilbert is also not a defense to a conversion claim. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Shister v. Patel
green
2 sentences2023Under well-established Wisconsin law, “an agent who does an act that would be a tort if he [or she] were not then acting as an agent for another is not relieved from liability to an injured third party, simply because he [or she] was acting as an agent when he [or she] caused the injury.” 21 No. 2021AP715 Shister v. Patel, 2009 WI App 163, ¶15 , 322 Wis. 2d 222 , 776 N.W.2d 632 (alterations in original) (quoting Ramsden v. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. 2023Under well-established Wisconsin law, “an agent who does an act that would be a tort if he [or she] were not then acting as an agent for another is not relieved from liability to an injured third party, simply because he [or she] was acting as an agent when he [or she] caused the injury.” 21 No. 2021AP715 Shister v. Patel, 2009 WI App 163, ¶15 , 322 Wis. 2d 222 , 776 N.W.2d 632 (alterations in original) (quoting Ramsden v. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Phelps v. Physicians Insurance
green
2 sentences2021Co. of Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶¶35-36 , 319 Wis. 2d 1 , 768 N.W.2d 615 . 4 The circuit court also wrestled with—and rejected—the conversion claim, but Century is only appealing the theft-by-contractor claim. 2021Co. of Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶¶35-36 , 319 Wis. 2d 1 , 768 N.W.2d 615 . 4 The circuit court also wrestled with—and rejected—the conversion claim, but Century is only appealing the theft-by-contractor claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mueller v. TL90108, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2020Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2018 WI App 52, ¶29 , 383 Wis. 2d 740 , 917 N.W.2d 551 . 2020Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2018 WI App 52, ¶29 , 383 Wis. 2d 740 , 917 N.W.2d 551 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Schwigel v. Kohlmann
green
2 sentences2005Schwigel v. Kohlmann, 2002 WI App 121, ¶ 9 , 254 Wis. 2d 830 , 647 N.W.2d 362 . 2 Kohlmann did not challenge that portion of the judgment associated with the conversion claim. 2005Schwigel v. Kohlmann, 2002 WI App 121, ¶ 9 , 254 Wis. 2d 830 , 647 N.W.2d 362 . 2 Kohlmann did not challenge that portion of the judgment associated with the conversion claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Laverty v. . Snethen
green
1 sentence1922Wilbraham v. Snow, 2 Williams’ Saunders’ Rep. 87; Boldewahn v. Schmidt, 89 Wis. 444 , 62 N. W. 177 ; Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Boldewahn v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences1922Wilbraham v. Snow, 2 Williams’ Saunders’ Rep. 87; Boldewahn v. Schmidt, 89 Wis. 444 , 62 N. W. 177 ; Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522 . 1922Wilbraham v. Snow, 2 Williams’ Saunders’ Rep. 87; Boldewahn v. Schmidt, 89 Wis. 444 , 62 N. W. 177 ; Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.