conversion claim in New York

2026Regarding the conversion claim, derivative plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that defendants acted without authority to take control of property belonging to derivative plaintiffs to the exclusion of the owner's rights ( see Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 [2006]; Lemle v Lemle , 92 AD3d 494, 497 [1st Dept 2012]).

2025On the other hand, Amaan's only purported involvement in this alleged scheme was his receipt of real property that Salman and Zahidah allegedly acquired from converted funds, which is insufficient to sustain a conversion claim as against him ( see Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc. , 8 NY3d 43, 50 [2006]).

2024See Peters Griffin Woodward, Inc. v. WCSC, Inc. , 88 AD2d 883 (1st Dept. 1982 . ) Stated another way, the relevant question when determining whether a conversion claim is duplicative is "if Plaintiff were to recover on each claim, would it recover twice?" See Medequa LLC v. O'Neill and Partners LLC , 2022 U.S. Dist.

2024See Peters Griffin Woodward, Inc. v. WCSC, Inc. , 88 AD2d 883 (1st Dept. 1982 . ) Stated another way, the relevant question when determining whether a conversion claim is duplicative is "if Plaintiff were to recover on each claim, would it recover twice?" See Medequa LLC v. O'Neill and Partners LLC , 2022 U.S. Dist.

2021Where "a conversion claim is asserted with respect to money, the funds must be specifically identifiable and be subject to an obligation to be returned or to be otherwise treated in a particular manner" ( Matter of Clark , 146 AD3d 495 , 496 [1st Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 907 [2017]; Republic of Haiti v Duvalier , 211 AD2d 379, 384 [1st Dept 1995]).

2021Where "a conversion claim is asserted with respect to money, the funds must be specifically identifiable and be subject to an obligation to be returned or to be otherwise treated in a particular manner" ( Matter of Clark , 146 AD3d 495 , 496 [1st Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 907 [2017]; Republic of Haiti v Duvalier , 211 AD2d 379, 384 [1st Dept 1995]).

2013LLC, 74 AD3d 546, 547 [1st Dept 2010]) the $2 million cannot be the subject of a conversion claim here.

2013LLC, 74 AD3d 546, 547 [1st Dept 2010]) the $2 million cannot be the subject of a conversion claim here.

2020In view of the foregoing, the conversion claim was properly dismissed because plaintiff was unable to show triable issues as to CAS's possessory right or interest in the property, such that defendant's dominion over the shares could be deemed wrongful ( Pappas v Tzolis , 20 NY3d 228, 234 [2012]).

2019Where a party's interests in property have been sold, there can be no interference with their property rights and a conversion claim may not be maintained ( see Pappas v Tzolis , 20 NY3d 228, 234 [2012]).

2022The conversion claim was properly dismissed for the same reasons ( see Cronos Group Ltd. v XComIP, LLC , 156 AD3d 54, 75 [1st Dept 2017]).

2022The conversion claim was properly dismissed for the same reasons ( see Cronos Group Ltd. v XComIP, LLC , 156 AD3d 54, 75 [1st Dept 2017]).

2022Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y. , 177 AD2d 277, 279 [1st Dept 1991] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and in any event at trial plaintiff did not show it had "legal ownership or an immediate superior right of possession" to the Napster proceeds over defendants ( National.

2022Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y. , 177 AD2d 277, 279 [1st Dept 1991] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and in any event at trial plaintiff did not show it had "legal ownership or an immediate superior right of possession" to the Napster proceeds over defendants ( National.

2021Even where "possession of the property is originally lawful, a conversion occurs when the defendant refuses to return the property after a demand" ( Matter of White v City of Mount Vernon , 221 AD2d 345, 346 [2d Dept 1995]).

2020The motion court correctly denied the Investel defendants' motion to dismiss the conversion claim as time-barred ( see White v City of Mount Vernon , 221 AD2d 345 [2d Dept 1995]), as the record showed that the claim accrued when the Investel defendants disposed of the diamond in 2013, and did not suggest that the Investel defendants played a part in Milella's alleged scheme to embezzle the diamond in 2009.

2026The conversion claim impermissibly seeks identical damages and is based on identical allegations to the breach of contract claim, requiring dismissal (see also Dragons 516 Limited v GDC 138 E 50 LLC, 201 AD3d 463,464 [1st Dept 2022]; Sebastian Holdings, Inc. v Deutsche Bank, AG, 108 AD3d 433, 433-434 [1st Dept 2013]).

2022Conversion occurs "where 'one who owns and has a right to possession of personal property proves that the property is in the unauthorized possession of another who has acted to exclude the rights of the owner'" Dragons 516 Ltd. v GDC 138 E 50 LLC , 201 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2022]; see also Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc. , 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 [2006]).

