absence of any claim in Utah

2024Given the absence of any error at all, we need not explore the prejudice prong to resolve the plain error issue, see State v. Fouse, 2014 UT App 29, ¶ 28 , 319 P.3d 778 (“Because we determine that no error occurred, we do not reach the remaining prongs of plain error analysis.”), but we choose to do so here because we resolve the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel below, in part, on the basis of lack of prejudice. ¶19 First, given the heinous and extensive nature of the sexual abuse Orton inflicted on his victims, there is no reasonable probability that he would have received a more fa

2024Given the absence of any error at all, we need not explore the prejudice prong to resolve the plain error issue, see State v. Fouse, 2014 UT App 29, ¶ 28 , 319 P.3d 778 (“Because we determine that no error occurred, we do not reach the remaining prongs of plain error analysis.”), but we choose to do so here because we resolve the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel below, in part, on the basis of lack of prejudice. ¶19 First, given the heinous and extensive nature of the sexual abuse Orton inflicted on his victims, there is no reasonable probability that he would have received a more fa

2024This procedure is available only for findings of fact that are “necessary for the appellate court’s determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶28 Goodall invokes our court’s “inherent authority” in making his request that, despite the absence of any rule allowing it, we create a rule permitting remand for a prosecutorial misconduct claim.

2011The trial judge, in fact, seemed to have had just this presumption in mind when he alluded to the fact that he would not have admitted the prior conviction in a jury trial but that its admission "would [not] be prejudicial in terms of [the court] being the [fact-finder] in this case." And with this presumption in mind, we now consider whether there is "a reasonable likelihood that [in the absence of any error in admission,] there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶ 17 , 999 P.2d 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011The trial judge, in fact, seemed to have had just this presumption in mind when he alluded to the fact that he would not have admitted the prior conviction in a jury trial but that its admission "would [not] be prejudicial in terms of [the court] being the [fact-finder] in this case." And with this presumption in mind, we now consider whether there is "a reasonable likelihood that [in the absence of any error in admission,] there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶ 17 , 999 P.2d 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1982I concur in the affirmance solely because the issue of unreasonable discrimination under Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution has not been raised on this appeal and because the Court declines to reassess State v. Beorchia, Utah, 530 P.2d 813 (1974), a case which should be reassessed because of the absence of any analysis in support of the conclusion there reached.

1982Self-defense simply is not a defense to a charge of possession. *684 I concur in the affirmance solely because the issue of unreasonable discrimination under Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution has not been raised on this appeal and because the Court declines to reassess State v. Beorchia, Utah, 530 P.2d 813 (1974), a case which should be reassessed because of the absence of any analysis in support of the conclusion there reached.

1944Damages can be allowed plaintiff only as an incident to the right of possession, Mc Cleary v. Crowley, 22 Mont. 245 , 56 P. 227 ; in the absence of any claim to recover possession there can be no award of damages, Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484 , 82 P. 754 ; 36 C.

1944Damages can be allowed plaintiff only as an incident to the right of possession, Mc Cleary v. Crowley, 22 Mont. 245 , 56 P. 227 ; in the absence of any claim to recover possession there can be no award of damages, Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484 , 82 P. 754 ; 36 C.

1944Damages can be allowed plaintiff only as an incident to the right of possession, Mc Cleary v. Crowley, 22 Mont. 245 , 56 P. 227 ; in the absence of any claim to recover possession there can be no award of damages, Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484 , 82 P. 754 ; 36 C.

1944Damages can be allowed plaintiff only as an incident to the right of possession, Mc Cleary v. Crowley, 22 Mont. 245 , 56 P. 227 ; in the absence of any claim to recover possession there can be no award of damages, Stevens v. Jones, 40 Wash. 484 , 82 P. 754 ; 36 C.

1933To that effect too is the case of Place v. City of Yonkers, 43 App. Div. 380 , 60 N. Y.

1919The term “ incumbrance/ ’ as used in a deed of conveyance, must be held and is generally regarded and interpreted to mean “every right to or interest in the land which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee by the' conveyance.” Rawle on Covenants of Title (5th Ed.) section 75; Post v. Campau, 42 Mich. 90 , 3 N. W. 272 .

1919The term “ incumbrance/ ’ as used in a deed of conveyance, must be held and is generally regarded and interpreted to mean “every right to or interest in the land which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee by the' conveyance.” Rawle on Covenants of Title (5th Ed.) section 75; Post v. Campau, 42 Mich. 90 , 3 N. W. 272 .

1917That such is the law is clearly held in the case of Connell v. Higgins, 170 Cal. 541 , 150 Pac. 769 .

1917That such is the law is clearly held in the case of Connell v. Higgins, 170 Cal. 541 , 150 Pac. 769 .