lie detector test in Maryland

2025The “blurt” the witness made related to a lie detector test she had taken, creating the “unavoidable inference” that “if she took the test, she passed and was telling the truth at trial; otherwise, the prosecution would not have gone forward with her as the only witness.” Id.

2020Compare United States v. Murray, 784 F.2d 188 , 188–89 (6th Cir. 1986) (expecting jurors to disregard prosecution witness’ testimony that defendant was asked to take a polygraph examination “is very close to an instruction to unring a bell”), with Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 656, 659 (inadvertent blurt that another witness took a lie detector test was adequately remedied by curative instruction).

2020Appellant’s Challenge Appellant contends that he “was deprived of a fair trial” because “[t]his curative instruction was not sufficient” to remedy such “highly prejudicial information[.]” In support, he cites Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587 (1989), holding that “a single, unsolicited reference to the defendant’s refusal to take a lie detector test” could not be cured by an instruction to disregard that evidence, given that “the case against Kosmas was not overwhelming and resolution of his guilt hinged upon the jury’s determination of his credibility.” Id. at 589 , 596–98.

2020Appellant’s Challenge Appellant contends that he “was deprived of a fair trial” because “[t]his curative instruction was not sufficient” to remedy such “highly prejudicial information[.]” In support, he cites Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587 (1989), holding that “a single, unsolicited reference to the defendant’s refusal to take a lie detector test” could not be cured by an instruction to disregard that evidence, given that “the case against Kosmas was not overwhelming and resolution of his guilt hinged upon the jury’s determination of his credibility.” Id. at 589 , 596–98.

2010Cf, e.g., Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 410 , 614 A.2d 949 (1992) (concluding that a mistrial was required after mother of alleged child sex abuse victim blurted out that the defendant " ‘was in jail for what he had done to’ ” the victim’s nine-year-old brother); Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 666-67 , 480 A.2d 800 (1984) (concluding that a mistrial was required after key prosecution witness blurted out that she took a lie detector test).

2010Cf, e.g., Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 410 , 614 A.2d 949 (1992) (concluding that a mistrial was required after mother of alleged child sex abuse victim blurted out that the defendant " ‘was in jail for what he had done to’ ” the victim’s nine-year-old brother); Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 666-67 , 480 A.2d 800 (1984) (concluding that a mistrial was required after key prosecution witness blurted out that she took a lie detector test).

1998Although the remarks at issue in Guesfeird concerned references to a lie detector test, the Court in Rainville applied the same factors to “a different kind of inadmissible and prejudicial testimony.” Rainville, 328 Md. at 408 , 614 A.2d 949 ; see also Coffey v. State, 100 Md.App. 587, 599-600 , 642 A.2d 276 (1994)(applying the factors to an officer’s statements that the defendant was found guilty at an earlier trial.) There, the testimony in issue involved a mother’s statement that the defendant, a boarder who was accused of sexually abusing her seven year old daughter, had been “ ‘in jail fo

1998Although the remarks at issue in Guesfeird concerned references to a lie detector test, the Court in Rainville applied the same factors to “a different kind of inadmissible and prejudicial testimony.” Rainville, 328 Md. at 408 , 614 A.2d 949 ; see also Coffey v. State, 100 Md.App. 587, 599-600 , 642 A.2d 276 (1994)(applying the factors to an officer’s statements that the defendant was found guilty at an earlier trial.) There, the testimony in issue involved a mother’s statement that the defendant, a boarder who was accused of sexually abusing her seven year old daughter, had been “ ‘in jail fo

2001“In [circumstantial evidence cases] particularly, to tell a jury of laymen at the very outset of the trial that defendant refused a number of times to take a lie detector test was to create a probable aura of prejudice which would permeate the proceeding to the very end.” Id. at 597 , 560 A.2d 1137 (quoting New Jersey v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255 , 183 A.2d 655, 658 (1962)).

2001“In [circumstantial evidence cases] particularly, to tell a jury of laymen at the very outset of the trial that defendant refused a number of times to take a lie detector test was to create a probable aura of prejudice which would permeate the proceeding to the very end.” Id. at 597 , 560 A.2d 1137 (quoting New Jersey v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255 , 183 A.2d 655, 658 (1962)).

1983In Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 , 75 S.Ct. 55 (1954), the prosecutor, over objection, was permitted to adduce evidence from the victim that he had taken a lie detector test.