2025But contrary to respondents' belief that money cannot be converted, "the funds of a specific, named bank account are sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a conversion claim" ( 3P-733, LLC v Tawan Davis , 187 AD3d 626, 629 [1st Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2025But contrary to respondents' belief that money cannot be converted, "the funds of a specific, named bank account are sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a conversion claim" ( 3P-733, LLC v Tawan Davis , 187 AD3d 626, 629 [1st Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2025“Conversion occurs ‘when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person’s right of possession.’” Family Health Mgt., v Rohan Devs., LLC, 207 AD3d 136, 139 (1st Dept. 2022), quoting Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 (2006); see Pappas v Tzolis, supra. “An action for conversion of money may be made out ‘where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.’” Thys v Forti

2022Although money can be the subject of a conversion claim, it must be "specifically identifiable and segregated" ( Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v Chemical Bank , 160 AD2d 113, 124 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 803 [1991]; see also McBride v KPMG Intl. , 135 AD3d 576, 580 [1st Dept 2016]).

2025“Conversion occurs ‘when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person’s right of possession.’” Family Health Mgt., v Rohan Devs., LLC, 207 AD3d 136, 139 (1st Dept. 2022), quoting Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 (2006); see Pappas v Tzolis, supra. “An action for conversion of money may be made out ‘where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.’” Thys v Forti

2022Although money can be the subject of a conversion claim, it must be "specifically identifiable and segregated" ( Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v Chemical Bank , 160 AD2d 113, 124 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 803 [1991]; see also McBride v KPMG Intl. , 135 AD3d 576, 580 [1st Dept 2016]).

2024Indeed, in some situations a proper plaintiff may be barred from bringing a conversion claim due to the three-year statute of limitations but a breach of contract action, with a six-year statute of limitations, could still be viable ( see Holser v Geerholt , 193 AD3d 1302, 1303 [3d Dept 2021]; see also CPLR 213 [2]; 214 [3]).

2024Indeed, in some situations a proper plaintiff may be barred from bringing a conversion claim due to the three-year statute of limitations but a breach of contract action, with a six-year statute of limitations, could still be viable ( see Holser v Geerholt , 193 AD3d 1302, 1303 [3d Dept 2021]; see also CPLR 213 [2]; 214 [3]).

2024A conversion claim may be based on specifically identifiable money ( see Abraham v. Torati , 219 AD3d 1275 , 1282 [2d Dept 2023]; Petrone v Davidoff Hutcher & Citron, LLP , 150 AD3d 776 , 777—78 [2d Dept 2017]), such as specific settlement proceeds ( see RD Legal Funding Partners, LP v Worby Groner Edelman & Napoli Bern, LLP , 195 AD3d 968, 970 [2d Dept 2021]).

2024A conversion claim may be based on specifically identifiable money ( see Abraham v. Torati , 219 AD3d 1275 , 1282 [2d Dept 2023]; Petrone v Davidoff Hutcher & Citron, LLP , 150 AD3d 776 , 777—78 [2d Dept 2017]), such as specific settlement proceeds ( see RD Legal Funding Partners, LP v Worby Groner Edelman & Napoli Bern, LLP , 195 AD3d 968, 970 [2d Dept 2021]).

2024Having initially failed to oppose defendants' assertion that the conversion claim should be dismissed, plaintiffs now argue on appeal that there is "property at issue," an argument that is not properly before us ( see Pirraglia v CCC Realty NY Corp. , 35 AD3d 234, 235 [1st Dept 2006]).

2024Having initially failed to oppose defendants' assertion that the conversion claim should be dismissed, plaintiffs now argue on appeal that there is "property at issue," an argument that is not properly before us ( see Pirraglia v CCC Realty NY Corp. , 35 AD3d 234, 235 [1st Dept 2006]).

2023Under the circumstances, plaintiff has set forth "a proper case" for a declaration that the 2019 account beneficiary form (designating defendant as sole beneficiary) is invalid and that the 2010 form (designating plaintiff as sole beneficiary) controls, and, on this motion to dismiss, "the merit of the claim is not a relevant factor and the action should be allowed to proceed" ( Law Research Serv. v Honeywell, Inc. , 31 AD2d 900, 901 [1st Dept 1969]).

2023Under the circumstances, plaintiff has set forth "a proper case" for a declaration that the 2019 account beneficiary form (designating defendant as sole beneficiary) is invalid and that the 2010 form (designating plaintiff as sole beneficiary) controls, and, on this motion to dismiss, "the merit of the claim is not a relevant factor and the action should be allowed to proceed" ( Law Research Serv. v Honeywell, Inc. , 31 AD2d 900, 901 [1st Dept 1969]).

