lie detector test in Illinois

1967In People v. Boney, 28 Ill.2d 505 , the defendant had been given a lie-detector test and he testified, over obj ection, that it indicated he was innocent.

1967The court stated: “Results of the lie-detector test could not properly be introduced as evidence of either guilt or innocence of the accused, (People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill.2d 302 ,) and the People’s objection should have been sustained.” 28 Ill.2d at 510 .

1977(People v. Nicholls (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 533 , 256 N.E.2d 818 ; People v. Zazzetta (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 302 , 189 N.E.2d 260 .) The rationale behind this rule is the yet unproved reliability and accuracy of this means of ascertaining the truth.

1965The court, citing People v. Zazzetta, supra, in commenting on the introduction of the evidence stated, at page 510: “Results of the lie-detector test could not properly be introduced as evidence of either guilt or innocence of the accused, and the People’s objection thereto should have been sustained.” The Illinois cases show a marked distrust of the value of the use of lie detection for evidence in criminal cases.

2003Frye, 293 F. at 1014 .

2003Frye, 293 F. at 1014 .

1999App. 3d 33 , 560 N.E.2d 983 (1990), for example, the police required the defendant to stand with his legs spread apart and searched him as they left his home, defendant was forced to take a lie detector test after he refused to take one, and the police officers testified that, if defendant had attempted to leave, they might have physically restrained him.

1999App. 3d 33 , 560 N.E.2d 983 (1990), for example, the police required the defendant to stand with his legs spread apart and searched him as they left his home, defendant was forced to take a lie detector test after he refused to take one, and the police officers testified that, if defendant had attempted to leave, they might have physically restrained him.

1999In People v. Avery, 180 Ill.

1999In People v. Avery, 180 Ill.

1992App. 2d 203 , 210 N.E.2d 798 , aff’d (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 289 , 220 N.E.2d 170 , testimony that a witness had taken a lie detector test was held properly admitted; there were no statements about the results of the test.

1992In People v. Martin (1965), 62 Ill.App.2d 203 , 210 N.E.2d 798 , aff'd (1966), 35 Ill.2d 289 , 220 N.E.2d 170 , testimony that a witness had taken a lie detector test was held properly admitted; there were no statements about the results of the test.

1988For these reasons, I believe that this case stands on all fours with People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill.2d 441 , where the defendant "performed" by taking a lie detector test, and is distinguishable from People v. Boyt (1985), 109 Ill.2d 403 , where the defendant merely promised to plead guilty.

1988For these reasons, I believe that this case stands on all fours with People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441 , where the defendant “performed” by taking a lie detector test, and is distinguishable from People v. Boyt (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 403 , where the defendant merely promised to plead guilty.

1978State, stated that the defendant was asked, “[i]f you were guilty, why did you take a lie test?” The supreme court held that: * ° the reply of the witness was not a sufficient ground for declaring a mistrial, even though it conveyed to the jury the impression that the defendant had taken a lie-detector test.” In People v. Flowers (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 406 , 152 N.E.2d 838 , one of the witnesses testified that he was the chief polygraph examiner for the State Bureau of Identification.

1978State, stated that the defendant was asked, “[i]f you were guilty, why did you take a lie test?” The supreme court held that: * ° the reply of the witness was not a sufficient ground for declaring a mistrial, even though it conveyed to the jury the impression that the defendant had taken a lie-detector test.” In People v. Flowers (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 406 , 152 N.E.2d 838 , one of the witnesses testified that he was the chief polygraph examiner for the State Bureau of Identification.

1978Although a polygraph examination clearly may not be introduced as evidence of an accused’s guilt or innocence (People v. Sanders (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 241 , 306 N.E.2d 865 ; People v. Nicholls (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 533 , 256 N.E.2d 818 ), the plaintiff here was the complainant in a civil case, not an accused in a criminal proceeding.

1978Although a polygraph examination clearly may not be introduced as evidence of an accused’s guilt or innocence (People v. Sanders (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 241 , 306 N.E.2d 865 ; People v. Nicholls (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 533 , 256 N.E.2d 818 ), the plaintiff here was the complainant in a civil case, not an accused in a criminal proceeding.

1972The appellant in this appeal cites as error that there was no evidence submitted to the Board as to the qualifications of the person who administered the test, relying on Seneca v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 71 Ill.App.2d 219 , 217 N.E.2d 320 , as malting such evidence a requisite before the results of a lie detector test are admissible.

1972The appellant in this appeal cites as error that there was no evidence submitted to the Board as to the qualifications of the person who administered the test, relying on Seneca v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 71 Ill.App.2d 219 , 217 N.E.2d 320 , as malting such evidence a requisite before the results of a lie detector test are admissible.

1995The jury would have to be off on some other spinning planet to miss it." (Opinion, at 778 of 208 Ill.Dec. at 235 of 650 N.E.2d.) But what could the jury not miss?

1994Recently, in People v. Melock (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 423, 465 , the court held that polygraph evidence should have been admitted at trial for the limited purpose of determining the credibility and reliability of the defendant’s confession because the exclusion of that evidence deprived the defendant of his fundamental right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.

