9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Borengreen2 sentences1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. 1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. | 2 | 2 |
May v. Supreme Courtgreen2 sentences1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. 1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. | 2 | 2 |
Rhone-Poulenc, S. A. v. Danngreen2 sentences1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. 1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. | 2 | 2 |
Mayes v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. 1978See State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 2630 , 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975) (Officers falsely told defendant accused of incest that his daughter had passed a lie detector test); McGee v. State, 2 Tenn.Cr. | 2 | 2 |
Peyton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015For instance, in Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 (D.C.1998), the government’s star witness, whose testimony that he saw the defendants shoot the victim was impeached with his initial grand jury testimony denying any knowledge of the killers, twice volunteered on redirect that he had taken a lie detector test — statements that had, we acknowledged, "a substantial potential for prejudice.” Id. at 65 . 2015For instance, in Peyton v. United States, 709 A.2d 65 (D.C.1998), the government’s star witness, whose testimony that he saw the defendants shoot the victim was impeached with his initial grand jury testimony denying any knowledge of the killers, twice volunteered on redirect that he had taken a lie detector test — statements that had, we acknowledged, "a substantial potential for prejudice.” Id. at 65 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hiltongreen1 sentence2004See, e.g., Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587 , 560 A.2d 1137, 1140 (1989) ("In a long line of cases ... it is universally held that evidence of the defendant’s willingness or unwillingness to submit to a lie detector examination is inadmissible.”); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Me.1981) ("Evidence of the results of a polygraph test or of a witness’ willingness or refusal to take such a test is inadmissible to show a witness’ credibility, regardless of the witness’ reasons for submitting to or declining the test.”). | 1 | 1 |
Kosmas v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587 , 560 A.2d 1137, 1140 (1989) ("In a long line of cases ... it is universally held that evidence of the defendant’s willingness or unwillingness to submit to a lie detector examination is inadmissible.”); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Me.1981) ("Evidence of the results of a polygraph test or of a witness’ willingness or refusal to take such a test is inadmissible to show a witness’ credibility, regardless of the witness’ reasons for submitting to or declining the test.”). 2004See, e.g., Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587 , 560 A.2d 1137, 1140 (1989) ("In a long line of cases ... it is universally held that evidence of the defendant’s willingness or unwillingness to submit to a lie detector examination is inadmissible.”); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Me.1981) ("Evidence of the results of a polygraph test or of a witness’ willingness or refusal to take such a test is inadmissible to show a witness’ credibility, regardless of the witness’ reasons for submitting to or declining the test.”). | 1 | 1 |
Plater v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001It is, of course, the “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.” Plater v. United States, 745 A.2d 953, 959 (D.C.2000) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001See Peyton, 709 A.2d at 72-74 (prompt and complete instruction, rather than mistrial, was appropriate after witness blurted out that he passed a lie detector test); Bennett, 597 A.2d at 27 (indicating that the prejudice to appellant is diminished if the trial court, in response to a motion for a mistrial, instead instructs the jury to disregard the damaging question and answer). 4 *303 In our view, the determinative question here is whether the trial court’s timing of the instruction 5 was sufficient in the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Guesfeird v. Stategreen2 sentences1998The court began by noting that “[t]he results of a lie detector test, as well as the fact of taking such a test, are not admissible.” 480 A.2d at 803 (citations omitted). 1998The court recognized, however, that “[a] reference to a lie detector test in a criminal trial is not ground for reversal if the result of the test cannot be inferred from the circum *70 stances or if the reference is not prejudicial to the defendant.” Id. (citations omitted). 13 The court then explored a number of criteria for assessing prejudice: In determining whether evidence of a lie detector test was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial, courts have looked at many factors. