43 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nichols v. Stategreen2 sentences2021App. 1964). 26 Id. at 336 . 27 Id. 28 Id. 11 it fair to observe that the only reason that anyone would possibly take a lie detector test would be to determine whether or not they were telling the truth.”29 Turning to Sutton’s case, the same problem exists with the evidence Sutton proffered in his trial. 2021App. 1964). 26 Id. at 336 . 27 Id. 28 Id. 11 it fair to observe that the only reason that anyone would possibly take a lie detector test would be to determine whether or not they were telling the truth.”29 Turning to Sutton’s case, the same problem exists with the evidence Sutton proffered in his trial. | 5 | 17 |
United States v. Richard W. Millergreen2 sentences2012See Nawrocki , 34 F.App'x at 838 (holding the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting polygraph evidence because it was not being admitted for its truth, but rather to prove probable cause); United States v. Miller , 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating "that polygraph evidence might be admissible if it is introduced for a limited purpose that is unrelated to the substantive correctness of the results of the polygraph examination."). 18. 18 Tex. R. 2012See Nawrocki, 34 Fed.Appx. at 838 (holding the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting polygraph evidence because it was not being admitted for its truth, but rather to prove probable cause); United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir.1989) (stating "that polygraph evidence might be admissible if it is introduced for a limited purpose that is unrelated to the substantive correctness of the results of the polygraph examination.”). . | 3 | 3 |
Nawrocki v. Township of Coolbaughgreen2 sentences2012See Nawrocki , 34 F.App'x at 838 (holding the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting polygraph evidence because it was not being admitted for its truth, but rather to prove probable cause); United States v. Miller , 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating "that polygraph evidence might be admissible if it is introduced for a limited purpose that is unrelated to the substantive correctness of the results of the polygraph examination."). 18. 18 Tex. R. 2012See Nawrocki, 34 Fed.Appx. at 838 (holding the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting polygraph evidence because it was not being admitted for its truth, but rather to prove probable cause); United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir.1989) (stating "that polygraph evidence might be admissible if it is introduced for a limited purpose that is unrelated to the substantive correctness of the results of the polygraph examination.”). . | 3 | 3 |
Russell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The Nichols Court stated: “We think it fair to observe that the only reason that anyone would possibly take a lie detector test would be to determine whether or not they were telling the truth.” Id. at 337 ; see also Russell, 798 S.W.2d at 635 (“Clearly, any reference to polygraph or lie detector tests is improper even when the test result is not disclosed.”). 2015The Nichols Court stated: "We think it fair to observe that the only reason that anyone would possibly take a lie detector test would be to determine whether or not they were telling the truth." Id. at 337 ; see also Russell, 798 S.W.2d at 635 ("Clearly, any reference to polygraph or lie detector tests is improper even when the test result is not disclosed."). | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2013When the State moved at trial to admit the recording, appellant’s trial counsel stated “No objection, Your Honor.” 6 In Robinson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned a murder conviction because testimony expressly set out that the State’s only witness tying the defendant to the murder had taken and passed a lie detector test as a requirement of the witness’s plea bargain. 550 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. 1982Twelve years later, in Robinson v. State, 550 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a capital murder conviction on the grounds that testimony that a vital State’s witness had passed a lie detector test constituted impermissible bolstering. | 1 | 2 |
Romero v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) (citing, in addition to other concerns, "the supposed tendency of the trier of the facts to treat polygraph evidence as conclusive on the issue of the guilt of the accused, the lack of standardization of test procedures, and the difficulty for jury evaluation of examiners' opinions.”); Nichols v. State, 378 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Tex.Crim.App.1964) ("The jurors, being lay persons, no doubt felt that the evidence of a lie detector test would reveal the truth...."). . 1973The prosecutor subsequently continued as follows: “Let me just say this, ladies and gentlemen, that is the first time that I heard anything about requesting a polygraph examination, in front of you twelve people.” While evidence of polygraph examinations is not proper evidence in a criminal trial, see Romero v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 206 , and, thus, not a proper subject of argument, we can see no error when appellant himself first mentioned the subject while testifying in his own behalf when he said the following in response to a question from the prosecutor concerning what he had tol | 1 | 2 |
Black v. Stategreen1 sentence2023App. 1961) (“The fact that appellant was given a lie detector test prior to making the confession did not render the same inadmissible.”); Black v. State, 677 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (“[P]romises made to the appellant to induce him to take his polygraph examination did not “taint” nor render the appellant’s confession inadmissible.”), rev’d on other grounds (“pretext” arrest), 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Leonard, William Thomasgreen1 sentence2019See id. at 577, 583 . | 1 | 1 |
