lie detector test in Georgia

2014In 1977, our Supreme Court held for the first time that “upon an express stipulation of the parties that they shall be admissible, the results of a lie detector test shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77 ( 239 SE2d 324 ) (1977) (under former law requiring corroboration of victim in rape case, polygraph results admitted per stipulation was sufficient corroboration).

2014In 1977, our Supreme Court held for the first time that “upon an express stipulation of the parties that they shall be admissible, the results of a lie detector test shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77 ( 239 SE2d 324 ) (1977) (under former law requiring corroboration of victim in rape case, polygraph results admitted per stipulation was sufficient corroboration).

1995In Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 25 , 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975), overruled on other grounds in State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76 , 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977), we noted that admissions which are otherwise competent and admissible are not to be excluded simply because the admissions were made after the taking of a lie detector test. [5] The same rule *32 applies to admissions made before commencement of the test.

1995In Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 25 , 214 S.E.2d 514 (1975), overruled on other grounds in State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76 , 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977), we noted that admissions which are otherwise competent and admissible are not to be excluded simply because the admissions were made after the taking of a lie detector test. [5] The same rule *32 applies to admissions made before commencement of the test.

1984In Herlong v. State, supra, 236 Ga. 326 , we found that it was not error to admit testimony by a police officer that an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant after a state’s witness was given a lie detector test.

1984In Herlong v. State, supra, 236 Ga. 326 , we found that it was not error to admit testimony by a police officer that an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant after a state's witness was given a lie detector test.

2005Nonetheless, a court will not presume prejudice whenever a jury learns only that a litigant took a lie detector but does not learn the result of the test. “[T]he mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to result is raised.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) White v. State, 255 Ga. 210, 213 (6) ( 336 SE2d 777 ) (1985) (a police officer’s testimony that the defendant had taken a polygraph examination raised no inference as to the result and thus did not require a mistrial). 1 *169 In this cas

2005Nonetheless, a court will not presume prejudice whenever a jury learns only that a litigant took a lie detector but does not learn the result of the test. “[T]he mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to result is raised.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) White v. State, 255 Ga. 210, 213 (6) ( 336 SE2d 777 ) (1985) (a police officer’s testimony that the defendant had taken a polygraph examination raised no inference as to the result and thus did not require a mistrial). 1 *169 In this cas

2005Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 See also Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 348 (16) ( 519 SE2d 655 ) (1999) (admission of portion *169 of defendant’s statement that he had taken a polygraph did not raise an inference about the result and thus did not require a mistrial); Hayes v. State, 244 Ga. App. 12, 14-15 (4) ( 534 SE2d 577 ) (2000) (statement by defendant’s ex-wife during cross-examination that “I think he was picked up for a lie detector test,” did not raise any inference as to the result and thus did not require a mistrial).

2005Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 See also Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 348 (16) ( 519 SE2d 655 ) (1999) (admission of portion *169 of defendant’s statement that he had taken a polygraph did not raise an inference about the result and thus did not require a mistrial); Hayes v. State, 244 Ga. App. 12, 14-15 (4) ( 534 SE2d 577 ) (2000) (statement by defendant’s ex-wife during cross-examination that “I think he was picked up for a lie detector test,” did not raise any inference as to the result and thus did not require a mistrial).

1977Porter v. State, 237 Ga. 580 (3), supra, reaffirms the Herlong premise that not every oblique reference to a lie detector test is a calamity of such proportion as to wreck the trial.

1977Porter v. State, 237 Ga. 580 (3), supra, reaffirms the Herlong premise that not every oblique reference to a lie detector test is a calamity of such proportion as to wreck the trial.

1999We find that the trial court correctly denied the motion for mistrial. “ ‘[T]he mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised. . . .’ [Cit.]” Carr v. State, 259 Ga. 318 (1) ( 380 SE2d 700 ) (1989), quoting White v. State, 255 Ga. 210 (6) ( 336 SE2d 777 ) (1985).