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Cf. Smith v. State, 31 Md.App. 106 , 355 A.2d 527, 536 (1976) ("The difference, if any, between the psychological stress evaluation test and a lie detector test is too minor and shadowy to justify a departure from our prior decision" excluding lie detector test results). 5 . 1995Cf. Smith v. State, 31 Md.App. 106 , 355 A.2d 527, 536 (1976) ("The difference, if any, between the psychological stress evaluation test and a lie detector test is too minor and shadowy to justify a departure from our prior decision" excluding lie detector test results). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Rhema Christian Center v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen1 sentence1987See Rhema Christian Center v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 198 (D.C.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McGee v. State
green
2 sentences1978App. 100, 451 S.W.2d 709 (1970) (Officer falsely told murder defendant that his polygraph test and tests of his clothing showed *259 he was lying); United States v. Bostic, supra; People v. Pendarvis, 189 Cal.App.2d 180 , 10 Cal.Rptr. 923 (1961) (Defendant accused of forging and uttering a prescription for a narcotic was falsely told he had been identified by the pharmacist). 1978App. 100, 451 S.W.2d 709 (1970) (Officer falsely told murder defendant that his polygraph test and tests of his clothing showed he was lying); United States v. Bostic, supra; People v. Pendarvis, 189 Cal.App.2d 180 , 10 Cal.Rptr. 923 (1961) (Defendant accused of forging and uttering a prescription for a narcotic was falsely told he had been identified by the pharmacist). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Pendarvis
green
2 sentences1978App. 100, 451 S.W.2d 709 (1970) (Officer falsely told murder defendant that his polygraph test and tests of his clothing showed he was lying); United States v. Bostic, supra; People v. Pendarvis, 189 Cal.App.2d 180 , 10 Cal.Rptr. 923 (1961) (Defendant accused of forging and uttering a prescription for a narcotic was falsely told he had been identified by the pharmacist). 1978App. 100, 451 S.W.2d 709 (1970) (Officer falsely told murder defendant that his polygraph test and tests of his clothing showed he was lying); United States v. Bostic, supra; People v. Pendarvis, 189 Cal.App.2d 180 , 10 Cal.Rptr. 923 (1961) (Defendant accused of forging and uttering a prescription for a narcotic was falsely told he had been identified by the pharmacist). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences2016In the seminal case of Frye, the trial court excluded evidence that the defendant had taken and passed an early form of a lie-detector test. 293 F. 1013 . 2016A. The Dyas/Frye Test In this jurisdiction, the admission of expert testimony has been governed by the legal principles set forth in Frye v. United States and Dyas v. United States, In the seminal case of Frye, the trial court excluded evidence that the defendant had taken and passed an early form of a lie-detector test. 293 F. 1013 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Proctor v. United States
green
2 sentences2004“Our own case law,” like that of most other jurisdictions, “has consistently reflected an aversion to lie detector evidence.” Proctor v. United States, 728 A.2d 1246, 1249 , amended on reh’g in immaterial part, 747 A.2d 134 (D.C.1999). 2004There are exceptions to that general proposition, however, and polygraph evidence, because of its “peculiarly prejudicial nature,” Proctor, 728 A.2d at 1249 , may be one of them. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Proctor v. United States
green
1 sentence2004“Our own case law,” like that of most other jurisdictions, “has consistently reflected an aversion to lie detector evidence.” Proctor v. United States, 728 A.2d 1246, 1249 , amended on reh’g in immaterial part, 747 A.2d 134 (D.C.1999). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Claim of Ferreri v. General Auto Driving School, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987The Director attempted to distinguish Ferreri v. General Auto Driving School, Inc., 26 A.D.2d 601 , 271 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1966), which held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that an employee’s fatal heart attack, occurring on his way to a lie detector test during a period of suspension, resulted from an industrial accident. . 1987The Director attempted to distinguish Ferreri v. General Auto Driving School, Inc., 26 A.D.2d 601 , 271 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1966), which held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that an employee’s fatal heart attack, occurring on his way to a lie detector test during a period of suspension, resulted from an industrial accident. . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.