1994Recently, in People v. Melock (1992), 149 Ill.2d 423, 465 , 174 Ill.Dec. 857 , 599 N.E.2d 941 , the court held that polygraph evidence should have been admitted at trial for the limited purpose of determining the credibility and reliability of the defendant's confession because the exclusion of that evidence deprived the defendant of his fundamental right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.

1994Once the juror believes that a law enforcement or prosecutorial decision has been based upon the results of a lie detector test, the damage has been done.” Similarly, in People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 327, 362 , the court had earlier excluded polygraph evidence from a sentencing jury’s consideration in a capital case for the same reasons that polygraph evidence was held inadmissible at trial in Baynes: doubts concerning the reliability of the polygraph and the risk that a jury will find polygraph results conclusive to the extent that the polygraph usurps the function of the jury as trier o

1994Once the juror believes that a law enforcement or prosecutorial decision has been based upon the results of a lie detector test, the damage has been done." Similarly, in People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 362 , 68 Ill.Dec. 935 , 447 N.E.2d 193 , the court had earlier excluded polygraph evidence from a sentencing jury's consideration in a capital case for the same reasons that polygraph evidence was held inadmissible at trial in Baynes : doubts concerning the reliability of the polygraph and the risk that a jury will find polygraph results conclusive to *1032 the extent that the polygraph u

1994People v. Sickley (1983), 114 Ill.

1993(Orenic, 88 Ill. 2d at 510-11 , 431 N.E.2d at 358 .) Here, the trial judge specifically found Pfanz’s testimony about the lie detector test was not responsive and volunteered.

1993(Orenic, 88 Ill. 2d at 510-11 , 431 N.E.2d at 358 .) Here, the trial judge specifically found Pfanz’s testimony about the lie detector test was not responsive and volunteered.

1992App. 3d 122, 132 , 421 N.E.2d 1362, 1370 , a police officer testified that a coconspirator of defendant’s had been given a lie detector test.

1992App.3d 122, 132 , 52 Ill.Dec. 290, 298 , 421 N.E.2d 1362, 1370 , a police officer testified that a coconspirator of defendant's had been given a lie detector test.

1992App. 2d 203 , 210 N.E.2d 798 , aff’d (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 289 , 220 N.E.2d 170 , testimony that a witness had taken a lie detector test was held properly admitted; there were no statements about the results of the test.

1992App. 2d 203 , 210 N.E.2d 798 , aff’d (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 289 , 220 N.E.2d 170 , testimony that a witness had taken a lie detector test was held properly admitted; there were no statements about the results of the test.

1992It has been held, however, that it is prejudicial error to admit evidence that complaining witnesses in a sexual abuse case had submitted to polygraph examinations even where the results of the tests are not admitted. ( People v. York (1975), 29 Ill.

1990(Cf. People v. Townes, 91 Ill. 2d 32 , 435 N.E.2d 103 (unlawful arrest partially evidenced by fact that police asked defendant to take medical examination).) Thedford testified that he told Medina “we were still talking with her son and that I would have to see what would be the decision made on the investigation with regards to the third watch and what would happen with her son.” This does not sound like the description of a youth voluntarily present at the police station over an extended period of time.

1990(Cf. People v. Townes, 91 Ill. 2d 32 , 435 N.E.2d 103 (unlawful arrest partially evidenced by fact that police asked defendant to take medical examination).) Thedford testified that he told Medina “we were still talking with her son and that I would have to see what would be the decision made on the investigation with regards to the third watch and what would happen with her son.” This does not sound like the description of a youth voluntarily present at the police station over an extended period of time.

1988In Kaske, the court held that such evidence “is not reliable enough to be used as substantive evidence in an administrative proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) (Kaske, 96 Ill. 2d at 309 .) The dissent, however, noted that the tests may still serve some purpose: “ ‘Such tests are recognized as having some value in investigation, even though they are not yet sufficiently reliable to be admitted in evidence.’ ” (Kaske, 96 Ill. 2d at 312-13 (Moran, J., dissenting), quoting McCain v. Sheridan (1958), 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 177 , 324 P.2d 923, 926 .) In People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441 , 478 N.E.2

1988In Kaske, the court held that such evidence “is not reliable enough to be used as substantive evidence in an administrative proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) (Kaske, 96 Ill. 2d at 309 .) The dissent, however, noted that the tests may still serve some purpose: “ ‘Such tests are recognized as having some value in investigation, even though they are not yet sufficiently reliable to be admitted in evidence.’ ” (Kaske, 96 Ill. 2d at 312-13 (Moran, J., dissenting), quoting McCain v. Sheridan (1958), 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 177 , 324 P.2d 923, 926 .) In People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441 , 478 N.E.2

1988For these reasons, I believe that this case stands on all fours with People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill.2d 441 , where the defendant "performed" by taking a lie detector test, and is distinguishable from People v. Boyt (1985), 109 Ill.2d 403 , where the defendant merely promised to plead guilty.

1988For these reasons, I believe that this case stands on all fours with People v. Starks (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 441 , where the defendant “performed” by taking a lie detector test, and is distinguishable from People v. Boyt (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 403 , where the defendant merely promised to plead guilty.