absence of any requirement in North Carolina

2018Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

2018Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L.

2018In defendant's view, the fact that the pre- Miller statutory provisions authorizing the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder lacked a "savings clause" authorizing the imposition of an alternative punishment in the event that the applicable mandatory life without parole sentence was declared to be unconstitutional means that "there was no constitutional sentence for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile on the offense date for this case." As a result, defendant asserts that he "could not b

2018In defendant's view, the fact that the pre- Miller statutory provisions authorizing the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder lacked a "savings clause" authorizing the imposition of an alternative punishment in the event that the applicable mandatory life without parole sentence was declared to be unconstitutional means that "there was no constitutional sentence for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile on the offense date for this case." As a result, defendant asserts that he "could not b

2018As a result of the fact that the statutory provisions at issue in this case require consideration of the factors enunciated in Miller and its progeny and the fact that Miller and its progeny indicate that life without parole sentences for juveniles should be exceedingly rare and reserved for specifically described individuals, we see no basis for concluding that the absence of any requirement that the sentencing authority find the existence of aggravating circumstances or make any other narrowing findings prior to determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole upon a juvenile

2018As a result of the fact that the statutory provisions at issue in this case require consideration of the factors enunciated in Miller and its progeny and the fact that Miller and its progeny indicate that life without parole sentences for juveniles should be exceedingly rare and reserved for specifically described individuals, we see no basis for concluding that the absence of any requirement that the sentencing authority find the existence of aggravating circumstances or make any other narrowing findings prior to determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole upon a juvenile

2018In defendant's view, the fact that the pre- Miller statutory provisions authorizing the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder lacked a "savings clause" authorizing the imposition of an alternative punishment in the event that the applicable mandatory life without parole sentence was declared to be unconstitutional means that "there was no constitutional sentence for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile on the offense date for this case." As a result, defendant asserts that he "could not b

2018In defendant's view, the fact that the pre- Miller statutory provisions authorizing the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder lacked a "savings clause" authorizing the imposition of an alternative punishment in the event that the applicable mandatory life without parole sentence was declared to be unconstitutional means that "there was no constitutional sentence for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile on the offense date for this case." As a result, defendant asserts that he "could not b

2018In defendant's view, the fact that the pre- Miller statutory provisions authorizing the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder lacked a "savings clause" authorizing the imposition of an alternative punishment in the event that the applicable mandatory life without parole sentence was declared to be unconstitutional means that "there was no constitutional sentence for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile on the offense date for this case." As a result, defendant asserts that he "could not b

2018In defendant's view, the fact that the pre- Miller statutory provisions authorizing the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon juveniles convicted of first-degree murder lacked a "savings clause" authorizing the imposition of an alternative punishment in the event that the applicable mandatory life without parole sentence was declared to be unconstitutional means that "there was no constitutional sentence for first-degree murder committed by a juvenile on the offense date for this case." As a result, defendant asserts that he "could not b

2014The warrant charging Defendant with contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile alleged, in pertinent part, that “the defendant named above unlawfully and willfully did knowingly, while at least 16 years of age, cause[], encourage, and aid [Jessica], age 8 years, ajuvenile, to commit an act, consume alcoholic beverage, whereby that juvenile could be adjudicated abused and neglected.” In his brief, Defendant argues, in reliance upon State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 107 , 253 S.E.2d 890 894 (stating that “[i]t has long been the law of this state that a defendant must be convicted, if con

2014The warrant charging Defendant with contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile alleged, in pertinent part, that “the defendant named above unlawfully and willfully did knowingly, while at least 16 years of age, cause[], encourage, and aid [Jessica], age 8 years, ajuvenile, to commit an act, consume alcoholic beverage, whereby that juvenile could be adjudicated abused and neglected.” In his brief, Defendant argues, in reliance upon State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 107 , 253 S.E.2d 890 894 (stating that “[i]t has long been the law of this state that a defendant must be convicted, if con

2014The warrant charging Defendant with contributing to the abuse or neglect of a juvenile alleged, in pertinent part, that “the defendant named above unlawfully and willfully did knowingly, while at least 16 years of age, cause[], encourage, and aid [Jessica], age 8 years, ajuvenile, to commit an act, consume alcoholic beverage, whereby that juvenile could be adjudicated abused and neglected.” In his brief, Defendant argues, in reliance upon State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 107 , 253 S.E.2d 890 894 (stating that “[i]t has long been the law of this state that a defendant must be convicted, if con

1993Smith v. Smith, 104 N.C.

1972In State v. Bentley, 223 N.C. 563 , 27 S. E.2d 738 (1943), the court did not submit whether the defendant was guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon; the jury returned the verdict of guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon on its own initiative and in the absence of any instruction that this was a permissible verdict.

1972In State v. Bentley, 223 N.C. 563 , 27 S. E.2d 738 (1943), the court did not submit whether the defendant was guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon; the jury returned the verdict of guilty of an assault with a deadly weapon on its own initiative and in the absence of any instruction that this was a permissible verdict.

1906R. , 136 Ind. 366 , Howard, C.

1904And as a mortgagee is a trustee, as held in Bobbitt v. Stanton, 120 N. C., 253 , and cases therein cited, a court of equity will compel him to faithfully execute his trust or surrender the trust property.

1893These cases do but at the most decide that where the husband and wife are living together the former, after issue born, may sue alone for the possession of the wife’s land (Wilson v. Arentz, 70 N. C., 670 ), or for the rents and profits thereof; and that the latter, in the absence of any claim on the part of the wife, is the owner of the same.