1983The successful attempt by the prosecution by the means employed to implant in the minds of the jury the impression that because the witness had voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test prior to trial he must perforce be tes tifying truthfully in the course of the trial, resulted, in effect, in the substitution of a mechanical device, without fair opportunity for cross-examination, for the time-tested, time-tried, and time-honored discretion of the judgment of a jury as to matters of credibility.” Kaminski, 63 So.2d at 340-41 (additional emphasis added).

2013Johnson is inapposite because in that case, the Court of Special Appeals held that a polygraph test may be admissible if it is used in a coercive manner to render a confession involuntary, not where the accused himself made an offer to take a lie detector test. 31 Md.App. at 308 , 355 A.2d at 508 ("We do hold that if such devices are utilized, the State takes the chance that a given jury will consider the device or procedure so coercive as to declare the confession to have been involuntary.”). .

2013Johnson is inapposite because in that case, the Court of Special Appeals held that a polygraph test may be admissible if it is used in a coercive manner to render a confession involuntary, not where the accused himself made an offer to take a lie detector test. 31 Md.App. at 308 , 355 A.2d at 508 ("We do hold that if such devices are utilized, the State takes the chance that a given jury will consider the device or procedure so coercive as to declare the confession to have been involuntary.”). .

2001Guesfeird also discussed Michigan v. Yatooma, 85 Mich. App. 236 , 271 N.W.2d 184 (1978), another case cited by Pantazes, in which one of the two witnesses against the defendant stated that one of the terms of his plea agreement with the state was that he pass a lie detector test.

2001Guesfeird also discussed Michigan v. Yatooma, 85 Mich. App. 236 , 271 N.W.2d 184 (1978), another case cited by Pantazes, in which one of the two witnesses against the defendant stated that one of the terms of his plea agreement with the state was that he pass a lie detector test.

1958In State v. Kolander, 52 N. W. 2d 458 (Minn.), it was held reversible error to allow testimony that a defendant refused to take a lie detector test.

1958In State v. Kolander, 52 N.W.2d 458 (Minn.), it was held reversible error to allow testimony that a defendant refused to take a lie detector test.

1983In Maryland, as in virtually every other jurisdiction that has considered the question, the results of a lie detector test are inadmissible. 1 The fact of taking a test, the willingness to take a test, or the unwillingness or refusal to take an offered test are also generally inadmissible. 2 This principle applies whether the person taking a test, willing to take a test, or unwilling or refusing to take an offered test is a witness 3 or the accused. 4 This principle also applies whether the evidence referring to a test is presented by a witness 5 or the accused. 6 Similarly, a comment made by

1983In Maryland, as in virtually every other jurisdiction that has considered the question, the results of a lie detector test are inadmissible. 1 The fact of taking a test, the willingness to take a test, or the unwillingness or refusal to take an offered test are also generally inadmissible. 2 This principle applies whether the person taking a test, willing to take a test, or unwilling or refusing to take an offered test is a witness 3 or the accused. 4 This principle also applies whether the evidence referring to a test is presented by a witness 5 or the accused. 6 Similarly, a comment made by

2020In appellant’s view, the instruction given here did not “correct the harm because [he] was charged with a crime involving the use of a firearm[,]” so that “[t]he jury “could not simply ignore” having heard from appellant himself “that he had previously been in trouble with another type of gun[.]” Given that the evidence “was purely circumstantial” and “credibility was crucial[,]” appellant argues that “[a]ny perceived taint . . . of [appellant] could only have harmed his case.” The State responds that because “[t]he parties agreed that all the jury heard was that when appellant was 17 years ol

2020In appellant’s view, the instruction given here did not “correct the harm because [he] was charged with a crime involving the use of a firearm[,]” so that “[t]he jury “could not simply ignore” having heard from appellant himself “that he had previously been in trouble with another type of gun[.]” Given that the evidence “was purely circumstantial” and “credibility was crucial[,]” appellant argues that “[a]ny perceived taint . . . of [appellant] could only have harmed his case.” The State responds that because “[t]he parties agreed that all the jury heard was that when appellant was 17 years ol

2020Compare United States v. Murray, 784 F.2d 188 , 188–89 (6th Cir. 1986) (expecting jurors to disregard prosecution witness’ testimony that defendant was asked to take a polygraph examination “is very close to an instruction to unring a bell”), with Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 656, 659 (inadvertent blurt that another witness took a lie detector test was adequately remedied by curative instruction).

2018See United States v. Scheffer , 523 U.S. 303 , 312-14, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) ; A. Shniderman, You Can't Handle the Truth: Lies, Damn Lies, and the Exclusion of Polygraph Evidence , 22 Albany L.

