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45 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1899–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2011See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79 , 797 N.E.2d at 638 . 2011See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79 , 797 N.E.2d at 638 . | 4 | 4 |
Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2019(Even though we conclude that structural error is not present in this case, we note that the United States Supreme Court recently explained the "concept of structural error" in Weaver v. Massachusetts , 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-08, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), and we have doubts whether defendant's structural error claims could ever meet the standards the Court explained in its discussion of structural error.) ¶ 88 To put Justice Holdridge's dissent in context, we will discuss the facts in McKinley . 2019(Even though we conclude that structural error is not present in this case, we note that the United States Supreme Court recently explained the "concept of structural error" in Weaver v. Massachusetts , 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 1907-08, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), and we have doubts whether defendant's structural error claims could ever meet the standards the Court explained in its discussion of structural error.) ¶ 88 To put Justice Holdridge's dissent in context, we will discuss the facts in McKinley . | 2 | 4 |
People v. Jihangreen1 sentence2025Mendez v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL App (1st) 211513, ¶ 29 ; see People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 385-86 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mendenhallgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., id. (noting that, when considering whether a challenged incident was a consensual encounter or a seizure, the absence of any factors such as the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person, or using language or tone compelling the individual to comply with the officer’s request, is highly instructive on the issue of whether a seizure occurred (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Almondgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., id. (noting that, when considering whether a challenged incident was a consensual encounter or a seizure, the absence of any factors such as the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person, or using language or tone compelling the individual to comply with the officer’s request, is highly instructive on the issue of whether a seizure occurred (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2021See Thompson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122265, ¶ 34 . ¶ 23 Generally, a prior consistent statement made by a witness constitutes inadmissible hearsay, which cannot be used to bolster a witness’s testimony or unfairly enhance the credibility of the witness. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Neimangreen2 sentences1973See People v. Neiman, 90 Ill.App.2d 337, 342-346 , 232 N.E.2d 805 , and People v. Curtis, 7 Ill.App.3d 520 , 525-526, 288 N.E.2d 35 . 1973See People v. Neiman, 90 Ill.App.2d 337, 342-346 , 232 N.E.2d 805 , and People v. Curtis, 7 Ill.App.3d 520 , 525-526, 288 N.E.2d 35 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Curtisgreen2 sentences1973See People v. Neiman, 90 Ill.App.2d 337, 342-346 , 232 N.E.2d 805 , and People v. Curtis, 7 Ill.App.3d 520 , 525-526, 288 N.E.2d 35 . 1973See People v. Neiman, 90 Ill.App.2d 337, 342-346 , 232 N.E.2d 805 , and People v. Curtis, 7 Ill.App.3d 520 , 525-526, 288 N.E.2d 35 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2021In the absence of any error, there is no need to address the oft-cited two-pronged test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), i.e., (1) that - 12 - counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. 2021In the absence of any error, there is no need to address the oft-cited two-pronged test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), i.e., - 13 - (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Landmarks Preservation Council v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences2010Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 179-80 , 531 N.E.2d at 15-16 . 2010Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 179-80 , 531 N.E.2d at 15-16 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Jeffers
green
2 sentences2010Jeffers, 239 Ill. 2010Jeffers, 239 Ill. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Shepard v. United States
green
2 sentences2005Taylor , therefore, anticipated the rule later articulated in Jones and Apprendi that any fact, other than a prior conviction, sufficient to extend a defendant’s sentence must be found by a jury “in the absence of any waiver of rights by the defendant.” Shepard , 544 U.S. at __ , 161 L. 2005Taylor, therefore, anticipated the rule later articulated in Jones and Apprendi that any fact, other than a prior conviction, sufficient to extend a defendant’s sentence must be found by a jury “in the absence of any waiver of rights by the defendant.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24 , 161 L. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Rack v. Chicago City Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1925(Rack v. Chicago City Railway Co. 173 Ill. 289 .) This rule was invoked by the plaintiffs in error in their defense of the case. 1912Co., 173 Ill. 289 , where a boy four years and seven months old was injured under somewhat like circumstances, it was held that until the boy indicated an intention to cross the track the gripman was not required to stop or slacken the speed of his train, and that if upon seeing the boy start to run across the track the gripman stopped the train as soon as possible the defendant was not chargeable with negligence, in the absence of any claim that the train was not properly equipped with brakes. | 2 | 1912–1925 |
Mendez v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2025Mendez v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL App (1st) 211513, ¶ 29 ; see People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 385-86 (1989). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Watson
green
1 sentence2023Watson, 423 U.S. at 417 . ¶ 25 In the absence of any exception to the lockstep doctrine, we construe the search and seizure clause of our state constitution in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment on the issues of warrantless arrests. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence2014CONCLUSION ¶ 91 We hold that (1) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly committed felony criminal damage to property, which formed the basis of the armed violence convictions, when he discharged the firearm and struck the two vehicles; (2) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly discharged the firearm “at or into” the houses that were struck and that defendant knew or should have known that they were occupied; (3) the - 29 - 2014 IL App (2d) 130148 State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Brady Elementary was operating as a school on | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Siegel v. Levy Organization Development Co.