2023Plaintiff also sufficiently alleged the elements of a conversion claim, in that he was the rightful account beneficiary, having originally been so designated by his aunt, and that, through undue influence, defendant interfered with such rights, replacing him as the sole account beneficiary ( see Dobroshi v Bank of Am., N.A. , 65 AD3d 882, 885 [1st Dept 2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 785 [2010]).

2023Plaintiff also sufficiently alleged the elements of a conversion claim, in that he was the rightful account beneficiary, having originally been so designated by his aunt, and that, through undue influence, defendant interfered with such rights, replacing him as the sole account beneficiary ( see Dobroshi v Bank of Am., N.A. , 65 AD3d 882, 885 [1st Dept 2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 785 [2010]).

2023Although we agree that the two defendants were not "united in interest" solely because they are husband and wife, the complaint adequately alleges an agency relationship between the two defendants sufficient to impose vicarious liability on defendant for codefendant's acts, including but not limited to Leah having allegedly forged plaintiff's signature on a deed as Shloime's agent and transferring and selling the property in furtherance of the underlying conversion ( see CPLR 203[b], [c]; Higgins v City of New York , 144 AD3d 511, 513 [1st Dept 2016]; LeBlanc v Skinner , 103 AD3d 202, 210 [2d

2023Although we agree that the two defendants were not "united in interest" solely because they are husband and wife, the complaint adequately alleges an agency relationship between the two defendants sufficient to impose vicarious liability on defendant for codefendant's acts, including but not limited to Leah having allegedly forged plaintiff's signature on a deed as Shloime's agent and transferring and selling the property in furtherance of the underlying conversion ( see CPLR 203[b], [c]; Higgins v City of New York , 144 AD3d 511, 513 [1st Dept 2016]; LeBlanc v Skinner , 103 AD3d 202, 210 [2d

2023To prevail on the conversion claim, plaintiff must show that it "had legal title or an immediate superior right of possession to the identifiable fund and the exercise by defendants of unauthorized dominion over the money in question to the exclusion of plaintiff's rights" ( Bankers Trust Co. v Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro , 187 AD2d 384 , 385 [1st Dept 1992]).

2008In order to establish a conversion claim, a plaintiff must show that he had “an immediate superior right of possession to the identifiable fund and the exercise by defendants of unauthorized dominion over the money in question to the exclusion of plaintiffs rights” (Bankers Trust Co. v Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 AD2d 384, 385 [1992]).

2026As we have previously recognized, the commingling of funds does not necessarily bar a conversion claim if the funds in question otherwise remain specifically identifiable ( see Family Health Mgt., 207 AD3d at 146-147 ; Grocery Delivery E-Servs.

2025“Conversion occurs ‘when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person’s right of possession.’” Family Health Mgt., v Rohan Devs., LLC, 207 AD3d 136, 139 (1st Dept. 2022), quoting Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 (2006); see Pappas v Tzolis, supra. “An action for conversion of money may be made out ‘where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.’” Thys v Forti

2026USA, Inc. v Flynn, 201 AD3d 585, 587 [1st Dept 2022]; see also LoPresti v Terwilliger , 126 F3d 34, 42 [2d Cir 1997] ["The fact that the employees' Union dues were not segregated, but instead placed in the Company's general account does not mean that those monies are not a 'specific identifiable thing' for purposes of imposing liability for conversion"]).

2022Our opinion in Grocery Delivery cites to a Second Department case, Petrone v Davidoff Hutcher & Citron, LLP ( 150 AD3d 776 [2d Dept 2017]), to support the conclusion that the commingling of the funds did not render the conversion claim insufficient ( Grocery Delivery , 201 AD3d at 587 ).

2025Plaintiffs never had title, possession, or control of the funds and, while they may have had a contractual [*3]right thereto, "the mere right to payment cannot be the basis for a cause of action alleging conversion since the essence of a conversion cause of action is the 'unauthorized dominion over the thing in question'" ( Daub v Future Tech Enter., Inc. , 65 AD3d 1004, 1006 [2d Dept 2009], quoting Fiorenti v Central Emergency Physicians , 305 AD2d 453, 455 [2d Dept 2003]).

2006Accordingly, the conversion claim asserted against the appellant, who allegedly had control over the sale proceeds, must fail (see Batsidis v Batsidis, supra; Fiorenti v Central Emergency Physicians, supra; Colombo v Sharmas Realty, 174 AD2d 985 [1991]; Peters Griffin Woodward, Inc. v WCSC, Inc., 88 AD2d 883 [1982]).