Leigh Gomer v. Altha/Ann Steinlage, Donald Davis and Ruby Davisgreen1 sentence2017See id.; Gomer v. Davis, 419 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Robson v. Gilbreath, 267 S.W.3d 401, 407 (Tex. 9 Nor do the reporter’s records provided to us include any objection by Ogle to Hector’s request for attorney’s fees under chapter 10 or rule 13, unless we view his repeated assertions that she had promised to take a lie detector test as including an implied objection that his suit was not groundless. | 1 | 1 |
Robson v. Gilbreathgreen1 sentence2017See id.; Gomer v. Davis, 419 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); Robson v. Gilbreath, 267 S.W.3d 401, 407 (Tex. 9 Nor do the reporter’s records provided to us include any objection by Ogle to Hector’s request for attorney’s fees under chapter 10 or rule 13, unless we view his repeated assertions that she had promised to take a lie detector test as including an implied objection that his suit was not groundless. | 1 | 1 |
Tennard v. Stategreen1 sentence2016However, considering the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ general hostility towards evidence regarding lie detector tests, see Nesbit v. State, 227 S.W.3d 64 , 66 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Tennard v. State, 802 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280, 293 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), we cannot say. that the trial judge’s .decision fell outside the bounds of reasonable disagreement. 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Castillo v. Stategreen1 sentence2016However, considering the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ general hostility towards evidence regarding lie detector tests, see Nesbit v. State, 227 S.W.3d 64 , 66 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Tennard v. State, 802 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280, 293 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), we cannot say. that the trial judge’s .decision fell outside the bounds of reasonable disagreement. 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Ebner v. First State Bank of Smithvillegreen1 sentence2015“The requisites of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise, 2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment.” English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983); Ebner v. First State Bank of 26 Smithville, 27 S.W.3d 287, 302 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
English v. Fischergreen1 sentence2015“The requisites of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise, 2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment.” English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983); Ebner v. First State Bank of 26 Smithville, 27 S.W.3d 287, 302 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Hannon v. Stategreen1 sentence2009In Hannon v. State , the defendant contended the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial after a State's witness, Bobby Jean Jordan, stated during cross-examination that a police officer had given her a lie detector test. 475 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gasway v. State
green
2 sentences1962Gasway v. State, 157 Texas Cr. 1961Gasway v. State, 157 Tex. Cr. | 3 | 1956–1962 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1970Johnson v. Rundle, D.C., 280 F.Supp. 453 . [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . [2] Appellant's ground of error #4 reads as follows: "The court committed material error highly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant in permitting evidence to the effect that the defendant was subjected to a lie detector test or polygraph test as such testimony and any result thereof or purported results thereof is inadmissable as a matter of law." 1970Johnson v. Rundle, D.C., 280 F.Supp. 453 . [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . [2] Appellant's ground of error #4 reads as follows: "The court committed material error highly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant in permitting evidence to the effect that the defendant was subjected to a lie detector test or polygraph test as such testimony and any result thereof or purported results thereof is inadmissable as a matter of law." | 2 | 1970–1972 |
Webb v. State
green
2 sentences1970It should be further noted that in Webb v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 391 , 291 S.W.2d 331 , we said “ * * * the use of the lie detector test as a means of interrogation does not violate accused’s constitutional rights or render the written confession thereafter made involuntary. * * * ” Appellant was arrested one month after the rape in question at approximately 9:00 p. m. and carried to jail. 1970It should be further noted that in Webb v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 391 , 291 S.W.2d 331 , we said "* * * the use of the lie detector test as a means of interrogation does not violate accused's constitutional rights or render the written confession thereafter made involuntary. * * *" Appellant was arrested one month after the rape in question at approximately 9:00 p. m. and carried to jail. | 2 | 1961–1970 |
Hulen v. State
neutral
2 sentences1956This Court has rather recently had before it a similar contention in Gasway v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 647 , 248 S.W.2d 942 , certiorari denied 344 U.S. 874 , 73 S.Ct. 167 , 97 L.Ed. 677 , Paris v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 580 , 249 S.W.2d 217 , certiorari denied 344 U.S. 857 , 73 S.Ct. 92 , 97 L.Ed. 665 , and in Hulen v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 507 , 250 S.W.2d 211 . 1952R. 248, S. W. (2d) 942; and Hulen v. State, No. 25,776, (page 507, this volume), 250 S. W. (2d) 211 , we discussed the taking of a lie detector test as a form of questioning. | 2 | 1952–1956 |
