absence of any claim in Texas

1998Prior to evidence being presented at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, appellant objected to the admission of the audio portion of the videotape on the basis that it contained incriminating statements that were made as a result of custodial interrogation and in the absence of any warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1998Prior to evidence being presented at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, appellant objected to the admission of the audio portion of the videotape on the basis that it contained incriminating statements that were made as a result of custodial interrogation and in the absence of any warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2023We disagree. 13 In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Lopez, we reversed an order granting class certification because “the trial court did not identify the specific causes of action to be decided in [the] case, nor did it indicate how they would be tried or the substantive issues that would control their disposition.” 156 S.W.3d at 557 .

2018Acts constituting an exercise of judicial discretion and, therefore, prohibited have been announced in the following instances: changing the venue of the case; drawing the venire; approving an appeal bond; and such other acts in civil cases . . .. 4 Koll, 157 S.W.2d at 379–80 (citations omitted).

2015Thus, the warrantless blood Woodberry v. State, 856 S.W.2d 453 , draw under section 724.012(b)(1) in this case viol- 458–59 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1993, no pet.) ated the Fourth Amendment and must be sup- . pressed in the absence of any exception to the war- rant requirement.

2015As he forthrightly acknowledges, Champion does not dispute that he was properly served with process and a copy of Estlow’s petition, yet failed to file any responsive pleading. 9 Without more, there is no venue error that is apparent on the face of the record, nor any basis for permitting him to raise such error now, and Champion is not entitled to relief. 1 .See, e.g., Alexander v. Lynda's Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845 , 848 n. 9 (Tex.2004) (citing Tex.R.App.

2015Given rela-tors’ burden to provide this court with a record establishing that the respondent abused his discretion in granting a new trial based on the factual-insufficiency issue and given the absence of any rule analogous to Rule 34.6(c), relators must provide this court with a mandamus record of all of the trial evidence before this court may determine whether the respondent abused his discretion in concluding that the trial evidence is factually insufficient. 4 See In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d at 758 ; Maritime Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 406-07 ; In re Wyatt Field

2015Given rela-tors’ burden to provide this court with a record establishing that the respondent abused his discretion in granting a new trial based on the factual-insufficiency issue and given the absence of any rule analogous to Rule 34.6(c), relators must provide this court with a mandamus record of all of the trial evidence before this court may determine whether the respondent abused his discretion in concluding that the trial evidence is factually insufficient. 4 See In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d at 758 ; Maritime Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 406-07 ; In re Wyatt Field

2014Id.

2014Id.

2012Although In-fante objected that LeJeune did not have any personal knowledge of the radio’s serial number, “[r]ule 803(6) does not require that the person authenticating the record be either the creator of the record or to have personal knowledge of the information recorded therein.” Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 777 -78 (quoting Canseco v. State, 199 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. refd)).

2010Williams v. Henderson , (Tex.) 580 S.W.2d 37 ; see also Carruth Mort.

2007App. P. 47.1. 42: Jackson v. Van Winkle , 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss , 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. 2003); Marvelli v. Alston , 100 S.W.3d 460, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). 43: Downer v. Aquamarine Operators , Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied , 476 U.S. 1159 (1986). 44: Id . 45: Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002). 46: Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins.

2007App. P. 47.1. 42: Jackson v. Van Winkle , 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss , 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. 2003); Marvelli v. Alston , 100 S.W.3d 460, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). 43: Downer v. Aquamarine Operators , Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied , 476 U.S. 1159 (1986). 44: Id . 45: Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002). 46: Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins.

1995Id.

1985Having thus considered (1) the legislative purpose of former art. 10a and present art. 1.13, i.e., to afford the defendant a primary right of waiver of jury trial, (2) the fact of the State’s consent apart from the omitted signed waiver, and (3) the absence of any claim of harm, a seven-member majority of the court held, with one concurrence and one dissent, that in the absence of a showing of harm a valid conviction may not be set aside by habeas corpus or collateral attack merely because the State failed to sign the consent to jury waiver ... where the evidence does show that the State did i

1985In contrast to Ex parte Collier, the panel decision in Lawrence, 626 S.W.2d 56 reversed and remanded upon a comparable fact situation, interpreting Collier’s reasoning as limited to collateral attack contentions and inapplicable to direct appeals.

1983Texas Processed Plastics, 592 S.W.2d at 416 .