green
1 sentence1993Siegel v. Levy Organization Development Co. (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 534 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Ricardo Trevino v. Union Pacific Railroad Company and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company
green
1 sentence1992Co. (7th Cir.1990), 916 F.2d 1230 .) This doctrine provides that a train stopped at a crossing is held to be adequate notice and warning of its presence to any traveler who is in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and the railroad is under no duty to provide additional signs, signals or warnings. ( Dunn, 127 Ill.2d at 357 , 130 Ill.Dec. at 412 , 537 N.E.2d at 741 .) While acknowledging that rule, plaintiff contends that it applies only to situations where there was an absence of any warning device. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Dunn v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
green
2 sentences1992Co. (7th Cir.1990), 916 F.2d 1230 .) This doctrine provides that a train stopped at a crossing is held to be adequate notice and warning of its presence to any traveler who is in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and the railroad is under no duty to provide additional signs, signals or warnings. ( Dunn, 127 Ill.2d at 357 , 130 Ill.Dec. at 412 , 537 N.E.2d at 741 .) While acknowledging that rule, plaintiff contends that it applies only to situations where there was an absence of any warning device. 1992Co. (7th Cir.1990), 916 F.2d 1230 .) This doctrine provides that a train stopped at a crossing is held to be adequate notice and warning of its presence to any traveler who is in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and the railroad is under no duty to provide additional signs, signals or warnings. ( Dunn, 127 Ill.2d at 357 , 130 Ill.Dec. at 412 , 537 N.E.2d at 741 .) While acknowledging that rule, plaintiff contends that it applies only to situations where there was an absence of any warning device. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Clark v. Morris
green
1 sentence1991The Clark court initially noted that due process is not an inflexible, technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances, and that in cases of disciplinary suspensions, the “procedures required to provide due process follow determination of the governmental function, as well as the private interest that is affected.” ( 99 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Lutwak v. United States
green
1 sentence1990In People v. Davis (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 554, 558-59 , 264 N.E.2d 140 ,. 142-43, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule as follows: “As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 , 97 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
The PEOPLE v. Davis
green
2 sentences1990In People v. Davis (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 554, 558-59 , 264 N.E.2d 140 ,. 142-43, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule as follows: “As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 , 97 L. 1990In People v. Davis (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 554, 558-59 , 264 N.E.2d 140 ,. 142-43, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule as follows: “As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 , 97 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Carlson
green
2 sentences1986(People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 230-31 , 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 , 404 N.E.2d 233, 238 .) We cannot allow defendant to profit through his own failure to act, whether that act be intentional or inadvertent, by considering his contention on appeal in the absence of any error substantially affecting his rights when that error could have been corrected or properly handled at trial. 1986(People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 230-31 , 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 , 404 N.E.2d 233, 238 .) We cannot allow defendant to profit through his own failure to act, whether that act be intentional or inadvertent, by considering his contention on appeal in the absence of any error substantially affecting his rights when that error could have been corrected or properly handled at trial. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Baynes
green
2 sentences1986(People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 230-31 , 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 , 404 N.E.2d 233, 238 .) We cannot allow defendant to profit through his own failure to act, whether that act be intentional or inadvertent, by considering his contention on appeal in the absence of any error substantially affecting his rights when that error could have been corrected or properly handled at trial. 1986(People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 230-31 , 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 ; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576 , 404 N.E.2d 233, 238 .) We cannot allow defendant to profit through his own failure to act, whether that act be intentional or inadvertent, by considering his contention on appeal in the absence of any error substantially affecting his rights when that error could have been corrected or properly handled at trial. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Raymond Scotland and St. Clair Springette. Appeal of St. Clair Springette