Black v. State
green
1 sentence2023App. 1961) (“The fact that appellant was given a lie detector test prior to making the confession did not render the same inadmissible.”); Black v. State, 677 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (“[P]romises made to the appellant to induce him to take his polygraph examination did not “taint” nor render the appellant’s confession inadmissible.”), rev’d on other grounds (“pretext” arrest), 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bacon v. State
green
1 sentence2017When asked what he told the police, the defendant volunteered that he had asked to “take a lie detector test.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kamisha Davis v. Texas Farm Bureau Insurance
green
1 sentence2017Assuming without deciding that Ogle’s affidavit raised fact questions as to whether Hector agreed to take a lie detector test and whether that agreement was “sufficiently specific and definite” to be relied upon, see Davis, 470 S.W.3d at 108 , Ogle explicitly stated that his dropping the suit and paying her attorney’s fees was not contingent on her taking the test. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Nesbit v. State
green
1 sentence2016However, considering the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ general hostility towards evidence regarding lie detector tests, see Nesbit v. State, 227 S.W.3d 64 , 66 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Tennard v. State, 802 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Castillo v. State, 739 S.W.2d 280, 293 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), we cannot say. that the trial judge’s .decision fell outside the bounds of reasonable disagreement. 4 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Martinez v. State
green
1 sentence2014If the trial court considered appellant’s claims of a deliberate two-step strategy of “question-first, warn-later” under Martinez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Roper v. State
green
2 sentences2009Id. 6 In Hannon v. State, the defendant contended the trial court erred in failing to grant his m otion for a m istrial after a State’s witness, Bobby Jean Jordan, stated during cross-exam ination that a police officer had given her a lie detector test. 475 S.W .2d 800, 803 (Tex. Crim . 2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Kugler v. State
green
1 sentence1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lee v. State
green
2 sentences1990In Lee v. State, 455 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) there was the mention of a warning that the accused did not have to take a lie detector test. 1990In Lee v. State, 455 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) there was the mention of a warning that the accused did not have to take a lie detector test. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Freeman v. Texas Compensation Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1990The Court reasoned that the jury could have felt that this trip was in the course of Freeman’s [sic] employment for Southwestern Bell because the employer would want to know about it ‘because of its responsibility to the public ( 603 S.W.2d at 192 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Garrity v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1986The United States Supreme Court has held in the case of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 [ 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1967) that answers to questions asked of a public employee who faces job termination for refusal to answer cannot be used against the employee in a subsequent criminal proceeding. * * * Small solace to the public employee compelled to take a lie detector test ordered by a superior, when only evidence of his misdeed, whatever it might be, was hearsay or the gossip around the office. 1986The United States Supreme Court has held in the case of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 [ 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (1967) that answers to questions asked of a public employee who faces job termination for refusal to answer cannot be used against the employee in a subsequent criminal proceeding. * * * Small solace to the public employee compelled to take a lie detector test ordered by a superior, when only evidence of his misdeed, whatever it might be, was hearsay or the gossip around the office. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Lewis v. State
green
1 sentence1982Lewis v. State, 500 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Leach v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Rodriguez v. State neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Rodriguez v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Stone v. Earp green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| The PEOPLE v. Prochut green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| People v. Zazzetta green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Fernandez v. State green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Charles v. State green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Braley v. State neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Jackson v. California green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Tyler v. United States green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Frye v. United States red | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Paris v. State neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Paris v. Texas green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Wild v. Atlantic Refining Co. green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Geotechnical Corp. v. Pure Oil Co. green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Theriot v. Commissioner green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Pidd green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.