2018See United States v. Scheffer , 523 U.S. 303 , 312-14, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) ; A. Shniderman, You Can't Handle the Truth: Lies, Damn Lies, and the Exclusion of Polygraph Evidence , 22 Albany L.

2015Williams, however, also relies on Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 722 , 404 A.2d 1073, 1082 (1979) in which we stated that there are “limits to the type of police deception which will be tolerated without rendering a confession involuntary, particularly with regard to deception concerning constitutional rights.” In addition to other arguments Lewis alleged that his confession was involuntary and that interrogating officers had stated to him that “failure to take a lie detector test would essentially amount to an admission of guilt” as well as that “asking for a lawyer amounted to an admission of

2015Williams, however, also relies on Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 722 , 404 A.2d 1073, 1082 (1979) in which we stated that there are “limits to the type of police deception which will be tolerated without rendering a confession involuntary, particularly with regard to deception concerning constitutional rights.” In addition to other arguments Lewis alleged that his confession was involuntary and that interrogating officers had stated to him that “failure to take a lie detector test would essentially amount to an admission of guilt” as well as that “asking for a lawyer amounted to an admission of

2013Specifically, in making his finding of manifest necessity, the trial judge noted that “an opening statement is a powerful setting,” and that “in this particular instance, we’re dealing with a statement not ... unexpectedly presented by a witness, but a statement carefully made as part of a preview of the evidence to the jury.” The trial judge further stated, “the statement, in effect, constituted a substitute for the defendant’s testimony ... [and] credibility is central to the prosecution of this case.” Therefore, according to the judge, “there is no way to erase the potential infection of th

2013Specifically, in making his finding of manifest necessity, the trial judge noted that “an opening statement is a powerful setting,” and that “in this particular instance, we’re dealing with a statement not ... unexpectedly presented by a witness, but a statement carefully made as part of a preview of the evidence to the jury.” The trial judge further stated, “the statement, in effect, constituted a substitute for the defendant’s testimony ... [and] credibility is central to the prosecution of this case.” Therefore, according to the judge, “there is no way to erase the potential infection of th

2013See Kosmas, 316 Md. at 593 , 560 A.2d at 1140 (“[E]vidence of the defendant’s willingness or unwillingness to submit to a lie detector examination is inadmissible.”); Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 412 , 326 A.2d at 714 (“[0]pening statements] should not include reference to facts which are plainly inadmissible.... ”).

2013See Kosmas, 316 Md. at 593 , 560 A.2d at 1140 (“[E]vidence of the defendant’s willingness or unwillingness to submit to a lie detector examination is inadmissible.”); Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 412 , 326 A.2d at 714 (“[0]pening statements] should not include reference to facts which are plainly inadmissible.... ”).

2012See United States v. Gantley, 172 F.3d 422, 427-28 (6th Cir.1999) (mistrial manifestly necessary where defendant disclosed during cross-examination that he had taken a lie detector test); Pettigrew v. Hardy, 403 F.Supp. 869, 870 (D.Ariz.1975) (affirming, on habeas review, state court’s conclusion that a mistrial was necessary after the defendant testified that he passed a lie detector test); Ferby v. Blankenship, 501 F.Supp. 89, 92 (E.D.Va.1980) (affirming, on habeas review, state court’s conclusion that, after a witness testified that the defendant was willing to take a lie detector test, a m

2012See United States v. Gantley, 172 F.3d 422, 427-28 (6th Cir.1999) (mistrial manifestly necessary where defendant disclosed during cross-examination that he had taken a lie detector test); Pettigrew v. Hardy, 403 F.Supp. 869, 870 (D.Ariz.1975) (affirming, on habeas review, state court’s conclusion that a mistrial was necessary after the defendant testified that he passed a lie detector test); Ferby v. Blankenship, 501 F.Supp. 89, 92 (E.D.Va.1980) (affirming, on habeas review, state court’s conclusion that, after a witness testified that the defendant was willing to take a lie detector test, a m

2012See United States v. Gantley, 172 F.3d 422, 427-28 (6th Cir.1999) (mistrial manifestly necessary where defendant disclosed during cross-examination that he had taken a lie detector test); Pettigrew v. Hardy, 403 F.Supp. 869, 870 (D.Ariz.1975) (affirming, on habeas review, state court’s conclusion that a mistrial was necessary after the defendant testified that he passed a lie detector test); Ferby v. Blankenship, 501 F.Supp. 89, 92 (E.D.Va.1980) (affirming, on habeas review, state court’s conclusion that, after a witness testified that the defendant was willing to take a lie detector test, a m