1999We find that the trial court correctly denied the motion for mistrial. “ ‘[T]he mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised. . . .’ [Cit.]” Carr v. State, 259 Ga. 318 (1) ( 380 SE2d 700 ) (1989), quoting White v. State, 255 Ga. 210 (6) ( 336 SE2d 777 ) (1985).

1996As the Georgia Supreme Court stated in Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 258 (5) ( 455 SE2d 27 ) (1995), “admissions which are otherwise competent and admissible are not to be excluded simply because the admissions were made after the taking of a lie detector test.” Accord Smith v. State, 265 Ga. 570, 571 (2) ( 459 SE2d 420 ) (1995).

1996As the Georgia Supreme Court stated in Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 258 (5) ( 455 SE2d 27 ) (1995), “admissions which are otherwise competent and admissible are not to be excluded simply because the admissions were made after the taking of a lie detector test.” Accord Smith v. State, 265 Ga. 570, 571 (2) ( 459 SE2d 420 ) (1995).

2001Neither did the trial court err by admitting defendant’s post-polygraph, noncustodial statement admitting that he had, on at least one occasion, slept in the same bed with S. P. “[A]dmissions which are otherwise competent and admissible are not to be excluded simply because the admissions were made after the taking of a lie detector test.” Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 258 (5) ( 455 SE2d 27 ) (1995).

2001Neither did the trial court err by admitting defendant’s post-polygraph, noncustodial statement admitting that he had, on at least one occasion, slept in the same bed with S. P. “[A]dmissions which are otherwise competent and admissible are not to be excluded simply because the admissions were made after the taking of a lie detector test.” Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 258 (5) ( 455 SE2d 27 ) (1995).

1976Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718 ( 146 SE2d 776 ); Wallace v. Moss, 121 Ga. App. 366 ( 174 SE2d 196 ); and Cagle v. State, 132 Ga. App. 227 (2) ( 207 SE2d 703 )." The evidence that the witness had been given a lie detector test was admissible to explain the conduct of the officers.

1976Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718 ( 146 SE2d 776 ); Wallace v. Moss, 121 Ga. App. 366 ( 174 SE2d 196 ); and Cagle v. State, 132 Ga. App. 227 (2) ( 207 SE2d 703 )." The evidence that the witness had been given a lie detector test was admissible to explain the conduct of the officers.

2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda

2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda

2016Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 642 (6) ( 522 SE2d 225 ) (1999); Hayes v. State, 244 Ga. App. 12, 14-15 (4) ( 534 SE2d 577 ) (2000).

2016Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 642 (6) ( 522 SE2d 225 ) (1999); Hayes v. State, 244 Ga. App. 12, 14-15 (4) ( 534 SE2d 577 ) (2000).

2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda

2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda

2012Since [Burt] did not further apprise the jury of the results of the test, there is no prejudice. [Cits.] Durden v. State, 274 Ga. 868, 870 (5) ( 561 SE2d 91 ) (2002).

2012Since [Burt] did not further apprise the jury of the results of the test, there is no prejudice. [Cits.] Durden v. State, 274 Ga. 868, 870 (5) ( 561 SE2d 91 ) (2002).

2012“The grant or denial of a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was manifestly abused. [Cit.]” Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 345 (4) ( 676 SE2d 215 ) (2009).

2012“The grant or denial of a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was manifestly abused. [Cit.]” Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 345 (4) ( 676 SE2d 215 ) (2009).

2005Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 See also Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 348 (16) ( 519 SE2d 655 ) (1999) (admission of portion *169 of defendant’s statement that he had taken a polygraph did not raise an inference about the result and thus did not require a mistrial); Hayes v. State, 244 Ga. App. 12, 14-15 (4) ( 534 SE2d 577 ) (2000) (statement by defendant’s ex-wife during cross-examination that “I think he was picked up for a lie detector test,” did not raise any inference as to the result and thus did not require a mistrial).

2005Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 See also Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 348 (16) ( 519 SE2d 655 ) (1999) (admission of portion *169 of defendant’s statement that he had taken a polygraph did not raise an inference about the result and thus did not require a mistrial); Hayes v. State, 244 Ga. App. 12, 14-15 (4) ( 534 SE2d 577 ) (2000) (statement by defendant’s ex-wife during cross-examination that “I think he was picked up for a lie detector test,” did not raise any inference as to the result and thus did not require a mistrial).