green
2 sentences1984The Cooper view was not accepted in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scotland (3d Cir.1980), 614 F.2d 360 , in the absence of any claim there that the defendant had relied on the agreement to his detriment. 1984The Cooper view was not accepted in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scotland (3d Cir. 1980), 614 F.2d 360 , in the absence of any claim there that the defendant had relied on the agreement to his detriment. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Mordican
green
2 sentences1981To have denied defendant another hearing, as the State urged, “would be to insulate from review a trial court ruling admitting evidence without which, in many cases, the trial might end in acquittal.” ( 64 Ill. 2d 257, 262 , 356 N.E.2d 71, 74 .) It is noteworthy that in Mordican, the preclusion of defendant from access to a reviewing forum as a result of his acquittal was by itself sufficient to entitle him to a second suppression hearing on a separate charge, even in the absence of any claim of additional evidence. 1981To have denied defendant another hearing, as the State urged, “would be to insulate from review a trial court ruling admitting evidence without which, in many cases, the trial might end in acquittal.” ( 64 Ill. 2d 257, 262 , 356 N.E.2d 71, 74 .) It is noteworthy that in Mordican, the preclusion of defendant from access to a reviewing forum as a result of his acquittal was by itself sufficient to entitle him to a second suppression hearing on a separate charge, even in the absence of any claim of additional evidence. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Ligon
green
2 sentences1979The court concluded: * * In the absence of any defense explanation, we therefore find it reasonable to conclude that his escape and flight under those circumstances were related to the murder charge rather than whatever other unknown (to this record) charge might have been pending against him, and that the evidence thereof was properly admitted to be considered by the jury in connection with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence as tending to prove guilt. * * V’ 15 Ill. 1979App. 3d 746, 751 , 305 N.E.2d 212, 217 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Slovinski v. Beasley
neutral
2 sentences1976In Slovinski v. Beasley, 316 Ill.App. 273 , 45 N.E.2d 42 , it is stated: “It has been repeatedly held that evidence or instructions going to the measure of damages, where the amount is not questioned as excessive, will not work a reversal, because, errors therein, if any, are harmless. 1976In Slovinski v. Beasley, 316 Ill.App. 273 , 45 N.E.2d 42 , it is stated: “It has been repeatedly held that evidence or instructions going to the measure of damages, where the amount is not questioned as excessive, will not work a reversal, because, errors therein, if any, are harmless. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Yeates v. Illinois Central Railroad
green
1 sentence1937Co., 241 Ill. 205 : “It is the duty of a master conducting a business with different branches, to make, publish 'and enforce reasonable rules and regulations to promote the safety of servants, but in the absence of any rule governing a particular situation it is proper to consider the existence of an established custom with respect thereto.” Counsel for the defense rely upon Rule 93, which provides as follows: “93. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Bonardo v. People
green
1 sentence1923Bonardo v. People, 182 Ill. 411 ; People v. Schoop, 288 id. 44; People v. Grosenheider, 266 id. 324; People v. Capello, 282 id. 542; Graham v. People, 115 id. 566. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Mead v. Mead neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Danforth v. Danforth green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| Quinn v. North American Union neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Trotter v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Board of Education v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of Normal neutral | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Star Brewery Co. v. Primas green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Ptacek v. People ex rel. Deneen neutral | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Consolidated Coal Co. of St. louis v. Gruber neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Norton Bros. v. Nadebok green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Pittsburg Bridge Co. v. Walker neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| City of Alton v. Foster neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Jones v. Village of Milford neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Hawley v. Huth neutral | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Chicago & Alton Railroad v. May green | 1 | 1901–1901 |
| Keightlinger v. Egan green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Plaut v. Young neutral | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.