2005And even when, because of such an express stipulation, the result of a polygraph examination is admissible, all other evidence concerning a polygraph is “nonprobative, irrelevant and inadmissible.” (Footnote omitted.) Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 385, 386 (2) ( 612 SE2d 518 ) (2005).

2005And even when, because of such an express stipulation, the result of a polygraph examination is admissible, all other evidence concerning a polygraph is “nonprobative, irrelevant and inadmissible.” (Footnote omitted.) Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 385, 386 (2) ( 612 SE2d 518 ) (2005).

1998Fargason v. State, 266 Ga. 463, 464 (2), 467 S.E.2d 551 (1996). 9.

1998Fargason v. State, 266 Ga. 463, 464 (2), 467 S.E.2d 551 (1996). 9.

1995Williams v. State, 144 Ga.App. 130, 135 , 240 S.E.2d 890 (1977). 6.

1995Williams v. State, 144 Ga.App. 130, 135 , 240 S.E.2d 890 (1977). 6.

1993Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 888 (4) ( 293 SE2d 474 ) (1982). 11.

1993Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 888 (4) ( 293 SE2d 474 ) (1982). 11.

1989See Cromer v. State, supra. Polygraph tests are not a reliable source of evidence, and due to this fact, the law only allows them in evidence when both parties stipulate to the admission of such evidence. “ ‘In general, it is impermissible for the state to bolster the credibility of a state’s witness or impugn the credibility of the defendant by eliciting testimony to the effect that the witness or the defendant were administered polygraph examinations. [Cits.]’ ” Wilson v. State, 254 Ga. 473, 476 ( 330 SE2d 364 ) (1985).

1989See Cromer v. State, supra. Polygraph tests are not a reliable source of evidence, and due to this fact, the law only allows them in evidence when both parties stipulate to the admission of such evidence. “ ‘In general, it is impermissible for the state to bolster the credibility of a state’s witness or impugn the credibility of the defendant by eliciting testimony to the effect that the witness or the defendant were administered polygraph examinations. [Cits.]’ ” Wilson v. State, 254 Ga. 473, 476 ( 330 SE2d 364 ) (1985).

1985See Garmon v. State, 167 Ga. App. 781, 784 (6) ( 307 SE2d 298 ) (1983).

1985See Garmon v. State, 167 Ga. App. 781, 784 (6) ( 307 SE2d 298 ) (1983).

1985However, pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-2 the jury may be apprised that a polygraph examination has been administered if necessary to explain an “actor’s” conduct and motives, but only “ ‘when . . . the conduct and motives of the actor are matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are relevant to the issues on trial),. . .’” Cromer v. State, supra, 253 Ga. at 356 (quoting Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867 ( 294 SE2d 482 ) (1982)).

1985However, pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-2 the jury may be apprised that a polygraph examination has been administered if necessary to explain an “actor’s” conduct and motives, but only “ ‘when . . . the conduct and motives of the actor are matters concerning which the truth must be found (i.e., are relevant to the issues on trial),. . .’” Cromer v. State, supra, 253 Ga. at 356 (quoting Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867 ( 294 SE2d 482 ) (1982)).

1983Porter v. State, 237 Ga. 580 (3) ( 229 SE2d 384 ) (1976); Roberts v. State, 243 Ga. 604 (2) ( 255 SE2d 689 ) (1979); Drake v. State, 142 Ga. App. 14 (1) ( 234 SE2d 825 ) (1977); Snell v. State, 160 Ga. App. 74 (1) ( 286 SE2d 52 ) (1981).

1983Porter v. State, 237 Ga. 580 (3) ( 229 SE2d 384 ) (1976); Roberts v. State, 243 Ga. 604 (2) ( 255 SE2d 689 ) (1979); Drake v. State, 142 Ga. App. 14 (1) ( 234 SE2d 825 ) (1977); Snell v. State, 160 Ga. App. 74 (1) ( 286 SE2d 52 ) (1981).